Anderson v Alberta (AG), 2020 ABCA 238

Posted on January 29, 2021 by thp151

Applications to admit fresh evidence allowed. The advance costs order was based on an error of law in applying the legal test to the facts regarding Beaver Lake Cree Nation’s award for funding an underlying claim. Given the resources available to the First Nation, the award was unreasonable and is set aside.

Indigenous Law Centre CaseWatch Blog

In these two appeals the Government of Canada and the Government of Alberta appeal an order requiring them each to contribute $300,000 a year to the plaintiffs to fund underlying litigation (Anderson v Alberta (AG), 2019 ABQB 746). Beaver Lake Cree Nation [“BLCN”] has about 1,200 members, and is a signatory to Treaty 6. The underlying claim is lengthy and nuanced, but the essence of the claim is that the Crown appellants have improperly allowed lands traditionally used by BLCN to be “taken up” for industrial and resource development. Declarations of rights, injunctions and damages are claimed.

The original statement of claim was issued in 2008. Since that time there have been various interlocutory steps taken in preparation for trial, such as closing the pleadings and some disclosure of documents. Questioning has not yet started but BLCN has spent approximately $3 million on legal fees to date, about one-half from its own funds, and presently pays $25,000 in fees per month ($300,000 per year). The 120 day trial is presently scheduled for January 2024.

The 2017 annual financial review by Indigenous Services Canada concluded that there are no concerns in regard to the financial health of BLCN. The case management judge did note that BLCN has operated in a surplus position in the last few years, and that its financial situation is improving. The test for advance funding was quoted at length from the leading cases (British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v Okanagan Indian Band, 2003 SCC 71 [“Okanagan”]; Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v Canada (Commissioner of Customs and Revenue), 2007 SCC 2, [“Little Sisters”]). It was concluded that BLCN had sufficient resources to fund the litigation, but was entitled to allocate it to other community priorities. While acknowledging the extraordinary nature of an advance costs order, the case management judge directed that each of the appellants contribute per year towards the costs of the litigation, with BLCN continuing to pay a like amount.

The test for ordering a defendant to fund public litigation against it through an advance costs order was set in Okanagan: 1) the party seeking interim costs genuinely cannot afford to pay for the litigation, and no other realistic option exists for bringing the issues to trial; 2) the claim to be adjudicated is prima facie meritorious; and 3) the issues raised transcend the individual interests of the particular litigant, are of public importance, and have not been resolved in previous cases (Okanagan; Little Sisters). In this appeal, the appellants only argue that the respondents have failed to meet the “impecuniosity” branch of the test. The test is that the applicant must be impecunious (Okanagan).

BLCN created the Beaver Lake Cree Nation Heritage Trust in 2014, after this litigation was well underway. It now argues that there are “strict restrictions” on these funds. A plaintiff cannot voluntarily tie up its assets in a trust, and then argue it is impecunious and in need of litigation funding. The limits on how much can be taken out every year were self-imposed, and could be changed. BLCN also has access to other funds, subject to a request or approval. A plaintiff cannot fail to seek access to its own assets, and then argue it is impecunious (Little Sisters). It was an error of principle to disregard these assets in the analysis.

The finding that “more than $3 million is available” demonstrates that the order should not have been granted, based on the record as it then existed. If circumstances have changed to the extent that BLCN has now become entitled to advance costs, it is incumbent on it to reapply. The presumption is still that public interest litigation must be funded by those advancing it.

R v SEL, 2020 NWTTC 03

Posted on January 28, 2021 by thp151

An Indigenous man without any previous criminal record, was charged with one count of sexual assault. The Court took into account the purpose, principles and objectives of sentencing, the circumstances of the offender, including his associated Gladue factors and case law. A sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment to be served in the community was imposed.

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SEL is a 29 year-old Indigenous man charged with one count of sexual assault. The victim JM regarded SEL as a very close friend. She had no reason to believe that by allowing him to sleep on her sofa, she was exposed to a risk of the violation of her sexual integrity. A major sexual assault is of a nature of character such that a reasonable person could foresee that it is likely to cause serious psychological or emotional harm whether or not physical injury occurs (R v Arcand, 2010 ABCA 363). SEL’s entry into JM’s bedroom, in her own home, as her very good friend, knowing she was unconscious and unresponsive, supports classifying his sexual assault on her as major. Any reasonable person could foresee the psychological harm that did ensue to JM as a result of the commission of this sexual assault in these circumstances despite there being no physical injury.

