Module 7: Transnational Terrorism

What is terrorism? Who is a terrorist? What is transnational terrorism? These are questions that have no definitive answer. Yet terrorism is an everyday reality for many, with indiscriminate violence an ever-present danger. Due to the increasing transnational character of terrorism, it has become a psychological fear for many more who live in places considered relatively equitable and peaceful like Ottawa or Stockholm.

This transnational scope has made contemporary terrorism a core global issue. As a concept, terrorism was introduced into western discourse by the Reign of Terror during the French Revolution. The ruling government consciously chose to use terror as the means to achieve the ends of the revolution. Contemporary terrorism on the other hand is most often perceived as the use of violence by non-state actors to achieve ideological or political ends.

The actors in these two examples are different but they both see the ends as justifying the means. Contemporary means are the use of violence, often indiscriminate and against non-combatants. Contemporary ends are often ideological or political. Examples of such ends include the ideological goals of white supremacy or the political goal of national liberation movements in Ireland or Algeria. Since the 1980s, and specifically the attacks against American military installations in the Middle East, religion has often been cited as a motivation for terrorism. However, this is contested by the question: does religion motivate terrorism or is it used to legitimate terrorism and recruit terrorists? On one side, there is the argument that groups like ISIS are seeking religious ends, such as hastening the apocalypse. On the other side, there is the argument that groups such as ISIS, as well as al Qaeda or the Taliban, are actually seeking political ends such as establishing a theocracy or opposing perceived Western imperialism. Regardless of whether the most recent acts of terror are motivated by or legitimated by religion, it has increasingly become transnational. Terrorist groups are no longer contained by state borders. Their support base is increasingly global as is their recruitment strategies. Terrorist attacks are increasingly carried out at the global level, for global audiences, and often with global goals. In order to make sense of contemporary transnational terrorism, we will first look at Rapoport’s waves of terrorism argument. This is a useful exercise as Rapoport breaks modern terrorism into its different forms. We will then look at contemporary terrorist activity, specifically focusing on its transnational character. Importantly, we will look at how the processes of globalization have facilitated this. Finally, we will look at the opportunities and challenges of combatting transnational terrorism.

The events of 9/11 brought the reality of transnational terrorism to the forefront of the American consciousness. This has had significant consequences as seen in the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and subsequent instability that has led to the rise of groups like ISIS.

However, terrorism as a concept has a long and chequered history. Terrorism entered the discourse of Western politics with the Reign of Terror in revolutionary France circa 1793-1794. During this period, over 200,000 citizens were detained, many of whom perished awaiting trial, and approximately 17,000 death sentences were handed down.

Robespierre, a leading figure in both the Jacobin Club and the First Republic of France, argued:

If the basis of popular government in peacetime is virtue, the basis of popular government during a revolution is both virtue and terror; virtue, without which terror is baneful; terror, without which virtue is powerless. Terror is nothing more than speedy, severe and inflexible justice; it is thus an emanation of virtue; it is less a principle in itself, than a consequence of the general principle of democracy, applied to the most pressing needs of the patrie.

In other words, Robespierre was arguing Le Terreur was carried out by the state in order to defend the revolution from those who threatened it. This made it a necessity and, in attaining the goals of the revolution, a virtue. However, the contemporary concept of terrorism is usually identified as a form of asymmetrical conflict, where smaller non-state actors strike larger more capable state adversaries, often through soft targets. Soft targets are vulnerable and largely undefended sites, often where a large number of civilians congregate. Striking such targets promotes fear in the population: fear that it could be your subway car or bike path or shopping mall that could be the next target. The goal of such attacks is to generate such fear in the body politic and to put pressure on government to change policy.

