Module 9: Who Deserves What?

In our last module, we discussed a Rawlsian defence of affirmative action policies. It was argued that such policies can be considered just even if they are unequal. For Rawls, the key question is whether or not the system is just. Within a just system, individuals are free and entitled to compete for the rewards on offer. But according to Rawls, no one can make a claim on the conditions of justice based on their own attributes. From a Rawlsian perspective, the inclusion of affirmative action policies in the university admissions process is just if the system is intended to promote diversity or to provide a check on historical discrimination. Inherent in this argument is a separation between questions of fairness and arguments of moral desert. Aristotle takes a fundamentally different approach to justice. For Aristotle, questions of justice are inherently questions about who deserves what, questions of rewarding virtue or just deserts. He argues that in order to make an argument about who deserves what, it is necessary to understand the purpose of the social practice in question, and the virtues it honors. If we look at affirmative action through an Aristotelian lens, we start with the question: what is the purpose of a university? According to Aristotle, part of understanding the purpose of a social institution can be found by identifying what virtues it honours. Yet, this also identifies a problem – how are contested understandings of a social institution’s purpose and the virtues that it honours to be adjudicated? Aristotle argues this is the role of politics. For Aristotle, the purpose of politics is to cultivate the virtue of citizens, to allow them to develop their human capacities. These capabilities include the ability to deliberate about the common good, and to deliberate on the purpose of social institutions like the university. This conception of justice is deeply informed by the dominant norms and traditions of the polis. A position that people like Rawls would argue is at odds with individual freedom and justice. In the end, for Aristotle, when we are debating questions of justice, we are really debating question of honour, virtue, and what is the good life. In order to investigate the Aristotelian conception of justice, this module will first look at the definition of telos and its connection to questions of honour. Next, we will look at Aristotle’s view on politics and its role in deliberating on questions of purpose in social institutions. Finally, we will critically assess the Aristotelian conception of justice.

An Aristotelian understanding of justice requires understanding both the meaning and interconnectedness of two key ideas: telos and honor. Like all translations, terms can have variations in meaning. Telos can mean ‘the purpose of something’, ‘the goal of something’, or the ‘the essential nature of something’. Aristotle seems to lean towards this last definition. He argues that everything has an inherent purpose, a reason for being the way it is – a telos. This is true for things created both by human beings and nature, including plants, animals, humans, and social institutions. The easiest way to understand what Aristotle meant when he states something has telos or purpose, is to look at a simple object. Take a clock for example. The inherent purpose, or telos, of a clock is to tell time. There are many other characteristics you may identify when describing specific clocks, including size, ornateness, and extra features the clock may be able to accomplish. Big Ben for example is very different than a wrist watch. But an accurate description of a clock will include a judgement on its ability to accurately tell time. That is the reason a clock is made – that is its purpose or its telos. Aristotle argues that if you describe a clock without making reference to its ability to tell time, you have missed the point. You have not truly described a clock and therefore you have not truly understood what a clock is, and what a clock is intended to do.

Again, Aristotle argues everything has a telos. To fully describe and understand an apple seed, you would need to recognize its role in becoming an apple tree. That the purpose of an apple seed is to take root and grow an apple tree. In its full maturity, an apple tree will grow tall, produce fruit, and provide shade.

To fully describe and understand a cheetah, you would need to recognize its ability to run really fast: in its full maturity, a cheetah may be able to reach speeds upwards of 120 km/h. It also has other features you may note. It is feline, spotted, graceful, et cetera. But if you fail to note its speed, you have not fully described a cheetah, you have not fully understood it, you have missed its inherent purpose.

As a side note, the telos of animals has become a source of vibrant debate in the study of animal welfare and animal husbandry, especially around the issue of biotechnology and transgenesis. According to Aristotle, like the clock, the apple seed, and the cheetah, humans also have a telos. In its fully realised self, what is the purpose or telos of a human being? Beyond maturing, having good health, and being able to reproduce, Aristotle argues the telos of human beings is eudemonia. Eudemonia can mean ‘happiness’, ‘right action leading to well-being’, or ‘human flourishing’. For Aristotle, eudemonia refers to productive self-actualization of our potential for excellence. Eudemonia is still used today as a metric of well-being.

