R v Neasloss, 2020 BCPC 161

Posted on September 10, 2020 by thp151

The Court accepted a joint proposal for a 10-month conditional sentence served in the community for possession of child pornography. The Court did express misgivings with the absence of any independent or expert evidence in the record to justify the proposal as no Gladue report, pre-sentence report, or psychiatric assessment was obtained. The proposal was accepted, however, due to the high standard for any judicial departure from a joint submission on sentence.

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Tyler Eugene Neasloss was charged with distributing and possessing child pornography contrary to the Criminal Code. At the sentencing hearing the Crown and defence jointly proposed a sentence comprising of a ten-month conditional sentence [“CSO”], three years’ probation and four ancillary orders. The Court questioned whether a non-custodial sentence was appropriate in the circumstances of the offence and offender. Although, not convinced a CSO gives proper effect to the sentencing principles of parity and proportionality, the Court is bound by the Supreme Court of Canada’s directive that trial judges are to follow joint submissions in all but the rarest of cases. The Court can only depart from a joint submission if it is so unhinged from the circumstances of the offence and the offender that its acceptance would lead reasonable and informed persons to believe that the proper functioning of the justice system had broken down (R v Anthony-Cook, 2016 SCC 43).

In 2018, Facebook, a United States social media corporation, reported the transmission of suspected child pornography to the National Centre for Missing and Exploited Children [“NCMEC”]. The following day, NCMEC reported the transmission to the BC Integrated Child Exploitation [“ICE”] Unit of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police [“RCMP”]. The BC-ICE Unit determined that two images sent by a Facebook user met the definition of child pornography and forwarded a report to the New Hazelton RCMP detachment. The Facebook user had used an identifying IP address. The RCMP obtained and executed a search warrant at a residence, at which time they arrested Mr. Neasloss. The RCMP seized several items from Mr. Neasloss’ bedroom. Mr. Neasloss confessed to possessing child pornography and viewing images of pre-pubescent boys and girls performing various sexual acts. He denied ever touching a child sexually, expressed shame and wrote a written apology to his family for what he has done.

Mr. Neasloss was 30 years old at the time of the offence and has no criminal record. Mr. Neasloss is a member of the Gitxsan Nation. In Grade 8, while attending Skeena Junior Secondary School, Mr. Neasloss left school, never to return. He lives a narrow, lonely and solitary life with his father, where he stays home, watches television and is not otherwise socially engaged. Mr. Neasloss does not drink or smoke or use drugs. He has no friends or intimate partners, past or present, no children, does not work and has a negligible work history. Mr. Neasloss lives on social assistance and although he might qualify for a disability pension, he is unable to navigate the application process.

Typically, before imposing sentence on an offender convicted of possessing child pornography, the trial judge has the benefit of a pre-sentence report and a psychiatric and psychological risk assessment. When the offender is Indigenous, the court often receives a Gladue report, In this case, the Court has no such reports. There is no Gladue report and only a faint thumbnail sketch of Mr. Neasloss’ personal history. The Court, however, is acutely aware of the challenges facing Indigenous people in this region. The systemic and background factors affecting Indigenous people in Canadian society have likely impacted Mr. Neasloss’ life in such a way as to diminish his moral culpability.

The Court does not know the nature or severity of Mr. Neasloss’s asserted psychological, cognitive and social impairments. Apparently, he has the intellectual skills to navigate the dark web to access child pornography, and the psychological dysfunction to do so. Both counsel, however, argue that sentencing ought to proceed in the absence of presentence reports or psychological assessments in order to minimize delay and expedite Mr. Neasloss’s access to treatment. Both counsel are experienced and clearly considered the systemic benefits of Mr. Neasloss’s guilty plea to justify a non-custodial sentence. The crafting of the sentence endeavours to protect the community from the risk of Mr. Neasloss reoffending through a combination of rehabilitative and restrictive conditions contained in various court orders. The Court endorses the joint submission as advocated by counsel.