Rapoport (2004) identifies four waves of terrorism. To this a fifth wave has been suggested by a variety of scholars. Looking at these waves is instructive, as it differentiates between the form and function of modern terrorism. Rapoport identifies two necessary conditions for each wave of terrorism. First, there needs to be extreme discontent with the current social order. Second, an event, or trigger, that provides inspiration by demonstrating the possibility of challenging the social order. The first wave of terrorism was pursued by the Anarchist movement circa the 1880s through the 1920s. Anarchists sought to abolish organized government and replace it with a cooperative social structure. It emerged from the discontent of the industrial working classes. The most extreme anarchists used bombings and political assassinations to pursue their goals, including: the 1893 bombing of the Liceu Opera House in Barcelona by anarchist Santiago Salvador; the 1894 assassination of French President Marie François Sadi Carnot by the Italian anarchist Sante Geronimo Caserio;  the 1894 bombing of the Greenwich Observatory by French anarchist Martial Bourdin; and the 1901 assassination of American President William McKinley by American anarchist and former steel worker Leon Czolgosz. However, the trigger for anarchist terrorism was events in Russia that began in 1878 with an attack on the Russian Police Commander by Vera Zasulich and culminated in the 1881 assassination of Tsar Alexander II by members of the ‘People’s Will’. This was not the first attempt on the Tsar who had been targeted due to the perception that he his reform agenda was too slow or inadequate. The Tsar had promised broad reform to Russian society, including the emancipation of Russian serfs, more socially equitable conscription laws, reform of the judicial system, and a degree of devolution to local governments.

The Russian case acted as a trigger because it demonstrated the possibility of success in the immediate goal of assassination albeit it less successful in the long term goal of social change. An important facilitator of anarchist terrorism was the emergence of international telecommunication technology, which was used to spread the ideas and successes of Russian anarchists throughout Europe. A significant consequence of anarchist terrorism was the disproportionate response of world governments who saw an international conspiracy that did not really exist. This led to a debate on security versus civil freedoms liberties, tighter control of borders, and greater international cooperation on policing, including the creation of what today is called Interpol in 1914. Some of this might sound familiar if we contrast it with Bill C51 in Canada, the Patriot Act/Homeland Security Act in the US, or the Anti-terrorism, Crime, and Security Act in the UK.

Second wave terrorism was anti-colonial in nature and often took the form of national liberation movements. At the end of the First World War, many European colonies felt there was a window of opportunity for national independence as the empires of the central powers were dismantled. This triggered agitation against colonial powers. However, such hopes were for naught as control of the colonies was transferred through the League of Nations mandate system.

There was some agitation and violence in the interwar years, notably by the Irish Republican Army but the full onset of second wave terrorism wouldn’t occur until after the Second World War. These anti-colonial terrorists framed themselves as freedom fighters, using the means at their disposal to seek their independence in places like Ireland, Cyprus, and Algeria.

Important developments in this second wave included the importance of diasporas for raising money and awareness, the role of the Great Powers in providing support and enabling proxy wars, and the utilization of guerilla tactics which targeted institutions of colonial power. Importantly, the anti-colonial nature of these movements provided a degree of legitimacy to the concept of terrorism. By adopting the concept of freedom fighters, these organizations and movements tapped into the narrative of people seeking freedom from tyranny.

Third wave terrorism was composed of new left wing movements that rose in reaction to perceptions of American warmongering, especially in the Vietnam War. The Viet Cong’s ability to resist first the French and later the United States was an important trigger event.

This spawned other groups like the American Weather Underground, the Italian Red Brigades, the Baader-Meinhof Group, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Of particular importance was the PLO and the ongoing conflict with Israel which was seen as being supported by the Americans.

The Soviet Union played an important role in facilitating these movements and anti-Americanism more generally. These left wing movements consciously utilized communication technology, measuring important victories through television airtime. Airplane hijackings, kidnappings and hostage taking were common as they had strong multimedia appeal. A spectacular example of this was the kidnapping and subsequent conversion of the media heiress Patty Hearst by the Symbionese Liberation Army. These terrorist organizations also began to communicate with each other and at times offer support to each other, most notably the PLO which provided training facilities to other groups. Of particular importance in third wave terrorism was both the increased use of communications technology, the turn towards transnational association and the strong anti-Americanism as a motivational force.

Fourth wave terrorism was constituted by a turn to religion, with the trigger being the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Pre-revolutionary Iran had very close ties to the United States under the leadership of Mohammed Reza Shah and both he and the Iran he envisioned represented a model of westernization in the region. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a Shia Muslim religious leader who had been exiled under the Shah, led the revolution and subsequently set Iran up as a theocracy.

Much like the Viet Cong had done earlier, the Iranian Revolution demonstrated the ability to push back against foreign, and particularly American, regional intervention but this time in the name of religion. This anti-Americanism was made abundantly clear by the storming of the American Embassy in Tehran resulting in 52 Americans being held hostage for 444 days. It was reinforced in 1983 with the suspected attacks by the Iranian funded Hezbollah in Beirut: the American Embassy in Beirut on April 18^th killing 63 people, including 17 Americans and the American Marine compound in Beirut Lebanon on October 23^rd killing 241 Americans and 58 French peacekeepers.