In its full maturity, human beings are capable of being virtuous, of being able to choose the right thing to do in the right context. These are not hard and fast rules nor some form of societal contract. This is the cultivation of the person, of their telos. The telos of the person is cultivated by exercising to the utmost their human capabilities, foremost of which for Aristotle is the capacity for speech and reason. The capacity of speech and reason facilitates our ability to discover through discourse what is right and wrong, what is just and unjust. Since these are not hard and fast rules, these questions are answered in an iterative fashion, responding to changing context. However, it is difficult for people to achieve their telos, achieve eudemonia, achieve their full potential for excellence. Aristotle argues this is only possible in a well-constructed community which nurtures virtuous human beings through education and through laws. We will speak more of this in the next section when discussing the role Aristotle prescribes to politics in adjudicating contested questions of purpose, like that which emerged when discussing affirmative action policies in universities.

When asking whether affirmative action admissions policies are just, we need to first discuss the telos of the university. In its full maturity, what is the purpose of the university? To debate the telos of a social institution, includes a discussion of what it honours. How is excellence measured? What are the virtues that are bestowed for excellence? As we saw in the last module, the purpose of the university is contested. Some will argue that the purpose of the university is to promote scholarly excellence. Some will argue that the purpose of the university is to serve a civic role, to promote diversity, to create diverse leadership, and to foster innovative solutions to contemporary social problems. Part of this debate is a discussion of honour. If the university honours academic excellence alone, then the telos of the university in its fully mature form is to cultivate the absolutely brightest minds. Therefore, affirmative action can only be deemed just if such policies are used to correct for bias or individual circumstances, the first justification we covered in module 8. In other words, from an Aristotelian conception of justice, affirmative action is just if it results in finding the best and the brightest students. If the university honours civic ideals, then the telos of the university in its fully mature form is to address discrimination, to improve representation, and to cultivate a future leadership that represents the community it will lead. Affirmative action policies with such a mandate in mind would be wholly compatible with an Aristotelian conception of justice. That is not to say that the telos of a social institution does not change. In 1907, the University Act provided the legal basis for establishing the University of Saskatchewan. The mission of the UofS was established as “providing facilities for higher education in all its branches and enabling all persons without regard to race, creed or religion to take the fullest advantage”. The current mission statement says,

[The] University of Saskatchewan advances the aspirations of the people of the province and beyond through interdisciplinary and collaborative approaches to discovering, teaching, sharing, integrating, preserving, and applying knowledge, including the creative arts, to build a rich cultural community. An innovative, accessible, and welcoming place for students, educators, and researchers from around the world, we serve the public good by connecting discovery, teaching, and outreach, by promoting diversity and meaningful change, and by preparing students for enriching careers and fulfilling lives as engaged global citizens.

The telos of the university in 1907 was to provide a comprehensive university for the whole province. The first University President, Walter Murray, argued the University was a servant of the people of the province, tasked with solving social problems particular to Saskatchewan including “agriculture, industries, commerce, government, and social life.” The contemporary telos of the university still embraces the goals of diversity and service, but its scope is much wider. The purpose of the contemporary U of S is to foster relevant research both here and abroad, to attract the best and brightest students both here and abroad, and to prepare global citizens of all its students.

This highlights the possibility that the telos of a social institution can change. Combine this with the argument that the telos of social institutions can be contested and the process of determining the telos of a social institution becomes critical. For Aristotle, the debate over the telos of a social institution is the purpose of politics – but to understand that position we need to look at Aristotle’s view of politics, the subject of the next section.

Aristotle argues the study of politics is a practical science concerned with promoting the common good via the formation of virtuous human beings. This is quite distinct from previous modules. So far in this class, we have largely privileged individual freedom as a necessary condition for justice. This conception has very little to do with the virtuous individual, and consciously divorces individuals from questions of just desert. Aristotle, on the other hand, disagrees. He argues questions of justice are deeply connected to questions of just desert. From this perspective, justice can only be achieved with just, or virtuous, people. A virtuous person will know what to do, when to do it, to what degree to do it, and they will choose to do it for no other reason than it is the right thing to do. However, virtuous human beings are only possible when they are able to fulfill their telos. And for Aristotle, human beings can only fulfill their telos, can only become virtuous, through political association. This is why Aristotle spent so much time investigating the form and function of constitutions.

Two of the characteristics that define a fully realized human being are the capabilities of language and reason. Aristotle posits that it is only within political association that human beings fully apply these capabilities. With language and reason human beings are able to debate what is good from bad, right from wrong, and just from unjust. More than just debate, this is a process of defining the good life.

Aristotle argues that through such discourse we cultivate our virtues. The key word here is ‘cultivate’, since he argues moral virtue can only be truly attained through learning and through habit. Much like playing an instrument, where you can only cultivate the knowledge and skill to play well through practice and emulation. Have you ever heard someone trying to learn the bagpipes? If not check out this video of Ross from the sitcom Friends trying to play.

