Tag Archives: Truth and Reconciliation Commission

Saskatchewan Polytechnic Faculty Assn v Saskatchewan Polytechnic, 2020 CanLII 78471 (SK LA)

Posted on by
Reply

The Arbitrator allowed a grievance filed on behalf of an instructor whose employment was terminated based on his inappropriate racist comments directed towards Indigenous people. While this conduct was found to have warranted a disciplinary response, the Arbitrator concluded termination was too severe in all the circumstances and ordered reinstatement with credit for a six-month unpaid suspension, compensation for lost wages, benefits, and seniority, and arrangements for the grievor to attend Indigenous Awareness Training. 

Indigenous Law Centre – CaseWatch Blog

The Saskatchewan Polytechnic Faculty Association [“SPFA”] filed a grievance on behalf of Wally Derow [“Grievor”] against Saskatchewan Polytechnic [“Employer”]. The Grievor’s employment was terminated in 2018 because of racist comments he had made towards Indigenous peoples.

The Grievor was an Instructor in SaskPoly’s Carpentry Program in Regina, Saskatchewan. An Indigenous student had sent an email to staff asking for donations for the SaskPoly’s Indigenous Student Holiday Hamper Appeal. The Grievor’s reaction including comments such as: “[h]ave we not given enough already. Be like the rest get jobs”; “taxpayers give enough, I work for what I have, they don’t work and get handouts”; “why can’t they get a job”; “we’ve given, all we’ve done is give”; and “you guys get free education – my son goes to university and he paid tuition and he says they don’t have to” and so on.

The Grievor, who at the time was 64 years old, testified that he had not attended SaskPoly’s Indigenous Awareness Training as of November 26, 2018. SPFA had advised the Grievor to expect some sort of discipline, but he did not expect to be terminated. He apologized after he was terminated because he felt remorse and had read further into the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. He explained that previously he thought residential schools were where people “learned our language so they could blend in, our culture, a trade, farming at the time” but realizes he was misinformed.

The Arbitrator determined that the Grievor is not alone in his misconceptions and misunderstandings, in consideration of the social context. Those misconceptions and misunderstandings which can give rise to prejudices on the basis of race have been developed over generations. Generations of non-Indigenous Canadians never received any education about Indigenous history, culture or experience. They know nothing about the Treaties. There is no question that racist attitudes exist because of misconceptions, misunderstanding and stereotyping. Generations of misinformation and lack of understanding cannot be wiped away in a day. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission is having an impact on all aspects of our society, but it is going to take time for society to change attitudes. The way to change those attitudes is not termination of the employment of otherwise good employees.

The Employer should have considered the fact that the Grievor had not yet taken the training as a significant factor to suggest that discipline along with training was the appropriate disciplinary response to the Grievor’s comments. SPFA submits there is no evidence the relationship is irreparable or that it cannot be repaired through education. The Grievor is willing to participate and has already taken steps on his own to educate himself and to make sure that what he says is accurate. The deterrent message in this case is that SaskPoly will not tolerate racism. SaskPoly could have sent a sufficient deterrent message in this case through a significant suspension and imposition of an education requirement.

The Arbitrator found that termination of employment was an excessive employer response to the Grievor’s conduct. SaskPoly is committed to Indigenization and through its Indigenous Awareness Training is attempting to educate all its employees to dispel myths and misconceptions and foster behavioural and attitudinal change towards Indigenous people. Principles of progressive discipline suggest that, especially in a situation like this where education is the best solution, steps short of dismissal would have been more appropriate. The appropriate remedy would have been a six-month unpaid suspension along with appropriate education.

Fontaine v Canada (AG), 2020 ONCA 540

Posted on by
Reply

The Court of Appeal declined a request to stay the destruction of the SADRE database used to manage Independent Assessment Process claims under the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement pending an appeal. All parties consented to an order for an expedited appeal and the preservation of the database until December 30, 2020, which was ordered on a schedule that would make the stay unnecessary.

Indigenous Law Centre – CaseWatch Blog

This motion for a stay arises in the context of the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement [“IRSSA”]. The IRSSA resulted in the establishment of the Independent Assessment Process [“IAP”], under which former students who suffered physical, sexual, or psychological abuse could claim compensation. The IAP is administered by the Indian Residential Schools Adjudication Secretariat [the “Secretariat”] under the direction of the Chief Adjudicator. Over 38,000 claims have been processed in the IAP and over $3 billion disbursed to former students. The Secretariat uses a database known as SADRE to case-manage the IAP claims. The IAP is coming to an end, and the Secretariat is to be closed and all claims adjudicated by March 31, 2021.