In the middle east, America had become the symbol of political repression and cultural impurity. While Rapoport focused almost exclusively on Islam, other scholars have noted the resurgence of religion as a driving force of discontent more broadly. Through the 1980s and 90s, religious terrorism would strike in Japan with Aum Shinrikyo’s nerve gas attack, the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin, the Hebron Mosque massacre, the use of violence by the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, the horrific actions of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Central Africa, Boko Haram in West Africa, and the rise of right wing extremism in the US. All of whom claim religious motivations and use religion to legitimate their terrorist acts.

There is some debate whether the rise of groups like al Qaeda and especially ISIS constitute fifth wave terrorism, defined as truly global terrorism.

Others argue against this, considering these groups simply a progression of the fourth wave. However, there are some distinct features of contemporary global terrorism that set it apart. The most global form of contemporary terrorism is what has been dubbed ‘global jihad’ or global Islamic terrorism. It arose in reaction to the perceived oppression of Muslims around the world, especially the conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians, unifying the narrative into an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ conflict. This perception of oppression is facilitated by the very extension and intensification of globalization discussed in previous models. The growth of technological and economic interconnection. The spread of western political institutions. The dominant position and exportation of western cultural product. These different facets of globalization are perceived as an attack on the societal and spiritual purity of Islam. The governments of Islamic states are highly suspect to religious fundamentalists who see the adoption of western political practices and participation in western institutions as an affront to spiritual purity. These are seen as secular and western and must be opposed both in their own country and in the western states/institutions that support them via jihad. Jihad, as understood by most Islamic scholars, means struggle or resistance but primarily refers to the personal struggle for spiritual purity. However, it can also be used by extremists as a means to make a claim of ‘just war’ against non-believers. This ‘other’ that is defined as non-believer includes those Muslims who are followers of the opposite Shia/Shi’ite branch or even members of their own branch if declared takfir or excommunicated for not following their fundamentalist version of Islam. This sharp ‘us’ versus ‘them’ narrative combined with holy war enables recruitment of dedicated fighters as well as suicide bombers who are willing to sacrifice their lives in the name of jihad. Counter intuitively, this fight against the west has been facilitated by the western structures and processes of globalization, the topic of the next section.

One of the most distinguishing elements of contemporary Islamic terrorism is the degree to which it is connected to globalization.

This can be seen in three distinct areas: messaging, mobility, and coordination. In terms of messaging, traditionally the state has been able to exercise a strong degree of control over the flow of information to the public. They controlled the public broadcasters. They regulated the airways. They could exclude voices that they found objectionable. They were able to demonize the ‘other’ and make their case directly to the people. However, the explosion of communication technology has weakened this state control. More people in more places have more access to the internet which is largely unregulated. The internet provides everyone with the ability to communicate their ideas, to organize across the globe around these ideas, and to possibly act on them.

Terrorist organizations realize this as well, using new communication media to broadcast their messages, organize around them, and facilitate the use of violence to achieve their ends. Terrorist organizations do so in two primary ways. First, a digital presence allows terrorist organizations to delocalize, creating a digital existence that cannot be attacked with a predator drone or hunted down by a special forces team. This allows these organizations to maintain a sense of continuity even as the leadership might be forced to change or the group may be forced to relocate. They are able to morph and adapt as necessary. The second and perhaps a more transformational impact of new communication technology is the ability to expand the reach of their propaganda. Transnational terrorist organizations have websites with slick video productions and serious money invested in post production. These video messages and websites often go viral, reaching exponentially more people. The global media companies become complicit in the process by reporting on these stories once they go viral. While many people may be disgusted by an ISIS video of beheading in the name of their perverted vision of Islam, for some it will resonate with their sense of persecution. It may encourage some to contribute to the cause financially, to join the cause personally, or to act in the name of the cause where they live. No group has been better at this than ISIS. Two of their media campaigns are instructive. The first example connects joining ISIS to playing the video game ‘call of duty’ but only better because when they ‘die’ they ‘respawn’ in Jannah or the Islamic conception of paradise. The second plays off the term YOLO, ‘You Only Live Once’, by stating ‘YODO’ or ‘You Only Die Once’. The idea is that you only have one life to commit to the cause, so choose your martyrdom carefully. Such propaganda facilitates self-activating terrorists and ‘lone wolf’ attacks which are incredibly hard to detect in advance and are greatly feared by security agencies.