In determining the sentence, the Court considered that all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention paid to the circumstances of Indigenous offenders. The Pre-Sentencing Report details that SEL was raised in a traditional lifestyle and is close to his parents and grandparents, who all attended residential schools. SEL was exposed to significant alcohol abuse and violence as a child but reports feeling loved and supported by his parents. He is interested in bettering himself, including addressing his issues with alcohol. SEL has no criminal record, has held gainful employment in the past and has served his community as a town councillor. His Pre-Sentence Report details signs of remorse.

A period of 12 months’ imprisonment is imposed. His service of the sentence is to be done in the community rather than in prison. It would not endanger the safety of the community and would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing. This sentence may also aid the community in healing and possibly lead to a restorative justice opportunity wherein if JM chooses, she may allow SEL to personally express his remorse to her. For the duration of his 12 month sentence, he will be bound by a number of conditions pursuant to section 742.2 of the Criminal Code. Following his sentence, he will be subjected to a probation for a period of 18 months with a number of conditions as well.

R v LR, 2021 BCPC 7

Posted on January 27, 2021 by thp151

Although the sentencing judge still views a new joint submission of 180 days jail plus probation and mandatory ancillary orders as unduly lenient for an Indigenous man’s public and violent attack on his spouse at an elementary school in front of their child, it does not meet the threshold to reject the joint submission.

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L.R. is before the Court for sentencing a second time after having pleaded guilty in 2020, to three offences charged as a result of a violent altercation with his former spouse and the investigating RCMP officers. Joint submission by counsel was rejected for being unduly lenient (R v LR, 2020 BCPC 80 (CanLII)). Counsel has returned to Court with a new joint submission for a global sentence of 180 days jail plus probation and mandatory ancillary orders.

L.R. and C.L. met in highschool and cohabitated for ten years from 2008 to 2018 and are the biological parents of two children, one aged eight years old, the other three years old. L.R. came to an elementary school with his son to attend a birthday party where he encountered C.L. in the school parking lot. L.R. says C.L. showed him nude or “near nude” photographs of herself she had sent a number of friends and relatives. He became angry and began arguing with her. C.L. then picked up her son and ran to the school office and asked the receptionist to call the police. Enraged, L.R. chased after C.L. When he caught up with her in the school office, he grabbed her hair and began punching her in the head, even though at the time she was holding their child. He then threw C.L. on the floor and began kicking her in the ribs. Throughout this assault, L.R. was yelling at and threatening to kill C.L.

Eventually the staff succeeded in separating L.R. from C.L. L.R. took their son and left the school. The staff complained to the RCMP, who came to the school where they found C.L. L.R. left the school with his son and drove to his parents’ residence and asked his parents to keep his son safe. L.R. picked up a collapsible baton and a hunting knife at his residence and then drove to the house of his friend. In an attempt to locate him, the police called L.R.’s cell phone where he answered and uttered threats. The constables attended the friend’s residence where they believed L.R. might be hiding. L.R. was caught inside a smoke shack with the weapons. He continued to utter threats, then eventually held his weapons up and took a half step forward and was pepper sprayed.

While in custody, L.R. wrote apology letters to C.L., his son, and his parents. L.R. says he did not deny making threats to the officers or swinging the baton, but did not recall his interaction with the police, other than being pepper sprayed. L.R.’s present circumstances and antecedents are well documented in the presentence reports. L.R. is a member of a First Nation and was 27 years old at the time of the offence and 28 at sentencing. Until his banishment as a result of the offences, L.R. lived most of his life in the First Nation, as did most of his extended family. L.R. did work sporadically for the First Nation’s village government as a labourer, however, he was unable to sustain steady employment. Nevertheless, L.R. actively harvested fish and game to provide for his family, community and Elders.