If you want to hear what any aspiring piper should seek to emulate, check out this video of the Edinburgh Military Tattoo.

As with piping, so goes moral virtue according to Aristotle: “we become just by doing just acts…” and by emulating virtuous agents. However, if we want to learn by doing, we need to be guided in the cultivation of such habits and this brings us back to the practical science of politics. Aristotle posits the primary purpose of laws and constitutions is to “make good citizens by forming habits in them…”. In this way, constitutions and laws are to people what water, soil, and air are to the apple seed.  They are both the means by which each respectively facilitates the full attainment of their telos or purpose. However, habit is but the first step of a moral education. Through habit, it is possible one may acquire the disposition towards acting virtuously; one may automatically begin to react in virtuous ways to given situations. It is possible that this disposition towards acting virtuously may become the ability to know what to do and when to do it, even in new contexts. This is the virtuous human being, and the human being most worthy of honours and political office. Thus, for Aristotle, the purpose of politics is much more substantive than maximizing utility. It is much more substantive than creating a framework within which free individuals can compete for their share of entitlements. For Aristotle, politics is the means by which we actualize ourselves. It is the means by which we define and seek to achieve the good life.

Turning back to our discussion of social institutions and affirmative action policies in universities, politics is the means by which we address such questions. When the purpose or telos of a social institution is contested, virtuous people can engage in deliberation to solve their dispute. They can also engage in deliberations as to whether the purpose of social institutions is changing. Such debate neither reifies social institutions based on their founding mission, nor allows its purpose to be dictated by wildly shifting opinions. The purpose or telos of a social institution is therefore both embedded in tradition and open to debate. It is not fixed once and for all. The example of the United States is instructive. Affirmative action policies are rooted in the Civil Rights Movement and in particular the Civil Rights Act of 1964. They are rooted in questions of race, historical discrimination, and structural violence. However, through shifting opinion in the general population and more specifically the judgements rendered by the Supreme Court, the purpose of affirmative action policies has changed. The telos is now about the common good, civic purpose, and achieving diversity. This is one of the strengths of the Aristotelian virtue ethics. That what is good and just is not a fixed point. That it is a matter of deliberation and can both reflect traditional values and changing norms in society.

The Aristotelean approach to justice is very different than any other we have dealt with so far. For Aristotle, questions of justice are intimately linked to the telos of the structure, process, or social institution in question. That to talk about questions of justice, it is unavoidable to talk about the nature of the good life. Defining the nature of the good life is therefore inextricably tied to particular communities. There are four strong arguments in support of this position. The first strength of Aristotle’s theory of justice is its ability to capture a wide range of social institutions. There are no artificial or predisposed narratives of what defines justice. It doesn’t use a simplified rule like hedonic calculus or the categorical imperative. It takes the complex world as it is. It allows an investigation of what justice is based on localized conditions. This segues into the second strength of Aristotle’s theory of justice: it is focused on the values and social practices of particular communities. As such, it is much more reflective of the real world. We are not asked to undertake a thought experiment that divorces our interests from our families and communities. Rather, Aristotle suggests that virtuous human beings within particular communities can come together and use their capabilities of language and reason to deliberate on what justice entails, what defines the good life for them. This links to the third strength of Aristotle’s theory of justice: it is agent focused. Aristotle roots questions of justice in the formation of virtuous human beings. Those human beings are then able to engage in debates about justice. This empowers individuals, putting meaningful agency in hands of citizens rather than neutral state-society constructs. Finally, and perhaps the biggest advantage of Aristotle’s theory of justice, is that it allows for both continuity and change. Since questions of justice are deeply embedded in localized communities and reflect its traditions, change can often be slow and even incremental. This may at times seem burdensome, but it is less disruptive. The cultivation of virtuous human beings still allows for critical reflection through debate and deliberation. It allows the definition and application of justice to change according to changing circumstances. Justice today is different than justice 25, 50, 75, or 100 years ago.