In terms of mobility, the expansion and intensification of global transport technology and networks have not only facilitated the ease of trade and commerce, it has also allowed terrorist organizations to move people, weapons, and illicit goods around the world. Consider the fact that 3.6 billion people flew in 2016, 1.11 billion of them internationally, and that there was more than 34.5 million tonnes of air freight.

While security has been considerably increased for passenger flights, airplane hijacking was the means by which the 9/11 attackers took down the twin towers in New York and tried to take out the pentagon. However, analysts are currently more focused on container shipping. Comparatively, the amount of goods shipped by container ships far outweighs that of air freight, and is much more difficult to control. In 2015, Shanghai alone processed nearly 36.5 million containers, Los Angeles over 8 million and Vancouver 3 million.

This level of economic integration makes meaningful security checks extremely difficult, leaving cracks in the borders of the west that terrorist organizations are able to exploit. Moreover, as seen in module three and four, this economic globalization has been facilitated by political globalization which has made state borders more porous in order to expedite the flow of goods and capital around the world. The most extreme example of this is the European Union, where the border controls in the Schengen area have been removed entirely allowing the free movement of people, goods, and finance.

But is also has allowed the movement of terrorists, guns, and illicit funds. In particular, Western security analysts fear the potential for a terrorist organization like ISIS or al Qaeda to slip a weapon of mass destruction to Europe or the continental US through one of these cracks in state borders.

Connecting both messaging and mobility is how globalization facilitates coordination of terrorist groups and activities. Cheap and readily accessible cell phones, computers, internet access, and software encryption have been readily adopted by terrorist organizations. It enhances the security of networks, especially virtual networks where it is possible to create digital spaces that require permission to gain entry. In these private digital spaces, it is possible to share propaganda, resources, knowledge and tactics.

As policing of such networks has increased, these terrorist groups have adapted, combining high tech infrastructure with low tech techniques. One method is to use ‘dead letters’, the saving of draft messages in shared email accounts without actually sending anything. Such communication cannot be intercepted because it is never sent. More importantly, this technology has allowed terrorist organizations to coordinate more efficiently. Take for example the ability to coordinate simultaneous attacks against American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 or the 2004 commuter train attack in Madrid, or the 2005 tube/bus attack in London.

The ability to communicate globally allows such mission coordination but it also allows a decentralised network to operate. This was demonstrated by the ability of al Qaeda to continue to operate after losing the protection of the Taliban in 2001. Instead of having a fixed physical location that is vulnerable to counter-terrorist operations, transnational terrorist organizations are increasingly decentralized. Important features of these decentralized networks are the formation of individual cells and the digital network they are plugged into. Individuals who are either self-activated or directed by the central hierarchy, recruit membership forming quasi independent cells with little meaningful intelligence on the central coordinating body. However, coordination between these cells are maintained via the digital network which can adapt or cut off membership if compromised without endangering the central body. This has necessitated the need for counter-terrorism to adapt accordingly.

On the face of it, counter terrorism is simple: prevent immediate threats, destroy terrorists abroad, prevent radicalization at home, and support stable democratic states abroad to deny them bases from which to organize. However, in practice this is not so simple. The prevention of immediate threats has been complicated by the decentralized cell structure and digital networks that are more difficult to penetrate. The use of draconian legislation that restricts civil liberties in the name of security tend to lose efficacy over time and may actually increase radicalization by individuals and groups who believe they are being unfairly targeted. The same logic applies to the overt surveillance or infiltration of suspect groups. These efforts may counter intuitively result in the self-activated terrorist or ‘lone wolf’ terrorist, the most difficult to identify and prevent from carrying out an attack. Destroying the terrorists abroad is also devilishly difficult and extremely expensive as the US can attest with its 2001-2014 war in Afghanistan which cost an estimated 4 to 6 trillion dollars. The fact that there is a 2 trillion-dollar estimate gap is in and of itself telling.

The use of remote technology such as predator or reaper drones is also problematic. While avoiding the risk to military personnel and achieving significant cost savings, the use of drones in Pakistan and Yemen has been likened to state terrorism. For those on the receiving end of a drone strike, the day is peaceful and then the air is full of bombs. Such faceless violence does little to win hearts and minds and may again increase terrorist recruitment.