C.L. and L.R.’s relationship was discordant. A social worker of the respective Child & Family Services Society, blames their problems on L.R.’s abusive behaviour. She depicts C.L. as the victim of the worst case of battered wife syndrome she has ever worked with. L.R. and C.L. separated permanently as a result of the school incident. After L.R. and C.L. separated, the children now live with C.L. At the hearing, the Court was not aware L.R. had issues of substance misuse. The presentence reports prepared for this continuation of the sentencing hearing tell a very different story. L.R. admitted to “selling and using cocaine” daily up to the time of his arrest.

While on remand at the Kamloops Regional Correction Centre, L.R. completed the 12-session Substance Abuse Management program and the 10-session Respectful Relationships programs. Since his release, L.R. sought and participated in individualized addictions and anger management counselling with an addiction specialist with the Terrace and District Counselling Services Society. L.R. does not speak or understand his Indigenous language nor does he participate in the spiritual or cultural activities to any significant degree. The Presentence Report and Gladue Report reference a number of support letters from Elders acknowledging L.R. as a skilled and generous hunter and fisher who provided sustenance fish and game to the community.

Although his grandparents attended residential school, L.R.’s upbringing was free of any trauma, physical or emotional abuse, neglect, abandonment, substance misuse, domestic discord or violence. L.R. grew up hunting and fishing with his father and extended family. L.R. remains close to his parents and siblings who have supported him throughout these legal proceedings. As a result of L.R.’s charges, his First Nation’s village government banished L.R. The village sent a letter to the RCMP and Terrace Crown Counsel advising that out of concern for the well-being of their citizens, the village government banished L.R. indefinitely from attending until he seeks medical or therapeutic attention for his actions and proves he is fit to return to their community.

While they are not immutable or sacrosanct, joint submissions should only be rejected in exceptional circumstances (R v Anthony-Cook, 2016 SCC 43 [“Anthony-Cook”]; R v Spencer-Wilson, 2020 BCPC 140 (CanLII)). There are exceptional circumstances in this case to justify a lesser period of incarceration than might otherwise be imposed. Still, L.R.’s assault on C.L. at the elementary school was outrageous. The sentence that counsel now propose is still not one, absent a joint submission that the Court would otherwise impose. Although the Court believes the joint submission for 180 days jail sentence is unfit, perhaps even demonstrably unfit, it is unable to conclude its acceptance would cause a reasonable person to conclude “the proper functioning of the justice system had broken down” (Anthony-Cook). L.R. has 204 days of pre-detention credit, and has served the 180 day jail sentence. He is subject to an 18 month Probation Order with terms and conditions.

R v Hall, 2021 ONSC 420

Posted on January 26, 2021 by thp151

A Mohawk man has been designated a dangerous offender and sentenced to a period of imprisonment of 8 years in addition to the 769 days he has served since his arrest, followed by a Long-Term Supervision Order for 8 years. The protection of the public was paramount but it is not required that the offender should be subject to external controls for the rest of his life, as would be the case with an indeterminate sentence.

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Edward Hall, a Mohawk man, has entered guilty pleas to the offences of aggravated assault, break and enter, choking, and failing to comply with probation. Mr. Hall is 51-year-old years old. At the time he committed the offences, he was bound by two probation orders relating to two convictions for aggravated assault.

Mr. Hall has a criminal record in both Canada and the United States. Between the two countries, he has been convicted of approximately 60 offences. His Gladue report provided a detailed history of Mr. Hall’s childhood. His mother was a registered Mohawk of Akwesasne band member and former resident. His father was half-Mohawk. Both died in 2019 while Mr. Hall was in custody. Akwesasne is a nation of Mohawk people situated along the banks of the St. Lawrence River. It straddles the border between the United States and Canada, and includes territory within the jurisdictions of New York State, Ontario, and Quebec. The Mohawks of Akwesasne have been severely impacted by policies of assimilation aimed at eradicating Indigenous cultures. The intense suffering these policies have caused have had intergenerational impacts that continue to be felt today.

The impacts of this intergenerational trauma are evident in Mr. Hall’s history, including the physical and emotional abuse he suffered as a child; his early addictions to alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine; his loss of his connection to his community; the lack of employment skills, education, and functionality; and the racism he has faced in various communities and institutions. Mr. Hall states that the trauma that he experienced as a child has stayed with him, where he has nightmares and flashbacks of abuse.