That being said, there are four important criticisms of Aristotle’s theory of justice. The first criticism is that Aristotle’s theory of justice sounds good but is in fact of little practical use. It sounds good to say that virtuous human beings will deliberate amongst themselves to define the telos of social institutions. That such deliberation allows us to define the good life. That these deliberations are ongoing, allowing self-reflection, and change. But it doesn’t provide much guidance on what such a society would look like. If both natural and human structures have an inherent purpose, shouldn’t social institutions? A clock is judged by how well it tells times since this is its purpose, its telos. Shouldn’t we be able to discern the telos of social institutions? The second criticism is that the relationship between Aristotle’s virtuous act and virtuous person is tautological. A virtuous act is that which would be done by a virtuous person. A virtuous person is someone predisposed to doing virtuous acts. But from this, how closer are we to defining a virtuous act or a virtuous person? The third criticism of Aristotle’s theory of justice is that it is unfit for our modern society. The idea of virtuous human beings gathering together to rule and be ruled is quaint. The polis of the city-state is not the polis of the nation-state. Our political communities are too large, too diverse, and too complicated to seek an Aristotelian concept of justice. The fourth criticism is linked to the problem of large complex societies which have sizeable minorities. In such political communities, it can be argued that an Aristotelian concept of justice might just be dangerous. If the purpose of politics is to cultivate virtuous people, that presupposes a definition of what virtues particular societies privilege. This creates the risk of imposing the values of some over others, particularly the majority over minorities.

Think back to the discussion of slavery in the Sandel text and in the reading for Learning Activity #4. However, with all that being said, there is still something attractive in the notion of connecting justice and moral desert. An argument that will be revisited in the next module which will look at questions of loyalty and collective versus individual loyalty.

This module has sought to introduce and problematize Aristotle’s theory of justice. For Aristotle, questions of justice are inherently questions about who deserves what, questions of rewarding virtue or just deserts. From this perspective, if we want to understand who deserves what, we must first understand the purpose of the social practice in question, we must understand its telos. According to Aristotle, part of understanding the purpose of a social institution can be found by identifying what virtues it honours. Yet, this also identifies a problem – how are contested understandings of a social institution’s purpose and the virtues that it honours to be adjudicated? Aristotle argues this is one of the roles of politics, but indirectly. For Aristotle, the true purpose of politics is to cultivate the virtue of citizens, to allow them to develop their human capacities. These capabilities include the ability to deliberate about the common good. If the political system can produce virtuous people, they will be able to make virtuous and just laws, just constitutions, and just societies. This conception of justice is deeply informed by the dominant norms and traditions of the polis. This is a position at odds with individual freedom as well as the contemporary and dominant theories of justice. In the end, for Aristotle, when we are debating questions of justice, we are really debating question of honour, virtue, and what is the good life.

Telos can mean ‘the purpose of something’, ‘the goal of something’, or the ‘the essential nature of something’. Aristotle seems to lean towards this last definition. He argues that everything has an inherent purpose, a reason for being the way it is – a telos. This is true for things created both by human beings and nature, including plants, animals, humans, and social institutions. The telos of a clock is to tell time.  The telos of an apple seed is to grow into a tree. The telos of a cheetah is to run fast. The telos of a person is to achieve eudemonia or the self actualization of the human potential for excellence.

Eudemonia can mean ‘happiness’, ‘right action leading to well being’, or ‘human flourishing’. For Aristotle, eudemonia refers to productive self-actualization of our potential for excellence. In its full maturity, human beings are capable of being virtuous, of being able to choose the right thing to do in the right context.

For Aristotle, human beings can only fulfill their telos through political association. Two of the characteristics that define a fully realized human being are the capabilities of language and reason. Aristotle posits that it is only in political association that human beings fully apply these capabilities. With language and reason human beings are able to debate what is good from bad, right from wrong, and just from unjust. And it is through political deliberation that laws and constitutions are created. Laws and constitutions are good in so far as they contribute to making “good citizens by forming habits in them…”. In this way, constitutions and laws, and by extension politics, are to people what water, soil, and air are to the apple seed.  They are the means by which each respectively facilitates the full attainment of their telos or purpose. More than just debate, politics is therefore a process of defining the good life.

The telos of the person is cultivated by exercising to the utmost their human capabilities, foremost of which for Aristotle is the capacity for speech and reason. The capacity of speech and reason facilitates our ability to discover through discourse what is right and wrong, what is just and unjust. Since these are not hard and fast rules, these questions are answered in an iterative fashion, responding to changing context. Aristotle argues that through political discourse we are able to fully cultivate our virtues. The key word here is ‘cultivate’, since he argues moral virtue can only be truly attained through learning and through habit. Much like playing an instrument, where you can only cultivate the knowledge and skill to play well through practice and emulation.

Aristotle argues justice is both teleological and honorific. He argues questions of justice are inherently questions about who deserves what, questions of rewarding virtue or just deserts. He argues that in order to make an argument about who deserves what, it is necessary to understand the purpose of the social practice in question – its telos. Inherent in deliberations of telos are questions of honour. These are questions of what honours should be bestowed on whom and by what basis.