The Chief Adjudicator sought directions on the disposition of certain records [“Non-Claim Records”] held by the Secretariat. He made a proposal to archive most of them with the Appellant, the National Centre for Truth and Reconciliation [“NCTR”]. Its mandate under the IRSSA is to archive and store records collected by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and other records relating to what were known as Indian Residential Schools. This proposal was supported by the Appellant and others, but not by the Respondent, the Attorney General of Canada [“Canada”]. The proposal was rejected on January 20, 2020, and Canada was instead directed to bring a Request for Directions [“RFD”] for court approval of a proposal for the archiving of copies of the Non-Claim Records with the Appellant subject to certain delineated principles.

“Final Static Reports” were to be excluded from the Non-Claim Records to be archived, as the generation of such reports would contravene the orders made in Fontaine v Canada (AG), 2014 ONSC 4585. Final Static Reports are new reports generated from the SADRE database used by the Secretariat and reflect final process and outcome data of the 38,000 IAP claims administered under the IAP. Final Static Reports include tables that represent a fixed extract from SADRE at the end of the IAP. It was determined that the reliability and soundness of the models is doubtful without more information and truth and reconciliation would not be advanced, therefore the Final Static Reports should not be archived with the Appellant and not to be included in the IAP Final Report.

A number of orders have been made by the supervising courts in the course of the administration of the IRSSA. Three that are the subject matter of the stay motion have ordered that the SADRE database be destroyed. These courts have also issued various sunset orders governing the orderly closure of the IAP claims process, the expiry of the Chief Adjudicator’s mandate, and the wind-up of the Secretariat. The process to effect the destruction of SADRE could begin on December 31, 2020 and the Secretariat itself is to close on March 31, 2021.

In a nutshell, the Appellant’s primary position on appeal is that invaluable information will be permanently lost if the Final Static Reports are destroyed. However, Canada’s position is that the Appellant’s request to halt the destruction of SADRE is non-justiciable, a collateral attack on the In Rem order already made, and amounts to re-litigation.

The overarching consideration is whether the interests of justice call for a stay (Zafar v Saiyid, 2017 ONCA 919; Longley v Canada (AG), 2007 ONCA 149). In this case, a stay is declined. The parties all consent to an order for an expedited appeal and the orders that the Appellant seeks to stay preserve the SADRE database until December 30, 2020. As a result, a stay is unnecessary if an expedite order is granted and the appeal is heard by the end of October or early November and decided before the end of the year. Therefore, it is reasonable to expedite the Appellant’s appeal.

Sheck v Canada (Minister of Justice), 2019 BCCA 364

Posted on by
Reply

Application allowed. An order for the surrender of an Indigenous person to face charges of money laundering in the United States is remitted to the Minister of Justice for reconsideration.

Native Law Centre CaseWatch Blog

This is a judicial review of the decision of the Minister of Justice [“Minister”] that ordered Mr. Sheck’s surrender to the United States of America [“USA”] on charges of money laundering. The relief sought is to have the surrender order quashed, or in the alternative, have the matter remitted back to the Minister for reconsideration. The majority of this Court determined that the Minister failed to appreciate the disparity of the more severe sentence the accused would likely be given in the USA if convicted. As well, the Minister failed to consider the accused and his children’s Indigenous heritage and the context of the historical mistreatment by Canada of Indigenous families which forcibly separated children from their parents and culture.

The standard of review with respect to the Minister’s surrender decision is not in dispute. The Minister’s decision is entitled to deference, and interference is warranted only in exceptional cases of “real substance”. This Court considered whether the Minister’s decision fell within a range of reasonable outcomes, and if the correct legal test was applied (Lake v Canada (Minister of Justice), 2008 SCC 23 [“Lake”]; s 57(7) of The Extradition Act). This standard of review recognizes that the decision to surrender the accused is largely political and involved the Minister’s superior expertise with respect to Canada’s international obligations and interests (India v Badesha, 2017 SCC 44). The Minister must take into account Canada’s international obligations, but also consider the rights of the person sought.

Pursuant to s 7 of the Charter, a person is not to be deprived of the right to life, liberty and security of the person except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. In the extradition context, the Minister is not to surrender a person if surrender would “shock the conscience” (Lake) or not to surrender the person if the consequences of surrender would be “contrary to the principles of fundamental justice” (MM v United States of America, 2015 SCC 62 [“MM”]). This necessarily includes, when relevant, the best interests of that person’s children who may be affected by the extradition (MM).