The Waseskun Healing Center [“Waseskun”] is recommended as an option for residential treatment that has a culturally focused approach. However, Mr. Hall’s prior history of community supervision is noted to have been poor in almost every instance. In addition, he breached the last probation order imposed upon him, both by committing the index offence and by engaging in smuggling to support himself.

Public protection is the general purpose of the dangerous offender provisions. The protection of the public is an enhanced sentencing objective for individuals who have been designated dangerous, even while sentencing judges retain the discretion to “look at the whole picture”. The sentencing judge must impose the least intrusive sentence required to achieve the primary purpose of the legislation (R v Boutilier, 2017 SCC 64; R v Spilman, 2018 ONCA 551). Mr. Hall’s most serious offences have occurred while he was in his 40s. This pattern, however, does not place him outside the statistical pattern in the literature that sees persons who share his characteristics significantly diminishing at least the frequency of their offending in their 50s and 60s.

Mr. Hall committed a vicious assault in the context of a planned home invasion offence while he was on two probation orders relating to two recent convictions for aggravated assault. He used a weapon and choked his victim to the point of unconsciousness. The public must be protected from conduct like this by Mr. Hall in the future. On the mitigating side, the Court considered Mr. Hall’s diminished moral blameworthiness for the offences given the impact of Gladue factors, and that he pleaded guilty to the predicate offences.

Mr. Hall is designated a dangerous offender. The custodial sentence of 8 additional years will bring Mr. Hall to the age of roughly 59.5 years. The Long-Term Supervision Order [“LTSO”] will continue until Mr. Hall is 67. The custodial portion of the sentence will provide Mr. Hall with time to take the treatment offered to him and demonstrate that he can apply any lessons he has learned to reduce his risk. Parole will be available to him if he makes sufficient progress. A lesser sentence will not adequately protect the public. The need to protect the public militates against awarding enhanced credit to Mr. Hall for his presentence custody of 769 days. Awarding enhanced credit would reduce the period of time for which Mr. Hall will be subject to outside controls. On the totality of the evidence, this is the least intrusive of the options to adequately protect the public against Mr. Hall’s future commission of murder or a serious personal injury offence.

As for the importance of treatment with a cultural component such as that offered at Waseskun, if Mr. Hall has access to treatment that incorporates Indigenous culture and values, this is for the good insofar as it may assist him with certain personal issues and in reintegrating into the community. In the event Mr. Hall makes sufficient progress with his skills-based treatment for anger management and substance abuse and reduces his risk of reoffending, he may apply to and be accepted at Waseskun. If Mr. Hall does not make progress during the custodial part of his sentence, he can expect that this opportunity will not be available to him, even while serving the LTSO, because he will be ordered to reside at a community correctional centre.

R v Simon, 2020 NWTSC 46

Posted on January 25, 2021 by thp151

An Indigenous offender convicted for a major sexual assault, has been designated a Long Term Offender and sentenced to a prison term of 6 years and 8 months, with credit for time spent on remand. The offender has considerable issues to address to overcome his substance abuse disorder and traumas from his past, and maintain a pro-social lifestyle. A jail term should afford him an opportunity to have access to the programming that he needs.

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Following a jury trial held in Inuvik, Mr. Simon was convicted for a sexual assault committed against HK. The background that led to Mr. Simon’s conviction was that he and the victim had known each other for many years. On the day of the incident, they had spent some time together on the streets of Inuvik, drinking. They went to the apartment of someone that the victim knew, looking for more alcohol. Because no one was home, they broke into the apartment and stole mickeys of vodka from the fridge. They then left the apartment ending up in a staircase where they drank the mickeys. At some point Mr. Simon started pushing the victim on the chest with his hands until she fell onto her back, where she was subsequently sexually assaulted. Mr. Simon then left the building. Eventually, the victim got dressed and went directly to the warming shelter where she called the RCMP.

