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A Summary of the Attorney General of Canada’s Directive on Civil Litigation Involving Indigenous Peoples

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This document provides a summary of the Attorney General of Canada’s Directive on Civil Litigation Involving Indigenous Peoples (the Directive).

The Directive was written by Jody Wilson-Raybould, the former Attorney General of Canada, in response to her mandate letter from Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. It outlines a series of litigation guidelines instructing Crown counsel as to how the Principles Respecting the Government of Canada’s Relationship with Indigenous Peoples (the Principles) must be applied in civil litigation involving Indigenous peoples.

The former Attorney General articulates that the guidelines are intended to reflect a significant shift in Crown-Indigenous relations. In particular, the Directive recognizes the limited ability of litigation to achieve the sort of reconciliation and renewal required in Crown-Indigenous relationships. The former Attorney General recognized that Indigenous peoples are entitled to select their own forum to resolve legal issues while also reiterating that where litigation is important, the guidelines should direct the Government’s positions and strategies.

The former Attorney General went on to outline that the Directive applies to section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which entrenches Aboriginal and Treaty rights, as well as other Crown obligations towards Indigenous peoples. It is intended to animate the advice provided by departments and Cabinet towards the goal of reconciliation with Indigenous peoples, which is the fundamental purpose of section 35 of the Constitution. Importantly, the Directive indicates that the honour of the Crown is reflected not just in the substance of positions taken by the Crown in litigation, but also in how those positions are expressed. This broader goal is grounded in four main objectives: (1) advancing reconciliation; (2) recognizing rights; (3) upholding the honour of the Crown; and (4) respecting and advancing Indigenous self-determination and self-governance.

The Litigation Guidelines are as follows:

Litigation Guideline #1 – Counsel must understand the Principles and apply them throughout a file’s lifespan.

Counsel must seek to understand and apply Indigenous perspectives, recognizing the diversity of Indigenous perspectives and the rights underlying these varied relationships.

Litigation Guideline #2 – Litigation strategy must reflect a whole-of-government approach.

Principle 3 requires the Government to act with honour, integrity, good faith and fairness in all dealings with Indigenous peoples. To this end, counsel must endeavour to engage in discussions between Indigenous peoples and the departments and agencies about the way in which litigation might affect their relationship. This guideline calls for litigation strategies that are firmly rooted in the policies of the Crown and advocates awareness of government-wide implications of judicial decisions or settlements. This will necessitate broad consultation from government actors.

Litigation Guideline #3 – Early and continuous engagement with legal services counsel and client departments is necessary to seek to avoid litigation.

In order for conflict and litigation to become the exception and not the rule, counsel must engage with client departments and agencies as soon as they become aware of a conflict that may result in litigation, and endeavour to develop coordinated approaches that aim to resolve disputes without litigation.

Litigation Guideline #4: Counsel should vigorously pursue all appropriate forms of resolution throughout the litigation process.

The primary goal of counsel must be to resolve issues, using the court process as a forum of last resort. Forms of resolution such as alternative dispute resolution processes (such as negotiations and mediations) must be considered including the invocation of Indigenous legal traditions or other traditional Indigenous approaches. Consideration must also be given to creative solutions with other department counsel and other government departments or agencies.

Litigation Guideline #5: Recognizing Aboriginal rights advances reconciliation.

This guideline recognizes that the Principles necessitate a change in the interpretation and governing of Aboriginal rights. It specifically points to Principles 1 and 2, which call on the Government of Canada to ensure its dealing with Indigenous peoples are based on the recognition and implementation of the right to self-determination and state that reconciliation requires hard work, changes in perspectives and action, compromise, and good faith. It also specifically points to the need to recognize Aboriginal rights, including Aboriginal title, wherever these can be recognized. Litigation counsel is advised to avoid taking positions or adding parties to litigation that undermine the ability of Indigenous groups to resolve disputes amongst themselves.

Litigation Guideline #6: Positions must be thoroughly vetted, and counsel should not advise client departments and agencies to pursue weak legal positions.

Counsel should resolve differences of opinion on available arguments and the strength of legal positions through discussion. Where discussion fails, consultation and approval must be done in an appropriate manner.

Litigation Guideline #7: Counsel must seek to simplify and expedite the litigation as much as possible.

Counsel must ensure that litigation is dealt with promptly and consider resource imbalances between parties.