R v Hoshal, 2020 ONCJ 345

Posted on September 9, 2020 by thp151

The Indigenous defendant breached a Long Term Supervision Order on two separate accounts by consuming prohibited substances. This resulted in just one additional day in custody based on credit for pre-sentence custody and the collateral consequences of COVID-19 in the Toronto South Detention Centre, including the suspension of culturally appropriate programming and activities. Gladue factors contextualized his youth criminal record and indicated a need for restraint.

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Mr. Hoshal has pled guilty to two separate counts of breaching the conditions of his Long Term Supervision Order [“LTSO”]. Both breaches involved the consumption of substances prohibited by this order. His risk of violent future re-offence is directly linked to whether he can abstain from the consumption of alcohol and drugs. Breaching an LTSO is not like breaching probation or bail. It is met with significant jail terms. The public loses confidence in the judicial system when offenders breach court-ordered terms. He has been detained at the Toronto South Detention Centre.

Mr. Hoshal’s childhood was mired in trauma, abandonment, and abuse. Mr. Hoshal is forty years old and has a serious criminal record that includes approximately 25 convictions for domestic violence, all rooted in substance misuse and abuse. Mr. Hoshal is a non-status Blackfoot on his father’s side. Upon discovering this Indigenous heritage, he attempted to learn more about it on his own. He twice moved onto a reserve, only to feel isolated and singled out, sometimes violently, because he appeared “white”. The information he has managed to obtain about his Indigenous heritage has largely come from programs in jail. Otherwise, he has been disconnected from his Indigenous culture.

Mr. Hoshal’s punishment must be tempered as much as possible without displacing the fitness of the sentence, by the exercise of restraint. In order to rehabilitate oneself, hope is necessary. The conditions of Mr. Hoshal’s presentence custody, including the COVID-19 consequences, have amplified anxiety and stress, isolated him from supports, and caused him to lose hope. The harsh presentence custody conditions at the TSDC upon Mr. Hoshal personally, and the impact of COVID-19 adds to the already deplorable conditions. Mr. Hoshal’s global sentence of 14 months less presentence custody remains fit and within the range.

R v Kuliktana, 2020 NUCA 7

Posted on August 21, 2020 by thp151

Appeal allowed. The sentence on the Appellant is altered as proposed by the joint submission. In this appeal, emphasis was placed on the role of Gladue factors to help justify a joint submission for a sentence that appeared to be lower than appropriate. Inferences were made in the absence of direct information, as a Gladue Report was not available.

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The Appellant, a 27-year-old Inuk man from the Hamlet of Kugluktuk, in the Kitikmeot Region of Nunavut, entered guilty pleas to one count of assault and one count of unlawful confinement. The Crown elected to proceed by summary conviction on both counts and pleas were entered after resolution discussions. The joint submission for a fit sentence was 120 days in custody, less credit for the 58 days the Appellant had spent in pre-sentence custody to that date, leaving 33 days to serve along with a probation order of 12 months.

The sentencing judge resisted the joint submission and called upon counsel to provide more information and a more elaborate rationale. The Appellant remained in custody in the meantime for almost 3 months. The sentencing judge then rejected the joint submission and imposed a sentence of imprisonment of 180 days on the count of assault which he described as “time served” and 60 days concurrent on the count of unlawful confinement also described as “time served”. In addition, the sentencing judge directed a probation order for a period of 12 months, with conditions, including performance of 50 hours of community service work.

The Appellant on this appeal submits that his sentence has been completed, but that his appeal is not moot because the entry on his criminal record will be higher than it should have been. The Appellant had an unstable childhood due to his family’s inability to settle in one community. He has a significant criminal record, including convictions in 2014 and 2015 for analogous “domestic assault” offences. His counsel attributes the Appellant’s criminal record at least in part to the criminogenic factors of alcohol and a lack of stable housing.