Mr. Simon is now 39 years old. He is Gwich’in, which engages the special legal framework that governs the sentencing of Indigenous offenders. That framework applies to Dangerous Offender and Long Term Offender proceedings (R v Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13; R v Boutillier, 2017 SCC 64). Mr. Simon’s childhood was deeply traumatic. He does not know who his father is and lived with his mother until he was 5 years old. After that, for many years he lived mainly with his grandfather, whereupon Mr. Simon suffered very serious physical and sexual abuse at the hands of his grandfather between the ages of 5 and 18. This abuse happened when his grandfather was intoxicated. Mr. Simon witnessed violence and fights in the home on a regular basis.

When Mr. Simon was 14 years old, his mother was stabbed to death. He believes, and has for years, that his grandfather was responsible for her death. He has also suspected for years that his grandfather may in fact be his biological father. Mr. Simon began consuming alcohol at a very young age, around 5 or 7 years old, and was using alcohol regularly before he turned 12. When he was 11 years old a relative introduced him to sniffing gasoline. He began sniffing gasoline, propane and other inhalants on a regular basis. All his life, he was never cared for properly, nor had rules or structure. He went hungry and he did not have proper clothing for the seasons. Mr. Simon has an extensive criminal record which includes a wide variety of offenses ranging from relatively minor offenses to very serious ones.

Although Mr. Simon believes that the death of his grandfather sets the stage for a major change in his life, it is likely that any significant change will require intensive therapeutic intervention and ongoing support. His rehabilitation, as well as the protection of the public, require that he be subject to external controls beyond the reach of the term of imprisonment that must be imposed for his sexual assault of HK. Considering the fact that Mr. Simon has no impediment, cognitive or otherwise, to taking treatment and programming, that he is motivated and has engaged in programming in the past, it is not necessary to have him subjected to outside controls for a further 8 years after the completion of the custodial portion of his sentence.

R v Olson, 2021 BCSC 61

Posted on January 22, 2021 by thp151

An appropriate cumulative sentence of 11 and ½ years is imposed for an offender found guilty for a string of offences that are violent. Despite a tenuous connection to some Indigenous heritage, a Gladue report was ordered and considered in the sentencing process.

Indigenous Law Centre CaseWatch Blog

Mr. Olson was found guilty, following a trial, of six counts contrary to the the Criminal Code from events that took place in 2017, including assault with a weapon, contrary to s 267(a); the reckless discharge of a firearm; possession of a loaded prohibited firearm (a sawed off shotgun) without a licence; possession of a firearm while prohibited; possession of stolen property in excess of $5000; and resist or wilfully obstruct a peace officer.

A Gladue report was obtained for Mr. Olson upon the Crown learning of possible Indigenous heritage. Mr. Olson, now 41, has a very lengthy criminal record, reaching back to 2001, with 58 prior convictions. Mr. Olson had a troubled childhood and felt unfairly treated by his stepfather. He recently reconnected with his mother and learned that there could be some Indigenous heritage on his mother’s side, that is a great, great grandmother, was believed to be First Nations. According to the Gladue report, Mr. Olson has six children with different mothers, and maintains some limited contact with one of his children. The Gladue report writer, noted that the Indigenous lineage could not be independently corroborated, and focussed on corrections and community resources available to Mr. Olson arising out of this somewhat tenuous connection.

It is clear from the nature of his offences and the risk of Mr. Olson reoffending that the principles of deterrence and denunciation are paramount, along with the protection of the public. However, there is a potential for rehabilitation that must also be taken into account, including considering the principles set out in s 718.2(b), (c), (d) and (e), that is, parity of sentencing, the totality principle, and restraint in imposing terms of imprisonment.

This string of offences is long and involves violence. Although there are connections between some of the counts, the indictment has a number of offences with slight or no connections. It is difficult to determine an appropriate and fair approach. Concurrent sentences are used where appropriate, but some of the sentences must necessarily be consecutive (R v M(CA), [1996] SCR 500). A total of 11 1⁄2 years, with credit for time served, is an appropriate cumulative sentence of this series of offences, and does not offend the totality principle.

TA v Alberta (Children’s Services), 2020 ABQB 97

Posted on January 21, 2021 by thp151

The Plaintiff, a Cree woman, filed a Statement of Claim against a number of parties after her children were apprehended by Children’s Services. The Application to strike the Statement of Claim and the Application for Summary Judgement were granted.