The accused faces a potential sentence of 27 years imprisonment if convicted in the USA. If he enters a guilty plea in a timely manner, that might be reduced to a range of 19 to 27 years imprisonment. In contrast, the Minister considered only the maximum sentence an offender would face in Canada for a corresponding offence of ten years under s 462.31 of the Criminal Code. Mr. Sheck is Indigenous, employed, has a long-term spousal relationship, and supports and is actively involved in parenting four children. It is unlikely that Mr. Sheck’s circumstances would result in the maximum sentence in Canada of ten years’ imprisonment. The authorities suggest that a sentence for money laundering alone in Canada could range from a conditional sentence of less than two years, to a custodial sentence of 18 months to five years (R v Rathor, 2011 BCPC 338; R v Garnett, 2017 NSCA 33; R v Lawrence, 2018 ONCA 676; R v Barna, 2018 ONCA 1034; R v Bui, 2006 BCCA 245; R v Abdel, 2019 ONSC 690; R v Williams, 2019 NBPC 1; R v Rosenfeld, 2009 ONCA 307). The Minister cannot have truly appreciated the gross disparity between the two potential sentences the accused would face.

The Minister also failed to consider the impact of separating the accused from his children in the context of their common Indigenous heritage. Historically, the government-approved residential school program separated Indigenous children from their parents and communities, depriving them of their Indigenous culture and often subjected them to abuse. In numerous contexts, not just sentencing or extradition, the courts are called upon to consider the legacy of harm to the Indigenous peoples in Canada when determining a legal right or remedy (United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child; Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015 [“TRC Report”]). Specifically, in the “Calls to Action”, the TRC Report identified five action items relating to Indigenous child welfare, including keeping Indigenous families together where safe to do so.

Troller v Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation, 2019 MBQB 157

Posted on by
Reply

Application denied. The actions of the Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation to limit the Applicant’s freedom of expression on his personalized license plate are a reasonable restriction in a free and democratic society.

Native Law Centre CaseWatch Blog

The Applicant is a resident of Winnipeg, Manitoba and an enthusiast of Star Trek, a science fiction television and movie franchise. He requested, and was granted, a personalized licence plate [“PLP”] from Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation [“MPI”] with the combination of letters and a number “ASIMIL8”. He asserts that this combination is a reference to a Star Trek character, the Borg and displayed the PLP for almost two years without incident. However, he was notified by MPI that the PLP was considered offensive and was demanded its immediate surrender, to which the Applicant complied.

The Supreme Court of Canada instructed a court as to how it should address an alleged violation of freedom of expression; s 2(b) of the Charter (Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (AG), [1989] 1 SCR 927 [“Irwin Toy”]). This Court found that “ASIML8” does attempt to convey a meaning and meets the first step, as the word itself does not attempt to convey a violent form of expression. This expression is within the protected sphere of conduct. The second step was to determine if the method of expression or the location of the expression is entitled to s 2(b) protection. The third step as outlined in Irwin Toy, was to determine whether the purpose or effect of the government action was to restrict freedom of expression. It was established that MPI’s purpose was to restrict the Applicant’s expression. The s 2(b) analysis in this case turns on the second step, the location of this expression.

The test for location, with respect to expression on government-owned property, is whether the place is public and where one would expect constitutional protection for free expression on the basis that expression in that place does not conflict with the purposes which s 2(b) is intended to serve: 1) democratic discourse, (2) truth finding and (3) self-fulfillment. To answer this question, the following factors were considered: a) the historical or actual function of the place; and b) whether other aspects of the place suggest that expression within it would undermine the values underlying free expression (Montréal (City) v 2952-1366 Québec Inc, 2005 SCC 62). The presence of a PLP, like advertising on a bus, is in the public space, not a private space.

Section 1 Charter rights and freedoms, however, are limited in scope and sets Canadian jurisprudence apart from American jurisprudence on free expression. The Court found that Charter protections were engaged, and the proportionate balancing required an understanding by the Court of the PLP program (Doré v Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12; Loyola High School v Quebec (AG), 2015 SCC 12). The MPI brochure sets out the restrictions for a PLP. Its review committee takes extensive steps to avoid unintended meanings outside of their collective knowledge. The Court accepted that “ASIMIL8” was originally approved because the search term entered was “asimilate” as opposed to “assimilate”. The error itself is of no import because MPI reserves the right to recall a PLP and the length of time it took in making the decision was not crucial. MPI believed that when they became apprised of a complaint, this decision required immediate attention and “falls within a range of reasonable alternatives” (RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada (AG), [1995] 3 SCR 199).