Litigation Guideline #8: All communication and submissions must be regarded as an important tool for pursuing reconciliation.

This guideline emphasizes the role of written and oral submissions as an instrument of communication between the parties, the Attorney General, Indigenous peoples, the judicial system and the public. In these pleadings, efforts must be made to advance reconciliation through the application of the Principles.

Litigation Guideline #9: Counsel must use respectful and clear language in their written work.

The Attorney General is expected to be a model litigant, upholding the expectation and maintaining high standards of civility and advocacy in their communication with the courts, Indigenous peoples or their counsel.

Litigation Guideline #10: Legal terminology must be consistent with constitutional and statutory language.

Counsel should abide by the specific terms used in the Constitution, by Parliament, and by the legislatures relating to Indigenous peoples, including the term Aboriginal as defined by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, the term “Indian” as it appears in subsection 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, and the term First Nation in reference to the First Nations Land Management Act, S.C.

Litigation Guideline #11: Overviews must be used to concisely state Canada’s position and narrow the issues.

An overview of Canada’s position, whether in pleadings or in factums, is an important communicative tool. The overview must be used to plainly explain Canada’s position, outlining what is and what is not an issue.

Litigation Guideline #12: To narrow the scope of litigation, admissions ought to be made, where possible.

Admissions of facts that support claims of historical harm should be acknowledged, with approval from the client and Assistant Deputy Attorney General. In pleadings, facts that are known to support the statements in the Indigenous party’s pleading and that may advance reconciliation should be explicitly stated and not just admitted where appropriate. For example, instead of only listing those paragraphs with such facts in a generic statement of admission, counsel should affirmatively plead those facts:

In response to paragraph x of the statement of claim, since at least the date of contact, the plaintiffs and their ancestors have lived at various sites in the vicinity of the identified area.

Litigation Guideline #13: Denials must be reviewed throughout the litigation process.

Denials made at early stages of litigation, when the facts may be unknown and when it would be imprudent to admit too much, must be withdrawn if and when it becomes clear that such denials are inconsistent with the available evidence.

Litigation Guideline #14: Limitations and equitable defences should be pleaded only where there is a principled basis and evidence to support the defence.

Long-standing federal positions such as extinguishment, surrender and abandonment are discouraged by the Principles. These defences should only be pleaded where there is a principled basis and evidence to support to the defence. Moreover, where litigation has been long delayed, defences such as laches and acquiescence are preferable to limitation defences.

Litigation Guideline #15: A large and liberal approach should be taken to the question of who is the proper rights holder.

This guideline speaks to the right of Indigenous peoples and nations to define for themselves who the rights-bearing collective is. Canada should not object to the entitlement of a group to bring litigation when rights are asserted on behalf of larger entities where no conflicting interests exist.

Litigation Guideline #16: Where litigation involves Federal and Provincial jurisdiction, counsel should seek to ensure that the litigation focuses as much as possible on the substance of the complaint.

Litigation Guideline #17: Oral history evidence should be a matter of weight, not admissibility.

Litigation Guideline #18: Decisions on judicial reviews and appeals should be subject to full consultation within government and be limited to important questions.

Litigation Guideline #19: Intervention should be used to pursue important questions of principle.

This guideline indicates that intervention requires consideration of whether the Attorney General’s intervention can assist the course through the provision of legal or constitutional perspective not addressed by the parties to the dispute.

Litigation Guideline #20: All files must be reviewed to determine what lessons can be learned about how the Principles can best be applied in litigation.

The final guideline suggests a review process that will enable counsel and the client department to learn from each litigation case by reflecting on how similar litigation cases can be avoided in the future.

For more information on the Principles see: Principles respecting the Government of Canada’s relationship with Indigenous Peoples.

For more information on the Directive see: The Attorney General of Canada’s Directive on Civil Litigation Involving Indigenous Peoples.

Editor’s Note: Professor Larry Chartrand of the University of Ottawa and former Director of the Wiyasiwewin Mikiwahp Native Law Centre, contributed his thoughts and expertise that assisted the improvement of the Directive.

Ahousaht Indian Band and Nation v Canada (AG), 2018 BCSC 633

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Wiyasiwewin Mikiwahp Native Law Centre Case Watch

Declaratory relief allowed for Aboriginal right to right-based “all species” commercial fishery.