Regrettably, there was no Gladue report prepared to further illuminate what other factors may have contributed to his difficulty in maintaining a prosocial conduct pattern (R v Gladue, [1999] 1 SCR 688). It has been said repeatedly that this type of information is not to provide a special exemption in sentencing but rather is directly related to locating a proportional sentence having regard to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender under s 718.1 of the Criminal Code. It is an error to proceed on the basis that Gladue factors do or do not justify departure from a proportionate sentence (R v Swampy, 2017 ABCA 134). Rather, they direct the sentencing court’s attention to circumstances that help to identify a proportionate sentence.

In this instance, it is a matter of conjecture as to what influence more Gladue information might have had on counsel or the Court. But it is possible to draw some inferences from what was provided about the Appellant’s circumstances. Often it is a matter of common-sense inference as to how the offender’s life has reached the point where the offender’s reactions to problems tends to breach social norms. In determining whether a proposed joint submission sentence for an offender seems unfit, the sentencing court should consider how Gladue factors might fit in to the situation.

When the Crown chooses to enter into a plea arrangement with an offender (by counsel) that is a solemn business, and it is not just clearing court backlog in some bureaucratic sense. Whether a sentencing court should harbor doubt about the utilitarian benefits of plea agreements and joint submissions, there cannot be similar doubt about the linkage between the Crown taking a consistent, reliable and predictable position and the Rule of Law.

The sentencing judge’s mention of what he felt did not reconcile the joint submission with his unexplained conceptualization of a fit sentence for the Appellant’s crimes came down to rejection of the joint submission on a basis subjectively held by him. It was not a manifestation of the principled override of a joint submission contemplated by, or consistent with, the guidance and policies in R v Anthony-Cook, 2016 SCC 43. Accordingly, the failure of the sentencing judge to explain what was wrong with the joint submission was a flaw with more than one dimension. It is not discernible what, if any, comparators or prior authority or guidance the sentencing judge was relying on, and it would not have been a demonstration of “public interest” error if the only discrepancy of the joint submission were that it did not fit the sentencing judge’s own practice.

R v Itturiligaq, 2020 NUCA 6

Posted on August 19, 2020 by thp151

Appeal allowed. The mandatory minimum punishment of imprisonment of four years is not a grossly disproportionate sentence for this offence and this offender. The Indigenous accused is now finished the custodial portion of his sentence and is well into his probation, therefore the sentence of imprisonment is stayed.

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A 24-year-old Inuit man and traditional hunter for country food, who had lived his entire life in Nunavut, intentionally fired his hunting rifle at the roofline of a house he knew to be occupied. The single bullet exited the roof and caused no injuries. He was charged with intentionally discharging a firearm at a place, contrary to s 244.2(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was interviewed by the RCMP and took full responsibility for his actions. He told police that on the day of the incident he had been upset that his girlfriend had not been spending enough time with him and their small daughter. He was angry that she had gone to her friend’s place without telling him and that she refused to leave with him. He told police that he only took one shot and was not trying to aim the gun at anybody, as he knew that he is not supposed to do so.

No formal Gladue report was prepared, but it is clear that some Gladue factors were relevant to the accused’s background. He and his family described that he had a good upbringing. The accused had no known history of residential schooling in his family’s background. He was in good physical health, save a hearing deficit and the need for hearing aids, a condition also shared by his father. While history of colonialism and its intergenerational effects must be acknowledged, the Gladue factors in this case do not operate to significantly diminish the high level of moral culpability underlying this offence.

The accused, who had no criminal record, entered an early guilty plea. He successfully challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum punishment, on the basis that it violated s 12 of the Charter (R v Itturiligaq, 2018 NUCJ 31). The accused was ordered a custodial sentence of slightly less than two years, with credit for pre-trial remand, followed by two years probation.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the accused as demonstrably unfit, and the court’s declaration that s 244.2(3)(b) is unconstitutional. While not joined, this appeal was heard at the same time as the oral hearing in R v Ookowt, 2020 NUCA 5 [“Ookowt”], which also involved a declaration that s 244.2(3)(b) was unconstitutional pursuant to s 12 of the Charter. As stated in Ookowt, both of these appeals arose as a result of young men resorting to the use of hunting rifles in response to what they believed to be personal slights or problems in their personal lives. The appeal is allowed, and the court’s declaration of s 244.2(3)(b) is set aside.