This tit-for-tat is the basis for the Global War on Terrorism which cannot be won. How do you beat an idea? But it does give the state a powerful rationale for the curtailing of liberties and the extraordinary consolidation of powers. Preventing radicalization at home presents a new set of problems. There is blatant state hypocrisy when minority groups are targeted for surveillance/infiltration and then asked to cooperate with authorities to stop future terrorist attacks; there is an implied blame involved in this interaction. This wariness extends to the general population, who treat identified visible minorities as suspect, only increasing alienation and perceptions of persecution which are key motivators for radicalization. Supporting stable and democratic states abroad is notoriously difficult. Besides the full scale occupation of Germany and Japan at the end of the Second World War, there has been little success in nation building with Iraq being the most recent example of a troubled process and outcome. Moreover, it requires a significant financial and time commitment if there is going to be a self-sustaining stable state in place when the occupiers leave. Without full occupation, it is possible to support states in maintaining stability and order but this often entails supporting states with questionable legitimacy and at times outright authoritarian tendencies. Such authoritarian states are viewed by domestic opponents of being puppets of the West which in term breeds resentment against not only the local state in question but also against the west more broadly. In sum, combatting terrorism is difficult. However, not combating terrorism is potentially catastrophic as was seen with the al Qaeda attack on the twin towers. A tricky balance needs to be found between stopping terrorist attacks without creating more resentment and alienation that produce a receptive audience for the recruitment and radicalization of a new generation of terrorists at home and abroad.

Since 9/11 terrorism has become a core concern for Western states. That is not to say terrorism is new or that it has not been a concern in many other places for much longer. As we have seen the idea of terrorism as a means to achieve political and ideological ends entered western discourse with the French Revolution. But the current form of Islamic transnational terrorism is seemingly different than those that came before it. It is less localized and carries out attacks globally. While abhorring the ramifications of globalization on traditional society, it uses the process of globalization to organize itself. This is evident in the new digital spaces created, the recruitment of members both at home and abroad, the propaganda used to raise finances, and how the requisite people, material, and funds are moved around the world to carry out its attacks. Combatting this form of terrorism is difficult with too coercive a path leading to the new generations of terrorist organizations and too passive a path leading to larger and/or more frequent attacks. There is no clear path ahead but rather it is a process that requires critical thought and the ability to adjust the course when needed. Unfortunately, this has not been the traditional strength of the state.

Fifth wave terrorism is argued to be the current wave of global terrorism, often with a radical quest of purity (whether tribal, racial, ecological, etc.), and a hybridization between terrorist groups and transnational organized crime groups. However, the dominant form of the fifth wave is transnational Islamic terrorism. It is differentiated from past forms of terrorism both by its use and co-option of the process of globalization and by the degree of its transnational nature

‘Lone wolf’ attacks are perpetrated by actors who prepare and commit violent acts alone, outside of any command structure and without material assistance from any group. They are significant as they are an increasing part of fifth wave terrorist tactics. They are self-activated via the propaganda of groups like ISIS or al Qaeda, who then claim credit for their deeds once carried out. They are extremely hard to predict and to prevent.

Terrorism entered the discourse of Western politics with the Reign of Terror in revolutionary France circa 1793-1794. During this period, over 200,000 citizens were detained, many of whom perished awaiting trial, and approximately 17,000 death sentences were handed down. Robespierre argued terrorism was carried out by the state in order to defend the revolution from those who threatened it. This made it a necessity and, in attaining the goals of the revolution, a virtue. It is connected to contemporary terrorism by its logic of the ends justifying the means.

The acronym YODO stands for You Only Die Once. It is a play of the phrase YOLO, You Only Live Once. YOLO is meant to inspire people to make the most of life, enjoy it to the fullest. YODO is meant to glamourize martyrdom and make suicide bombing seem more meaningful. It is indicative of the slick marketing of fifth wave terrorist groups like ISIS who utilize new communication media to reach out for funding and new membership.

The 1979 Iranian Revolution triggered fourth wave terrorism constituted by a turn to religion. Pre-revolutionary Iran had very close ties to the United States under the leadership of Mohammed Reza Shah and both he and the Iran he envisioned represented a model of westernization in the region. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a Shia Muslim religious leader who had been exiled under the Shah, led the revolution and subsequently set Iran up as a theocracy. Much like the Viet Cong had done earlier, the Iranian Revolution demonstrated the ability to push back against foreign, and particularly American, regional intervention but this time in the name of religion.