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The Plaintiff [“TA”] is a Cree woman whose six children were apprehended pursuant to court orders under the Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act. The Claim criticized Edmonton Children’s Services’ [“CS”] handling of the apprehension of the children and sought a broad range of remedies. The Defendants pleaded that CS owed no legal duty of care to TA as the subject parent responding to CS actions and that the child protection proceedings have been handled properly and in good faith. The psychologist who assessed TA additionally asked for summary judgment on the basis that the only evidence has shown that they met their standard of care and acted in circumstances of qualified privilege.

The Defendants applied to strike the Claim as an abusive collateral attack on child protection proceedings pursuant to Rule 3.68(2)(d) and because it disclosed no cause of action. The Court relied on the rule that it is an abuse of process to attempt to relitigate a matter already decided (Dykun v Odishaw, 2000 ABQB 548). Further, the Court found that the wrongs in which TA says were done to her do not create causes of action against the Defendants, and the remedies she asks for are mostly beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. The action is doomed to fail because the mere fact that someone has done something that you do not like, treated you unfairly, or caused you emotional distress, does not automatically create a right to sue them.

The Claim was struck in its entirety, save for the defamation claim against the psychologist. The Court looked to Rule 7.3(b) which provides that a party may apply for a summary judgment where there is no defence or merit to some or part of a claim (Weir-Jones Technical Services Incorporated v Purolator Courier Ltd, 2019 ABCA 49). The plaintiff offered no factual basis to conclude the professional assessment was conducted negligently.

The Court concluded that the lawsuit is an abuse of process in the technical sense that it attempts to relitigate completed court proceedings and is based on a variety of complaints that do not give the Plaintiff a cause of action, irrespective of whether they are accurate or not. The application to strike the Claim and the application for summary judgment are granted.

R v Wood, 2021 MBQB 4

Posted on January 20, 2021 by thp151

An imposed sentence for 18 years’ incarceration is considered fit for an Indigenous offender convicted of manslaughter for killing his wife. His moral blameworthiness, even when tempered for his Gladue circumstances, is very high. Denunciation is critical in condemning spousal violence, particularly the chronic threat to Indigenous women. While restorative sentences are important in many situations of an Indigenous victim and abuser, that is far less so in cases of murder or manslaughter.

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In 2018, Jonathon Wood was convicted of manslaughter for killing his wife, Kathleen Wood, in their home community of St. Theresa Point First Nation, Manitoba. Both Mr. Wood and his wife are Indigenous persons who were raised, and lived in the isolated First Nation with a population of about 4,000 people, accessible only by air, boat or winter ice-road. They began their relationship in 2004 and were married in 2010. Mr. Wood intermittently assaulted Mrs. Wood since 2012. He was convicted of assaulting her four times. By this point, they had three children together, along with an older boy from Mrs. Wood’s prior relationship. These assaults followed a consistent pattern.

When Mr, Wood attacked Mrs. Wood in 2013, 2014 and 2015, he was on some form of bail or probation aimed at reducing the chance he would assault her again. When he ultimately assaulted and killed her, he was still bound by two Probation Orders which stipulated he was not to have contact with Mrs. Wood and imposed restrictions on him when drinking. Regardless of these Orders, Mr. Wood was charged again for assault and aggravated assault of several people, including Mrs. Wood, as well as four probation breaches. He was released on a Recognizance which included not to communicate with Mrs. Wood, and in part, allowed him to be arrested even if he was just in the area of St. Theresa Point.

Despite the court orders, and his promise to abide by them, Mr. Wood went to St. Theresa Point to see his family and Mrs. Wood. A party took place at Mr. Wood’s brother’s residence, and all were intoxicated. As the evening progressed, Mr. and Mrs. Wood got into an argument, which eventually led to Mr. Wood assaulting Mrs. Wood with his fists and feet, repeating the escalating pattern of the four prior convictions. The brother wanted to check on Mrs. Wood, who was then lying on the floor, but Mr. Wood told him to leave her alone, that she was just passed-out. Concerned, the brother went next door for help but returned moments later to Mrs. Wood no longer breathing.