The plaintiffs are five First Nations whose territories are located on a strip of varying widths along the West Coast of Vancouver Island and are part of the fourteen Nuu-chah-nulth group of Nations. This trial took place in two stages, which was unanticipated by either party when it began. The first part of the trial was heard by a different judge who issued reasons in Ahousaht Indian Band and Nation v Canada (AG), [2010] 1 CNLR 1 (BCSC), as well as declarations. There were originally eleven plaintiffs in this action. However, the initial Statement of Claim claimed Aboriginal title on behalf of each of the eleven Nations, as well as Aboriginal rights. Because some of the title claims overlapped, it was ordered that the plaintiffs choose one or more Nations whose claims to title did not overlap, and the claims of those plaintiffs would proceed in this action. The present five plaintiffs proceeded to trial with their claims but the remaining claims have yet to be tried.

The plaintiffs asserted an Aboriginal right to harvest fisheries resources for a variety of purposes including for food, social and ceremonial purposes, commercial purposes, and so on. It was declared in 2009 that the plaintiffs have an Aboriginal right in these terms: “to fish for any species of fish within their Fishing Territories and to sell that fish”. However, the Fishing Territories were limited to a nine-mile strip or Court Defined Area (“CDA”). It was also declared that the entire fisheries management regime, consisting of legislation, regulations, and policies, constituted a prima facie infringement of that right. The trial was then adjourned to allow the parties to negotiate a fishery based on this declaration. In the event the negotiations (“Negotiations”) were unsuccessful, they could return to court on the issue of whether Canada could justify its legislative, regulatory and policy regimes as they apply to the plaintiffs’ Aboriginal fishery, named T’aaq-wiihak, which means “permission to fish”.

The history of this action is complex and interwoven with another action on Aboriginal fishing rights (Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band v Canada (AG), [2011] 4 CNLR 346 (SCC)) (“Lax Kw’alaams”), which proceeded slightly ahead of this action, and this Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) decision has influenced the course of the present action. After the 2009 judgment, the Negotiations began in 2010, but soon led to a reactivation of the litigation. The Negotiations have continued and are ongoing. Meanwhile, following the first stage of the trial, Canada appealed the 2009 decision. That appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal in 2011 (Ahousaht Indian Band v Canada (AG), [2011] 3 CNLR 1 (BCCA)). The Court of Appeal upheld the trial decision but removed geoduck species from the “any species” list of the right-based fishery and included other minor variations. Canada then appealed to the SCC. The SCC remanded this present case back to the Court of Appeal in 2012 with no reasons, but with a direction that the case be reconsidered in accordance with their recent decision in Lax Kw’alaams. After reconsideration, the Court of Appeal once again dismissed the appeal and confirmed its order from 2011 (Ahousaht Indian Band v Canada (AG), [2013] 4 CNLR 31 (BCCA)). Canada applied to the SCC for leave to appeal the reconsideration decision but was denied in 2014. This court is bound by the Court of Appeal’s 2013 reconsideration decision. The stage of this trial then began in 2015 where the parties agreed that a justification analysis is required for each species of fish for which the plaintiffs have submitted fishing proposals.

This case as it stands can only be concerned with the justification analysis. The 2009 declared Aboriginal right cannot be redefined, despite being general without any qualifiers. However, in order for the justification analysis to take place, the Court held that the right has to be clearly described. The only way to circumscribe the right-based fishery at this stage of trial was by using what could be inferred from reading the 2009 reasons as a whole. Although the Court rendered general comments regarding the infringement and justification analysis in the present case, it found that a justification analysis had to be done in a species-specific manner. An analysis of continuity in respect of each individual species, however, could not result in subtraction of species from the “any species” declaration, despite the 2011 Court of Appeal’s removal of the geoduck species, which was eliminated on the basis of fishing technique.

The 2009 declaration has been described as a two-edged sword. Canada is bound by the right as declared, but the plaintiffs are bound as well, and unhappy with the nine-mile limit for a right-based fishery. They cannot exercise their right within the CDA in a way that is satisfactory to them. The conclusion to be drawn from interpreting the 2009 reasons as a whole, despite the lack of parameters in the declarations, is that the declared right to fish for any species and to sell that fish is to be interpreted as a small-scale, artisanal, local, multi-species, right-based fishery, to be conducted in a nine-mile strip from shore, using small, low-cost boats with limited technology and restricted catching power, and aimed at wide community participation.