MPI submits that offensiveness is a matter of community standards and the word “assimilate” when considered in the context of Canadian history is on its face objectionable. The assimilation of Aboriginal people was the official policy of the Government of Canada and the Prime Minister in 2008 formerly apologized on behalf of all Canadians for its implementation and ongoing effects (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015 [“TRC Report”]). Given the history of assimilate, the mere presence of “ASIMIL8” is contrary to a respectful and welcoming environment.

The Court accepts that by choosing to display the PLP on his vehicle, the Applicant was not denigrating Indigenous people. The standard of review, however, is reasonableness. The action of the Registrar in revoking the PLP was determined to be reasonable. The Path to Reconciliation Act played a significant part in the decision. The policy of the assimilation of Indigenous people appears 151 times in the TRC report. The word assimilate has taken on a new meaning within this country. In order to meet the Doré test, the Charter right must be minimally impaired. Following the surrender of the “ASIMIL8” PLP, Troller chose a different word to express his love of the Borg character in Star Trek and was issued a new PLP.

The Children’s Aid Society of Brant v SG

Posted on by
Reply

Wiyasiwewin Mikiwahp Native Law Centre Case Watch

Applicant’s motion for summary judgement denied. A Children’s Aid Society did not meet its onus for evidence in the pursuit of an order to place a child in extended care with no access.

The Applicant, the Children’s Aid Society of Brant (“The Society”), was seeking preliminary findings, protection findings and an order of disposition placing the child, M. G-D. (“M.”) born in 2017 and aged one year a the time of this application, in extended care with no access. The motion for summary judgment has been denied. There is ample evidence that M. is a medically fragile child. He has been diagnosed with a serious congenital heart condition known as ventricular septal defect as well as double outlet right ventricular transposition of the arteries, pulmonary stenosis and pulmonary atresia. He required the administration of oxygen at birth, has had heart surgery in June 2018 and will require further surgery in the future. M. must attend Sick Children’s Hospital in Toronto on a regular basis for cardiac follow-up, checks of his oxygen and saturation levels as well as close monitoring of his weight. There was additional evidence that demonstrated that when M. becomes ill he can become very ill very quickly and thereby requires timely medical attention.

The respondent father indicated that he identifies as Ojibway but does not have a “status card” and that the child does not have status as First Nations. The Society did not, despite court instruction to do so, clearly assess whether the child was First Nation, and if so whether there was an Indigenous community that was a party. It was apparent during numerous discussions and stand-downs that occurred, that no one understood precisely what questions needed to be asked or what the test was, let alone how to apply the information obtained to the legal test. In a child protection proceeding it is a vital question and a determination that the Court is statutorily obligated to make. M. is a young child who has been the subject of an application seeking extended care without access and has been in the Society’s care his entire life. His right to an orderly and expeditious hearing of the pertinent issues should never have been compromised by the lack of follow through on legislatively prescribed requirements. Section 90(2) of the Child Youth and Family Services Act reads as follows: “As soon as practicable, and in any event before determining whether a child is in need of protection, the court shall determine, (a) the child’s name and age; (b) whether the child is a First Nations, Inuk or Métis child and, if so, the child’s bands and First Nations, Inuit or Métis communities; and (c) where the child was brought to a place of safety before the hearing, the location of the place from which the child was removed.”

The early determination of whether a child is First Nation and the appropriate Indigenous community is a particular priority for a number of reasons. First, it triggers an obligation by the Society to meet the child’s cultural needs. Second, if there is an identifiable Indigenous community, that community is a party to the proceeding and service is required. Child protection proceedings are conducted in the adversarial, not the inquisitorial style. The Court thus must rely on the parties to provide the requisite evidence in order to determine the issues. In the Court’s view, the Society’s assertion that its worker was only “informed” of the father’s status through service of his affidavit on November 1, 2018, does not assist it. Parents caught up in child protection proceedings are often stressed and vulnerable. It is not reasonable to assume that the parents will understand the need to self-identify at an early stage. Even where the parents have counsel, counsel’s primary obligation is to his or her client.  When a child is in Society care, the Society is that child’s guardian. The Society, therefore, has an obligation to that child to ensure these inquiries are made early and proactively.