Mrs. Wood’s injuries were awful. The autopsy revealed the true devastation. The forensic pathologist detailed many injuries including numerous bones broken, including her jaw, left clavicle, left wrist and all 24 ribs, 23 of which had multiple fractures. She also suffered a subarachnoid hemorrhage, full-thickness tongue laceration, contusions and lacerations of the lungs and diaphragm, and contusion of the liver. There was no evidence Mrs. Wood’s injuries were caused by anything other than Mr. Wood beating her at the party.

A pre-sentence and Gladue report was prepared for sentencing. Mr. Wood left school with very little education, and no employable skills. There is nothing to suggest Mr. Wood experienced any mental health concerns. Poverty, unemployment, lack of education and substance abuse were negative influences in Mr. Wood’s upbringing. During the course of his times in custody, Mr. Wood participated in many programs, including anger management, parenting skills and healthy relationships.

The vulnerability of a victim, particularly a woman in a domestic context, are well established aggravating factors on sentencing and ones which emphasize denunciation and deterrence (R v LP, 2020 QCCA 1239). Generally, spousal killings attract a higher sentence, and greater condemnation, than other types of manslaughter (s 718.2(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code). Mrs. Wood’s Indigenous status, and living in a community so under-serviced and isolated as St. Theresa Point First Nation, heightened her vulnerability to spousal violence (R v AD, 2019 ABCA 396). It is clear that this event was not only catastrophic for Mrs. Wood but also for her four teenage children.

The nature of the beating was merciless. His previous pattern of beating Mrs. Wood and resulting convictions, his sober defiance of court orders, and his willful disregard for placing her, his wife, in situations of grave danger, adds considerably to his blameworthiness. Denunciation is critical in condemning spousal violence, particularly the chronic threat to Indigenous women. There is the need to separate Mr. Wood from his community so he is no longer a threat to them.

R v Nahanee, 2021 BCCA 13

Posted on January 19, 2021 by thp151

Appeal dismissed. The Appellant’s guilty plea was not accompanied by a joint submission on sentencing, thereby the trial judge was not obliged to notify counsel that she planned to impose a longer sentence than what was sought by the Crown. The sentence was not demonstrably unfit, as the Appellant’s Indigenous heritage was taken into account when assessing aggravating factors.

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The Appellant, Mr. Nahanee, who grew up in the Squamish Nation Capilano Reserve in West Vancouver, pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual assault and was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. The first count was against SR on one occasion, the second was against EN on many occasions. The sentencing judge ordered a pre-sentence report, a psychiatric assessment, and a Gladue report.

The offences against EN were committed over a long period. EN lived in the care of her grandparents, together with the Appellant, her uncle, between 2010 and 2015. When she first moved into their home, she was 13 years old, and the Appellant was 19 years old. The Appellant repeatedly assaulted her at night, and when she was 14 years old, the assaults escalated with so much frequency she lost track of the number. EN came forward to the police in 2018, after learning that Mr. Nahanee had also assaulted her younger cousin, SR. SR had told her grandmother about past assaults by her uncle, but was not believed by her family.

Gladue factors were considered at length by the trial judge, but did not weigh significantly in sentencing. The Appellant had not endured violence or abuse, and was raised in a safe home. She described the Appellant’s family’s history, and his forebears’ experience in residential schools and their loss of cultural and spiritual connections. She placed significant weight upon the fact the victim and the community in question here were Indigenous, and the victims, as a result, were much more vulnerable to sexual assault than their non-Indigenous counterparts (R v Barton, 2019 SCC 33; R v SPS, 2019 BCPC 158).

The admission made by the Appellant, amounted to an admission that there had been prior, uncharged assaults, the victim had reported them to her grandmother, and she had been disbelieved. Given that the admission was made to assist the court in sentencing following a guilty plea, no other purpose could be served by the admission. It was certainly not an admission that the victim had previously made false reports to her grandmother.