Canada, however, did not take the position that the entire regime, found to be a prima facie infringement, could be justified and should remain unchanged. Given all the circumstances and complexity surrounding the procedural history and subsequent Negotiations, it was considered inappropriate or unnecessary to make a general declaration in respect of a failure of the duty to consult in good faith either under the common law or under the declaration. There were stumbling blocks presented by both sides, and the process is still in progress. The Court also noted the Department of Fisheries and Oceans’ commitment to ongoing deep consultation, and therefore did not see this as an issue upon which the justification analysis should stand or fall.

Editor’s Note: Six First Nations governments and three industry groups sought leave to intervene on the basis that each has a public interest in a public law issue and each can bring a valuable perspective to the Court. On November 7, 2018, leave for all nine applicants was granted by the British Columbia Court of Appeal but limited to issues that will not be repetitive and will be helpful to the Court (Ahousaht Indian Band and Nation v Canada (AG), 2018 BCCA 413).

Northern Inter-Tribal Health Authority Inc. and Peter Ballantyne Cree Nation Health Services Inc. v Attorney General of Canada (Minister of Finance), 2018 FC 1180 [NITHA]

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The Federal Government has a long-standing obligation to provide health services to First Nations. The Applicants pension plans fall under federal jurisdiction.

In NITHA, the Federal Court considered whether the pension plans of the applicants, Northern Inter-Tribal Health Authority Inc. (NITHA) and Peter Ballantyne Cree Nation Health Services Inc. (PBCNHS), fell under federal or provincial jurisdiction. The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions of Canada (OSFI), argued that the pension plans fall under provincial jurisdiction, while NITHA and PBCNHS argue that they fall under federal jurisdiction. Applying the two-part test articulated by the Supreme Court in NIL/TU, O, the Court declared that the pension plans in question fall under federal jurisdiction.

The Court concluded that a correctness standard of review was to be applied on the grounds that the dispute engaged a question of a constitutional nature. NIL/TU, O and Nation Innu Matemekush-Lac John supports that constitutional issues regarding the division of powers are to be decided on a correctness standard.

The applicable test identified as outlined by Abella J in NIL/TU, O, contains two parts. The first part is a functional test of whether the entity is engaged in a federal undertaking. This requires an inquiry into the nature, habitual activities and daily operations of the entity in question. The second part applies only if the first part is inconclusive and it requires consideration of whether provincial regulation would impair the core federal power. The Court also reiterated Abella J’s citation to Four B Manufacturing Ltd, which indicates that federal government funding does not on its own convert the operation into a federal activity.

The functional test calls for an inquiry into the nature, habitual activities and daily operations of the entity in question to determine whether it constitutes a federal undertaking. In examining the Supreme Court’s application of the functional test in NIL/TU, O, the Court highlighted Abella J’s position that the emphasis be placed on the underlying reason for the performance of the activities. The Court also echoed McLachlin CJC and Fish J’s concern in Four B Manufacturing Ltd that the test must be applied cautiously to avoid simply conflating the nature of activities with the habitual and daily operations involved in carrying out an activity.

The Court concluded that OSFI made an error by failing to consider the underlying reason for the activities. In particular, the fact that OSFI narrowly construed the purpose of the agreements governing the relationship, by referring to some recitals and excluding others which make reference to constitutional provisions, the special relationship subsisting between First Nations People and the Crown as well as important historical documents, such as Treaties 5, 6, 8 and 10, which include promises of healthcare. These treaties make it clear that the Federal Government undertook to provide health services to Indians on Indian Reserves.

On this basis, the Court granted the application for certiorari to quash OSFI’s decision. These arguments, along with a further examination of the historical treaty record, were also used to support a declaration that the provision of health services to the Indians is a century long federal undertaking made, in part, in keeping with the treaty relationship between the Applicants and the Federal Government.

Francis v Canada, 2018 FC 49

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The Plaintiff’s motion failed for a declaration of an interim order for advanced costs. The circumstances surrounding the claim of an unjust infringement of treaty and Aboriginal rights was not sufficiently compelling or unique enough for the Court to grant this exceptional remedy.