These events have also been a “wake-up call” to this Court. Although the Court is dependent on parties providing evidence, the Court should be extremely mindful of its supervisory role to ensure that findings are, indeed, addressed “as soon as practicable”. In 2015, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission released a Call to Action under the heading Child Protection. It called upon the federal, provincial, territorial and Aboriginal government to commit to reducing the number of Aboriginal children in care. To that end, it asks the governments inter alia to “[e]nsure that social workers and others who conduct child welfare investigations are properly educated and trained about the potential for Aboriginal communities and families to provide more appropriate solutions to family healing.” It also implored governments to establish as an important priority a requirement that placements of Aboriginal children in temporary and permanent care be culturally appropriate. Neither of these steps can be effected if the Society is not diligent in ensuring early identification of First Nation children and their bands or Indigenous communities.

Law Society of British Columbia v Coutlee, 2018 LSBC 33

Posted on by
Reply

Wiyasiwewin Mikiwahp Native Law Centre Case Watch

A law society hearing panel agreed to adjourn a hearing and recommend that it be reconstituted with an Indigenous member on the basis that its lack of Indigenous representation raised an apprehension of institutional bias.

A Hearing Panel of the Law Society of British Columbia (the Panel) granted an application to adjourn the hearing of a disciplinary citation against the Respondent, that concerned a failure to abide by practice restrictions. The decision to adjourn the hearing was in reaction to the second of two applications made by the Respondent at the outset of the hearing of the citation. The Respondent’s first application was dismissed. It asked that the citation be withdrawn or stayed as being baseless and in breach of natural justice and procedural fairness. The Respondent’s second application was for a determination that the Hearing Panel should include a person who is either an Indigenous lawyer or Elder. The Respondent did not assert any actual bias in the members of the Panel. Yet he argued that he would be more confident in the decision of the Panel, if reconstituted as requested, as being non-discriminatory and having weighed the evidence fairly. Counsel for the Law Society took no position on this application except to oppose any decision by the Panel that would result in an adjournment of the hearing of the citation.

The Respondent referred to the analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R v Kokopenace as a basis for his right to be treated differently, at least to the extent of ensuring that he is “tried” or heard by a panel that includes an Elder. The Respondent argued that this give him more confidence that the Panel was not biased against him as an Indigenous person. Counsel for the Law Society distinguished Kokopenace as dealing with an accused’s right to a fair trial under Section 11 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, submitting that this does not apply to the proceedings before a Law Society hearing panel because they do not attract true penalty consequences.

In reaching its decision, the Panel did not rely on Kokopenace, but they were guided by challenges identified in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Final Report. The Panel also concluded that specifically addressing cultural competencies on the Panel is warranted in this case.

The Panel granted the Respondent’s application by adjourning the hearing and making a recommendation to the President’s Designate that the Panel be reconstituted to include an Indigenous person. The Panel found that a failure to reconstitute the Panel with an Indigenous member would be inconsistent with the values and objectives of the Law Society that are made evident in its commitment to its Truth and Reconciliation Advisory Committee Report.

Alberta (Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act, Director) v JR, 2018 ABPC 258

Posted on by
Reply

United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Calls to Action, and Gladue principles inapplicable to child protection matter.

JR and AL are the parents of seven children ranging in age from nine months to nine years. Both parents have been diagnosed with cognitive and intellectual disabilities. Throughout their time spent together and apart, JR and AL suffered from multiple addictions, which aggravated domestic violence issues between them. All seven children have spent considerable time in state care due to the domestic violence and addictions suffered by their parents. The youngest children even tested positive for methamphetamines post-birth. The oldest children display severe behavioural issues and are likely to struggle in future years, thereby needing a stable and safe environment.

The applicant, Kasohkowew Child Wellness Society (KCWS), exists pursuant to a tripartite agreement between the Province of Alberta, the Government of Canada and the Samson Cree Nation. KCWS brought an application under the Child Youth and Family Enhancement Act RSA 2000 c C-12 (CYFEA), for a permanent guardianship order for all seven children and this was ultimately granted by the Court. Counsel for AL opposed the application, making submissions in favour of less invasive action based on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) Calls to Action, and the principles set out in R v Gladue, [1999] 1 SCR 688.