R v Ookowt, 2020 NUCA 5

Posted on August 18, 2020 by thp151

Appeal allowed. The declaration of unconstitutionality of a mandatory minimum sentence imposed by the sentencing judge is set aside, and a four-year penitentiary term is substituted. Significant time has elapsed since the Indigenous accused was sentenced – and who now has finished that sentence, therefore the sentence of imprisonment is stayed.

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A 19 year old Inuit man, in retaliation for being bullied, fired a bullet into a house, which shattered a window and missed striking a man by inches. The accused entered a guilty plea to intentionally discharging a firearm into a place knowing that or being reckless as to whether another person was present, contrary to s 244.2(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. The mandatory minimum sentence for this offence is four years.

At the sentencing hearing, a Notice of Constitutional Challenge was filed by the Defence arguing that the mandatory minimum sentence was grossly disproportionate to a fit sentence for this offence and this offender, contrary to s 12 of the Charter. The sentencing judge determined that a fit sentence for the accused was two years less one day, plus one year of probation, and the imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence in this case would result in a sentence that is double the appropriate sentence (R v Ookowt, 2017 NUCJ 22). The Crown appeals to this Court, contending the sentencing judge failed to properly assess the gravity of this offence and that the accused’s conduct warranted the four year mandatory minimum sentence.

It is common for those who live in Nunavut’s communities to own rifles. They are used for subsistence hunting, supporting a traditional way of life. Sadly, this also means they are often readily accessible for unlawful and dangerous purposes such as intimidation, revenge, domestic violence, and retaliation.

This Court concludes that the sentencing judge committed errors in principle by imposing a disproportionate and demonstrably unfit sentence. Further, it is concluded that the four year mandatory minimum sentence under s 244.2(3)(b) is not a grossly disproportionate sentence for this offence and this offender. The Court sets aside the sentencing judge’s declaration that the imposition of the four year mandatory minimum sentence would breach the accused’s s 12 Charter rights.

In the Court’s view, the sentencing judge underemphasized the accused’s high moral blameworthiness for this offence, and overemphasized intoxication, bullying and Gladue factors. As a result, the sentencing court failed to give sufficient weight to denunciation and deterrence in reaching a sentence that was ultimately disproportionate and unfit in all of the circumstances. The sentencing judge did not provide any persuasive reasons for imposing a sentence that did not address the well-established seriousness of this firearm offence, and failure to do so was an error (R v Mala, 2018 NUCA 2). In sum, an offender who commits the offence of intentionally discharging a firearm into a place, knowing or being reckless as to whether anyone is in that place, is guilty of significant morally blameworthy conduct.

The accused’s admitted act of “extreme premeditated violence is completely disproportionate to any reasonable and measured response to the bullying he suffered”. It was sheer luck that his bullet did not hit and kill either of the two men in the house, only one being the target of his “warning”. Gladue considerations do not significantly reduce the accused’s moral blameworthiness in this matter (R v Swampy, 2017 ABCA 134).

The trial judge found the accused did not have a disadvantaged upbringing, nor does there appear to be a history of family violence, displacement, residential schooling or “constrained circumstances” (R v Ipeelee, [2012] 2 CNLR 218). Rather, the accused enjoyed a culture-centred and close family upbringing throughout his life. He is both intelligent and educated, communicating in both English (written and oral) and Inuktitut (oral). He opted to leave formal schooling to pursue his vocation as a traditional hunter, earning a living from the land by selling furs and supporting his family and community with the country food he harvested, and by keeping their machines and dog teams in good order. While a history of colonialism must be taken into account, including substance abuse and suicide in this matter, it is difficult to identify any background factors that greatly diminish the accused’s moral blameworthiness for this serious firearm offence, at least to the extent found by the sentence judge to “temper the usual deterrence sentence” by more than two years.