The Plaintiff, Hubert Francis, is a Mi’kmaw and member of the Elsipogtog First Nation in the province of New Brunswick. On three occasions in 2015, officials from the Department of Fisheries and Oceans boarded his vessel and seized his catch for fishing without a valid fishing license. He asserts he is entitled to do so pursuant to treaty and Aboriginal rights. The Plaintiff and the Aboriginal crew of his vessel, have been charged with fishing without authorization in respect of the last two incidents, and are facing summary conviction proceedings under the Fisheries Act before the courts of the province of Québec.

The Plaintiff sought declarations that the prohibitions and restrictions placed upon him are an unjustifiable infringement of his treaty and Aboriginal rights. The Plaintiff asked for an interim order for advanced costs, relying on the principles in British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v Okanagan Indian Band, as he would otherwise be unable to proceed with this civil action. There is agreement among the parties that the Plaintiff must meet three criteria of the Okanagan test before the Court may order for advanced costs: (1) The party genuinely cannot afford to pay for the litigation, and no other realistic option exists for bringing the issues to trial; (2) The claim to be adjudicated is prima facie meritorious or of sufficient merit that it is contrary to the interests of justice for the litigation to be forfeited just because the litigant lacks financial means; (3) The issues raised transcend the individual interests of the particular litigant, are of public importance, and have not been resolved in previous cases.

The Court concluded the Plaintiff cannot meet two of the three criteria required of the Okanagan test, therefore his motion fails. Although the Plaintiff only raised a nominal amount for a civil proceeding, there was no attempt by him to secure funding for his defense in the summary conviction proceedings. It has not been demonstrated that these issues cannot be determined fairly, adequately and without injustice in the context of the Quebec criminal proceedings. The failure of the Supreme Court to mention the availability of other fora under the specific heading of impecuniosity in both R v Caron and Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v Canada has little relevance to the issues. Advanced cost orders must be used only as a last resort to avoid an injustice, not because it is a “preferable” mode of determining issues, where an adequate alternative mode exists. It must be to prevent an injustice for the litigant and the public at large that would result from the failure of having issues of public importance properly resolved. It should not be used as a smart litigation strategy.

Although the declarations sought by the Plaintiff in his statement of claim are limited to his own rights, it remains that the rights he asserts are, by their nature, collective rights held by the relevant Aboriginal communities or collectives. As such, they cannot be advanced as the basis of a civil claim or a declaratory action without the support of the community or collective, which he does not have. Individuals can, without the support of the relevant collective that holds the rights, assert these communal rights and have them adjudicated, to the extent necessary, in defense to criminal or regulatory offence proceedings, but individuals may not invoke them as the basis of a claim for determination of rights (R v Chevrier and Queackar- Komoyue Nation v British Columbia). To recognize an individual’s right to institute and maintain, without the support of the appropriate collective, civil actions asserting Aboriginal rights whenever they are brought “in parallel” to criminal proceedings, would ignore the unique nature of those rights and undermine the authority of the lawful representatives of the relevant band or nation to determine when and how to assert these rights. Given the Plaintiff’s lack of standing to bring this action, the second criterion of the Okanagan test, that the claim be prima facie meritorious, has not been met.

Conseil des Atikamekw d’Opitciwan c Weizineau, 2018 QCCS 4170

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Judicial authorization granted to banish a defendant from the Opitciwan First Nation in accordance with a Band Council by-law.

The Opitciwan First Nation is an Aboriginal people of Canada who benefit from the rights arising from s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, including the right to self-government. Under this principle of self-government and in accordance with the power conferred by s. 81 of the Indian Act, the Band Council adopted a by-law “respecting the expulsion of persons found guilty of trafficking certain drugs and other substances”, that allows the Band to banish any person found guilty of such offences by a court from their reserve for a period of sixty months. This by-law came into effect on January 1, 2017.

The defendant was found guilty of trafficking narcotics on March 22, 2017, by the Court of Quebec. On August 1, 2017, the Band Council adopted a resolution in accordance with the above by-law to expel her from the community until March 22, 2022. Despite the various attempts to apply the by-law and resulting resolution, the plaintiff ignored these requests by hiding in private homes in the Opitciwan community. Consequently, the Band Council has failed to expel her.