The sentencing judge acknowledged the obligation to consider the Gladue principles in this case, as in every case involving an Indigenous offender. Having done so, it was not an error to consider the extent to which the offender himself was affected by cultural oppression, social inequality and systemic discrimination. Appropriate care was taken in this case to identify Gladue factors and to determine whether they attenuated the Appellant’s moral blameworthiness. It should be borne in mind that the application of the Gladue principles in this case must also have been tempered by consideration of the fact the victims were Indigenous children. The effort at reconciliation that, in part, motivates the Gladue approach to sentencing, is not served by sentences that do not sufficiently deter violence against Indigenous children.

Paul v Correctional Services of Canada, 2020 NSSC 380

Posted on January 18, 2021 by thp151

The Applicant, a Maliseet woman, has been partially successful. The Respondent prison authorities shall pay costs in the amount of $500.00 to the incarcerated Applicant. She will receive a declaration that the deprivation of her residual liberties that she experienced for a further 10 days in maximum security after it was determined she could return to medium security, was unlawful.

Indigenous Law Centre CaseWatch Blog

The Applicant, Ms. Paul, brings this application for habeas corpus. She is serving a sentence for offences that include robbery, four counts of failure to comply with a Probation Order, and other counts. Ms. Paul is a 35-year-old first-time federal offender and is presently incarcerated at Nova Institute for Women [“Nova”]. She is Maliseet, and from St. Mary’s First Nation in New Brunswick [“SMFN”]. Her undisputed contentions are that she lives with long-standing addictions, and has reported diagnoses of bipolar disorder, attention deficit disorder, depression and anxiety. She also reports a history of sexual trauma and family fragmentation.

Nova is a women’s multilevel facility. In 2019, Ms. Paul was released and granted day parole from Nova which was subsequently suspended due to a urinalysis test performed in her community, which had returned positive for opiates. Prior to Ms. Paul’s return, Nova had received information from Ms. Paul’s community parole officer to the effect that it was believed that she would attempt to introduce drugs into the institution. Ms. Paul was subjected to testing by a drug sniffer dog, as well as an ion scanner upon arrival at Nova. This testing was positive for drugs, and as a result, the facility placed her in the Structured Intervention Unit [“SIU”], where she remained for six days. Ms. Paul no longer challenges her initial 6-day placement in the SIU. What she does challenge is the subsequent decision to detain her in the Secure Unit [“SU”], or maximum security, when the records at the institution always had her either classified or as a “recommended” medium security risk. Despite this, she remained in SU until the Warden’s Board accepted the recommendation and then was she moved into general population.

The Court concludes that Ms. Paul’s matter, although moot, merits a decision in the circumstances of this case (Borowski v Canada (AG), [1989] 1 SCR 342). Ms. Paul sustained a deprivation of liberty for the period of time during which she was in SU as opposed to a medium security setting. She was deprived of some of the liberties to which the general population inmates were entitled. Her security classification never changed from “medium”. This means that her treatment is subject to review by this Court on the basis of lawfulness and reasonableness.

Once a deprivation of liberty has been established by the Applicant, along with a legitimate ground upon which to question its legality, she bears no further burden. The onus shifts to the Respondent prison authorities to demonstrate on the balance of probabilities that it acted both lawfully and reasonably on both substantive and procedural grounds. It was reasonable on the part of the decision-makers at Nova to the placement of Ms. Paul in the SIU at first instance due to the above concerns. The Court concluded this placement was in conformity with the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, and therefore substantively reasonable.

However, there is no reference explaining why it took the institution ten days longer to convene the Wardens Board hearing. This length of time requires explanation and justification, which is part of the onus which the Respondent must discharge. This is particularly troubling given the fact that the impact of the SU placement on Ms. Paul was always known by the Respondents to have critical consequences to her well-being and must not be understated. The Respondent’s onus is not discharged merely by explaining and justifying the reason(s) as to why Ms. Paul was initially allowed less liberty than her medium security counterparts. It must also explain the length of time during which she was so deprived (Dumas v Leclerc Institute, [1986] 2 SCR 459).

In these circumstances, an explanation of why it took a further 10 days to confirm that Ms. Paul would be released into the medium security, general population, commensurate with her recommended and subsequently endorsed security rating is required and was not provided. The Applicant will have a declaration of such and the Respondents, as well, shall pay costs in the amount of $500.00, including disbursements.