R v Kapolak, 2020 NWTTC 12

Posted on August 17, 2020 by thp151

The NWT Territorial Court found a provision for sexual assault against a minor under the Criminal Code to breach s 12 of the Charter and therefore declined to apply it and ordered a conditional sentence for an Inuk offender with FASD.

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This decision bears in mind the cognitive challenges associated with FASD with the Indigenous accused. It had to balance between the protection of Indigenous victims and the need to implement the Gladue principles for Indigenous offenders. Like provincial courts, the territorial court cannot strike down any provisions but it may become a persuasive precedent for other courts in the territories and elsewhere.

This case involved a single incident, and the victim suffered no apparent injury. This was a bold act, committed on a residential street, in the daytime, as opposed to a surreptitious act committed behind closed doors, on a sleeping victim, or in a context where the victim is physically isolated and cannot get away from the perpetrator. The victim initially did not feel threatened by the accused, because she was familiar with him, and likely because of his diminutive size and almost child-like appearance. But the accused then touched the victim’s body many times and in many places, and he failed to disengage when prompted verbally by her. She had to resort to physical violence to make him stop. This was a crime of opportunity, committed on impulse. The victim was in foster care at the time of the incident. She did not file a Victim Impact Statement, but it is inferred that she is from Inuit ancestry from her name.

Because the mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment for six months applies to all offenders having committed any form of sexual assault on a victim aged anywhere between 1 day and 16 years, it is vulnerable to Charter scrutiny. Imposing a sentence of six months in jail on this accused who is a first offender when there are many mitigating factors and when the circumstances of the offence, while being serious, are not too egregious, is fundamentally unfair and as a result, disproportionate. As a result, the accused’s right to be protected against cruel and unusual treatment or punishment is infringed by the mandatory minimum punishment found at section 271(b) of the Criminal Code. The provision is not saved by section 1 of the Charter, and accordingly the mandatory minimum punishment is declined.

The presence of an intellectual disability that affects the accused’s cognitive functions makes it difficult to assess the risk to reoffend. Although present, and in light of other circumstances, the risk is not viewed as high, or determinative. However, the offence of sexual assault is prevalent in Northern communities, 5.3 times the national ratio in 2017. The accused’s early guilty plea is highly mitigating, as it spared the victim from having to testify in court.

The personal circumstances of the accused, which include the diagnosis of Alcohol-Related Neuro-Developmental Disorder, suggest a reduced moral blameworthiness. For a first offender, sentencing usually focuses on rehabilitation. There is nothing to say that a community-based sentence would not work for this accused. The risk to reoffend that this accused presents because of the impulsivity associated with his condition, as well as his intellectual limitation, is compensated by the fact that he benefits from family support. He has a home in which supervision may occur, and he has shown that he is able to comply with conditions.

For an offender with challenges to his executive functions, repetition of instructions, structure, and professional follow-up, appear to be key. A carefully crafted conditional sentence order can bring the necessary restrictions to a person’s freedom while providing rehabilitative tools, and thus achieve deterrence.

The Supreme Court of Canada determined that the standard for finding that a sentence represents a cruel and unusual punishment is that it be grossly disproportionate. An option to preserve the constitutionality of offences that cast a wide net is to provide for residual judicial discretion to impose a fit and constitutional sentence in exceptional cases (R v Lloyd, 2016 1 RCS 13).

In this case, the offender presents with cognitive challenges, and is sentenced more than one year after the commission of the offence. The immediate link between consequence and cause may be lost and as a result a sentence of imprisonment may not achieve the necessary deterrence. Reducing the over-incarceration of Aboriginal offenders is as important an objective as that of protecting vulnerable victims, and must be given equal consideration. The accused is to serve a conditional sentence of imprisonment of 120 days, to be followed by a period of probation of 18 months.