The Court ordered the defendant to leave the borders of the Opitciwan Indian Reserve and to remain outside these borders until such time as sanctioned by the Band Council. Any peace officer or bailiff is authorized to assist the plaintiff in the execution of this judgment, the whole at the plaintiff’s mere verbal request and regardless of the premises in which the defendant is to be found, such that they may be entered and the defendant escorted to the border of the Opitciwan Indian Reserve. As well, the Court acknowledges the plaintiff’s undertaking to execute the expulsion measures in such a way that the defendant will not be left alone or without support at the borders of the Opitciwan Indian Reserve.

WSÁNEĆ School Board v BC Government and Service Employees’ Union, 2017 FCA 210

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The Doré framework is applicable when an administrative tribunal’s decision making engages the underlying principles and values of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, and such decisions are to be reviewed on the same standard of reasonableness.

This case involved an application for judicial review by the WSÁNEĆ School Board (the WSB) seeking to set aside a decision of the Canada Industrial Relations Board (CIRB). Specifically, the WSB challenged a decision of the CIRB to dismiss an application from the WSB in which it sought to exclude employees teaching WSÁNEĆ language, beliefs, and culture in the SENĆOŦEN Immersion Program from the all-employee bargaining unit of the BC Government and Service Employees’ Union (BCGSEU).

The WSB argued that including the SENĆOŦEN employees in an all-employee bargaining unit would negatively impact the constitutional rights of the WSÁNEĆ First Nations to control the transmission of their language and culture, as entrenched in ss 25 and 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The WSB submitted that the Canada Labour Code must be interpreted and applied in a manner that respects these constitutional rights and takes into account the values and principles that underpin them, including the need for reconciliation. The WSB also asserted that the CIRB had breached its procedural fairness rights by failing to grant it an oral hearing. The WSB had unsuccessfully sought an oral hearing before the CIRB on the basis that this would allow for an explanation of the WSÁNEĆ beliefs and teachings in accordance with their oral traditions.

The Federal Court of Appeal held that the CIRB’s decision to dismiss the application was reasonable and that the CIRB was not obligated to provide an oral hearing.

Writing for the court, Gleason JA accepted that correctness is the appropriate standard for determining whether an oral hearing is required as part of procedural fairness though he also stated that the circumstances in which a party’s procedural fairness rights may be said to be violated are narrow. With respect to the merits of the CIRB decision, Gleason JA noted that reasonableness was generally the applicable standard to CIRB decisions that interpret and apply the Canada Labour Code and held that WSB’s invocation of ss 25 and 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 did not require him to reach a different conclusion here.

The WSB did not seek to have the CIRB rule on the scope of its Aboriginal rights to control education nor did it argue that such rights brought the labour relations of the SENĆOŦEN employees outside the purview of the Code. Instead, WSB invoked principles and values enshrined in ss 25 and 35 of the Constitution Act 1982, and argued that these required the CIRB to determine that the SENĆOŦEN employees should be excluded from BCSGEU. Gleason JA found this argument to be analogous to the those advanced in Doré v Barreau du Quebec, 2012 SCC 12, [2012] 1 SCR with respect to the need for an administrative tribunal to balance Charter values against other administrative law considerations. He accepted that the Doré framework could be applied to principles and values underlying s 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

Gleason JA invoked the principle that employee units should not be fractured without compelling evidence. As indicated by the CIRB, compelling evidence might include geographic factors, specific statutory provisions and the likelihood that a larger unit may not be viable. Ultimately, Gleason JA found that there was no evidence the WSB would lose their control over the way the SENĆOŦEN employers performed their duties. He also pointed out that the application may have been premature as there was no way to know whether the BCGSEU would accept terms and conditions that the WSB sought for the SENĆOŦEN employees and the WSB raised concerns about an eventual strike that were premature and theoretical in the absence of any evidence that a strike was likely.

With respect to procedural fairness, Gleason JA noted that the request for an oral history was neither clearly made nor well supported by the evidence. Moreover, he pointed out that it was well within the Court’s powers under the Canada Industrial Relations Board Regulations to decide the matter without an oral hearing, which the WSB knew prior to making their application.

Beaver v Hill, 2018 ONCA 816

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A claimant should not be barred from seeking leave of the court to pursue a s. 35 claim because his claim engages collective Aboriginal rights or incidentally engages questions of self-government.