With respect to UNDRIP, counsel for AL pointed to Article 7.2, which states “Indigenous individuals have the collective right to live in freedom, peace and security as distinct peoples and shall not be subjected to any act of genocide or any other act of violence including forcibly removing children of the group to another group (emphasis added)”. In response, the Court pointed out that KCWS is a delegated First Nations authority established under a tripartite agreement to provide child, youth and family services to Samson Cree Nation. The Court found it difficult to assume that such an authority would be at all involved in discriminating against its own people. Instead, the Court assumed that the director would only remove children and place them with non-Aboriginal foster parents as a last resort, and that the director found it in the best interests of the children to do so. The Court held that UNDRIP is aspirational and does not trump the best interests or physical and mental safety of the child.

Counsel for AL quotes several TRC Calls to Action that relate to reducing the number of Aboriginal children in care. She pointed out that some of the child welfare workers directly involved with the family were not Cree or even Aboriginal. However, the TRC Calls to Action she quoted only calls for child welfare workers to be properly educated and trained in the history and subsequent impacts of the residential school system, and about the potential for Aboriginal communities and families to provide more appropriate solutions to family healing. The TRC did not say that all child welfare workers must be Aboriginal.

As for the potential applicability of R v Gladue, submissions of this type are usually in the context of criminal law cases, not child protection matters. The Court noted that the purpose of the CYFEA is not to punish parents, but to protect children and achieve what is in their best interests. In this case that would be stable, permanent and nurturing relationships and continuity of care for all seven children. As far as the negative impacts regarding the transmission of Cree culture, steps had been taken to keep the children together as much as possible. It was necessary to have the two youngest children placed in a group home, but the older five children are all together in one foster home. In terms of the preservation of the uniqueness of the children’s Aboriginal culture, heritage, spirituality and traditions, the Court was convinced that all appropriate steps were taken by KCWS to ensure these needs are met for the children.

National Aboriginal Day Celebrations

Posted on by
Reply

 BY CHRISTINA GRAY

Photo Credit: Lynda Gray, Ts'msyen Author of First Nations 101.

Photo Credit: Lynda Gray, Ts’msyen author of First Nations 101.

This June 21st, 2016 is significant as it marks 20 years since National Aboriginal Day was instituted as a national holiday in Canada. This is the one day specifically for Aboriginal people (and non-Aboriginal) across Canada to come together and celebrate, share meals, stories, music, and partake in cultural activities ranging from salmon feasts, canoeing to listening to throat singing.

Aside from being National Aboriginal Day, June 21st is also the summer solstice. It’s the longest day of the year and the shortest night of the year. This year we were fortunate enough to see the Strawberry Moon where the moon shone bright pink. It’s naturally a day to spend time in the warmth of the sunshine and celebrate the earth’s rotation in bringing us a renewed wealth of life.

People from all walks of life on June 21st come together to recognize our diverse cultures. In cities it can often feel stifling or invisible to be an Aboriginal person with distinct legal traditions, culture, history, and a distinct past. One that includes a lot of cultural and legal strengths, but that is often fraught with continued difficulties.

This last year the Truth and Reconciliation Commission formally closed in Ottawa with the release of their Final Report and Calls to Action. The closing of the TRC ended their 5-year mandate as part of the “truth telling and reconciliation process” in response to the Indian Residential School legacy.

At the TRC closing there was a lot of good energy shared between people. There was a walk for reconciliation, workshops, musical performances, art exhibits, and informal drumming and dancing that happened in the streets and hotel foyers. That energy will never be forgotten and neither will the residential schools’ dark legacy. This day is part of recognizing the truth-telling that happened through the TRC.

On my way home, I had a conversation with my mom about the good energy that I felt from attending the closing ceremonies. I left Ottawa with a renewed sense of who I am as an Aboriginal person living in a big city. I had time to reflect and find strength from being with survivors and allies. Attending the TRC was truly an internal and external reconciliation with Canada’s residential school legacy.

On June 22nd, there will another opportunity to build relationships, reconcile, and celebrate who we are as Aboriginal people in Canada. Over 300 school children, Aboriginal people, and community members will be doing just that at the Walk for Reconciliation at Saskatoon’s Victoria Park at 10am. This walk is to commemorate the one year that has passed since the TRC’s closing and for people to “rock your roots”. Let’s continue that good energy that was felt at the TRC’s closing and be proud of our distinct heritage, be it Mayan from Oaxaca, Dene, or Cree!

About the Author: Christina Gray is legally trained and works in Publications at the University of Saskatchewan’s College of Law, Native Law Centre of Canada. A first people of the Ts’msyen of Lax Kw’alaams, Dene from Lutsel K’e, and Red River Metis.