R v Campbell, 2020 NUCJ 28

Posted on August 14, 2020 by thp151

The fact that programming is on hold during the pandemic is taken into account with sentencing in two ways: 1) in determining how much credit to allocate based on pre-trial custody; and 2) in assessing a fit term for a prison sentence, as collateral consequences of any period of incarceration that would make it harsher.

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In Nunavut, and elsewhere, it seems like most Indigenous programming in prison has been put on hold for months, including the examples of Elder counselling and family visits. Mr. Campbell plead guilty to a string of charges all committed in Iqaluit. A Pre-Sentence Report was ordered. Unfortunately, the date for his sentencing was cancelled by the COVID-19 pandemic effect on the operation of Court Services.

Following his time in custody, Mr. Campbell will be given a probation order for 18 months, to help his rehabilitation. In assessing his sentence, the Court considered the fundamental principle that the sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and degree of responsibility of the offender. Over a period of almost six months, Mr. Campbell assaulted five separate individuals in four separate locations across Iqaluit, from well-known businesses to private residences. Each individual offence was relatively low on the gravity scale. However, two of the offences are statutorily aggravating because of the young age of one victim and the domestic nature of the previous relationship with another victim.

The Court must also consider the purpose of sentencing set out in s. 718 which is to impose just sanctions that have one or more of these objectives: denunciation, deterrence of the offender and others, separation if necessary, rehabilitation, reparation and promoting a sense of responsibility in offenders. Mr. Campbell’s guilty plea shows he is taking responsibility for these offences and intends to work on rehabilitating himself. The pre-sentence report outlined some Gladue factors that also need to be considered in this case, per s. 718.2(e).

Mr. Campbell has now been in custody for a little over five months and is entitled to credit for that time. The issue is whether and how to account for the effect of COVID-19 on prison conditions and what, if any, sentencing considerations should be made on account of such conditions. Time in custody during the current pandemic, depending on public health and geographic realities, may be harsher time in custody than usual. This is so not only because authorities have put in place restrictions to try to keep inmates safe, but also because of the general uncertainty about the present and future wellbeing of individuals and society.

These changes due to the pandemic are to protect inmates and staff at the institution, where public health measures such as social distancing are not readily available. Protecting the inmates and staff then also protects the public in Iqaluit. The measures are imposed even though the Territory continues to be “COVID free” because that status could change at any time. In Nunavut where programming is often available for prisoners, punishment is also increased by loss of programs as well as family visits. These restrictions will continue going forward.

Mr. Campbell’s time spent in custody will be harsher for an unknown period of time. He has been given the maximum allowable amount of credit for his pre-sentence custody. In these circumstances, it is appropriate to reduce Mr. Campbell’s sentence going forward by 60 days because of the harsher conditions of his incarceration.

R v McKay, 2020 MBQB 106

Posted on August 10, 2020 by thp151

The Gladue analysis in this sentencing decision included attention to both the systemic and background factors of the Indigenous offender and his victim, which in this case were significant and central enough to make rehabilitation the key sentencing principle.

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Mr. McKay, a young Indigenous man from Berens River First Nation, a remote settlement 300 km by air north of Winnipeg, pled guilty to manslaughter. Upon returning home extremely intoxicated, he severely beat his mother who did not recover from her injuries and died months later. During the time she was comatose in a Winnipeg hospital, he was overheard at her bedside, sobbing and saying he was sorry. A stepbrother confronted him and Mr. McKay admitted he had hurt his mother. After her death, he was arrested a month later. He told police that he had hit her with a “glass thing”, and could not say why he attacked her.

This decision deals with setting a fit and appropriate sentence for Mr. McKay for this crime, in these circumstances. A Probation Services Pre-sentence Report [“PSR”] and an independent Gladue report was ordered, which in part connected Canada’s historical treatment of Indigenous peoples to Mr. McKay and the killing. It is well accepted that the Government’s role, since the early days of dealing with First Nations peoples, has had the effect of isolating, infantilizing, marginalizing, and traumatizing Indigenous societies like the Ojibwe (or Anishinaabe) of Berens River. These effects on Mr. McKay’s traditional community set the context for his life and experiences.

Mr. McKay’s upbringing was horrible. He has 12 brothers and sisters that were often raised in foster homes. Intermittently, he would be returned to the custody of his mother and father, but his relationship with his family was fractured. His parents struggled with alcohol and sniffing, which he ultimately started at age 13. He is not close to his brothers or sisters, some of whom have died. Family empathy and support is non-existent. Mr. McKay’s father died of alcohol abuse, and they were not close. Mr. McKay and his mother were very close, and supported and depended upon each other. He loved her and is deeply affected by having killed her.

Mr. McKay was formally diagnosed with partial Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (“pFAS”) at 24 months. He continues to suffer physical, cognitive and intellectual disabilities. Child and Family Services files indicate that Mr. McKay was neglected because of the family’s chronic alcohol addiction, solvent sniffing, domestic abuse and family violence. He would often be the target of teasing and beatings by his brothers, and even now has been threatened by some siblings, who say they would kill him if he returned to Berens River. For the most part, while Mr. McKay has been in custody since his arrest in October 2018, he has done well, including taking many programs. Importantly, he wants a good future but does not have a real idea or plan of how to get there.

A sentence imposed on an accused for a serious crime should be tailor-made in the sense that, mindful of principles of sentencing, it is appropriate to the circumstances of the offence and the particulars of the offender. The critical issue is to determine a sentence that would benefit and protect the community, as well as provide the best prospects of rehabilitation for Mr. McKay. Gladue factors loom large, which affect the assessment of moral culpability for this grievous offense. His moral blameworthiness is high, but not as high as it would otherwise have been but for Gladue factors, including his pFAS. In balancing all of the factors, rehabilitation must be an overarching concern. While denunciation and deterrence are important factors, they are moderated by the unusual circumstances here.

Mr. Kay is sentenced to 50 months of incarceration, from which 26 months’ time-in-custody credit shall be deducted for a go-forward custody sentence of 24 months less one day, as well as three years of supervised probation with conditions.

R v Gaudet, 2020 ONSC 3975

Posted on August 5, 2020 by thp151

This bail review summarizes how the Gladue principles can apply to bail. Not only has Indigenous programming in remand been suspended for the pandemic, the Indigenous accused’s asthmatic condition was also taken into account in this decision.

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Mr. Gaudet is an accused that identifies as Indigenous. Gladue principles and purposes apply to all situations where an Indigenous person’s liberty is at stake. Section 493.2 of the Criminal Code [“CC”] provides that a judge shall give particular attention to the circumstances of an Indigenous person in making a bail decision. The inference to be drawn from the accused’s sentencing record is that he is a regular but minor offence offender. In the last 5 years, the accused has been convicted of failing to attend court or compliance with conditions of undertaking, recognizance or probation five times. He had two assault convictions in that period. This latest stint of detention is his longest in the last five years.

This review centers on the impact of time and unreasonable delay on the proportionality of detention, the rational offered for the original detention order and any new information brought forward. The issue is whether continued detention in custody is justified five months later within the parameters of s 515(10), in the context of an accused who identifies as Indigenous in the midst of the pandemic that lugs in public health and trial scheduling concerns.

The right to reasonable bail is entrenched in s 11(e) of the Charter and is closely connected to other entrenched constitutional rights such as the presumption of innocence (s 11(d)), the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned (s 9) and the right to liberty and security (s 7). The Supreme Court of Canada iterates that the pre-trial release of accused persons is the cardinal rule and detention the exception (R v Myers, 2019 SCC 27). Section 493.1 of the CC provides that release on reasonable terms is favoured at the earliest reasonable opportunity on the least onerous appropriate conditions including conditions that are reasonably practicable for the accused to comply with.

Given that the examination of Gladue factors in sentencing is directed at diminished moral blameworthiness for an offence in sentencing, the same application without adaptation in a bail proceeding could inappropriately violate the presumption of innocence. The interaction of Gladue principles and s 515(10) cannot be brought to bear in a vacuum. Consideration might include the factors, such as colonization and so on and practices that disproportionately affect Indigenous persons and contribute to their over-incarceration. The principle of restraint in bail is codified in s 493.1. The interim release process is not the time to apply rehabilitative or reformative provisions. Provisions looking like probation or conditional sentence are problematic.

Trial bottlenecks in the criminal justice trial system arising from pandemic restrictions are for now frustrating that option. There are valid reasons for releasing the accused. Prospects for timely trial fade on a daily basis. It is also reported that the Indigenous support programs in the detention center were terminated in March and emphasized the importance of the loss of this support on the accused’s mental health. The accused also suffers with asthma, which is a tertiary ground circumstance. Living conditions at the detention center do not permit social distancing. The pandemic stands as a material change in circumstances since the accused’s last bail hearing.

The accused’s record indicates that he honours conditions when a breach would result in automatic incarceration. If the accused breaches, his only source of trusted support, Ms. Seguin will report it. She will post a bond without cash in the amount of $1,000. For a person in her financial circumstances that is a significant commitment and imports the tug of bail on her part. The accused is to enter into a recognizance with surety, Ms. Seguin. She knows she is undertaking the role of jailor and if she neglects her duties, she will be called on to pay up.

R v Grandinetti, 2020 ABQB 416

Posted on July 31, 2020 by thp151

Experiences of racism is a Gladue factor, and there is relevance of credible employment opportunities for the Aboriginal accused that has informed the design of a fit and proper sentence in this matter.

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Mr. Grandinetti was closely involved in the process of creating fraudulent documentation which he used to effect registration of six stolen trailers in his own name in order to facilitate the transfer of the trailers to others, including at least one innocent purchaser. He also physically possessed each of the stolen travel trailers, and knew each was stolen. He was not charged with a “possession offence” in respect of two of the trailers. He trafficked two of the travel trailers he knew were stolen. As well, he possessed two of them for the purpose of trafficking them.

Mr. Grandinetti’s crimes are not accurately described as sophisticated or involving a high degree of planning, at least not on his part. He was not charged with the theft of any of the six travel trailers with which he was involved and the evidence presented did not suggest he was involved in any theft. The actual mechanism of the deception in which he participated was relatively simple. He did not invent or design it.

Even before the sentencing principle established by s 718.2(2)(e) of the Criminal Code and considering Gladue factors, the circumstances of Mr. Grandinetti’s offences do not require that priority be given to deterrence, denunciation and separation over the other purposes of sentencing, rehabilitation, reparation and promotion of a sense of responsibility.

Mr. Grandinetti is the child of an Italian father and a Cree mother. He has a younger brother and an older half brother. As a child Mr. Grandinetti witnessed his father being physically abusive to his mother. His parents divorced when he was 15. When Mr. Grandinetti was 17 years old and in high school, his mother was murdered by his cousin. Evidence at the murder trial indicated that the cousin had been paid by Mr. Grandinetti’s father to murder his mother. There was an ongoing child support arrears dispute between Mr. Grandinetti’s parents at the time.

The Gladue Report indicates that Mr. Grandinetti’s brothers reported that their grandmother attended residential school and that the experience caused her to be “a mean and angry person at times”. She struggled with alcohol. But Mr. Grandinetti’s younger brother credits the grandmother with keeping the family together.

Mr. Grandinetti’s father forbade him from participating in Cree cultural activities and tradition, and not even to reveal his Cree heritage to anyone. He learned to attach shame to that heritage. The Gladue report writer noted that Mr. Grandinetti has strong and positive support from his brother and his brother’s family. There are culturally relevant and mainstream healing resources available to him which he has never attempted to access, in part, due to the shame of his Cree heritage instilled in him by his father.

Mr. Grandinetti is sentenced to a global 18 months of that includes 4-6 months incarceration, with the rest to be served in the community pursuant to a conditional sentence order, followed by a three year probation order. Upon his employment, he is to pay restitution.