In Beaver, Lauwers J.A. reversed the motion judge’s ruling, which dismissed Mr. Hill’s claim under s. 35 of the Constitution Act,1982. In his claim, Mr. Hill sought to challenge the applicability of the Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12 and Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. F.3, on the basis that he had a right to resolve support obligations under the Indigenous family dispute laws of the Haudenosaunee. The motion judge barred Mr. Hill from pursuing his claim on grounds of standing and justiciability. Regarding standing, the lower court pointed to the uncertainty in the law regarding an individual’s ability to personally pursue Aboriginal rights. Regarding justiciability, the motions judge cited Delgamuuk for the proposition that courts cannot adjudicate on claims involving broadly framed rights of self-governance.

In reversing this ruling, Lauwers J.A. pointed to various governing principles established in the case law. Among these was the principle that the basic purpose of s. 35 articulated in Van der Peet, Delgamuukw and Haida Nation, is to pursue reconciliation of the pre-existence of Aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown. Secondly, citing Behn, Lauwers J.A. emphasizes that in matters engaging Aboriginal treaty claims, a full hearing that is fair to all stakeholders is essential. Thirdly, he restates Binnie J’s caution in Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band that judges should avoid making definitive pronouncements regarding s. 35 at these early stages in the jurisprudence. He further adds that the reconciliation of individual and collective aspects of Aboriginal and treaty rights is an unresolved issue. Citing Behn, Lauwers J.A. notes that the Supreme Court “resisted the invitation of intervenors to classify or categorize [A]boriginal or treaty rights into those that are exclusively collective, those that are predominantly individual and those that are mixed.”

Applying these principles, Lauwers J.A. concludes that Mr. Hill’s claims are not exclusively claims to self-government. Instead, he seeks a right to have his support obligation determined by the Indigenous family system, which isn’t itself a claim to self-government. Moreover, while Mr. Hill’s claim may affect other Haudenosaunee people, this is simply the nature of constitutional litigation. Mr. Hill does not make claims for the Haudenosaunee peoples as a group. Lauwers J.A. continues to clarify that while this decision would enable separate spheres of jurisdiction (i.e. the provincial family law system and the Indigenous family law system) this is in keeping with the vision of s.35 as a tool for reconciliation.

Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada (Governor General in Council), 2018 SCC 40

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By Daniel Quainoo and Benjamin Ralston

The honour of the Crown is engaged in the development of legislation but not the Crown’s duty to consult

In Mikisew Cree the Supreme Court of Canada considered the question of whether the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate Aboriginal peoples extends to the legislative process. Mikisew Cree First Nation sought a declaration acknowledging the role of ministers in developing policy for the formulation of legislation as “Crown conduct” that triggers the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate. The Court also addressed whether s.18 of the Federal Courts Act provides the Federal Court with jurisdiction to review matters engaging the law-making process and whether enabling courts to review legislative processes would be in keeping with Canada’s constitutional order. While the Court was unanimous in deciding that the Federal Court lacked the jurisdiction to consider the question under s.18 of the Federal Courts Act, it was divided as to whether an executive actor could be said to have a duty to consult while participating in the legislative process and why.

In the result, a 7-2 majority of the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate Aboriginal peoples does not apply to any stage in the legislative process. At the same time, a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that the constitutional principle of the honour of the Crown applies to legislative processes even if these justices disagreed over whether the duty to consult was the appropriate means to uphold the principle in this context.

Karakatsanis J, writing the judgment for herself, Wagner CJ and Gascon J, held that the duty to consult cannot apply to the law-making process as this would contradict the constitutional principles of the separation of powers, parliamentary sovereignty and parliamentary privilege. She added that as a matter of pragmatism, imposing a duty to consult on the policy development stage of the legislative process could limit the possibility of meaningful accommodation since a proposed bill can be freely amended once introduced into Parliament. It would also lead to incongruous treatment of private member bills that do not involve any comparable Crown conduct to trigger the duty. Karakatsanis J concluded that the duty to consult doctrine is ill-suited to be applied directly to the law-making process.

At the same time, Karakatsanis J held that the constitutional principle of the honour of the Crown applies to the law-making process and that it would undermine the endeavour of reconciliation to allow the Crown to use legislation to circumvent its duty to consult and accommodate Aboriginal peoples. She pointed out the Ross River decision of the Yukon Court of Appeal where it was stated that legislation will be unconstitutional to the extent that it prevents meaningful consultation and accommodation from occurring. Karakatsanis J left open the possibility of other remedies for breaches of the honour of the Crown in the legislative context and suggested that the extent of any consultation may be a relevant consideration to other forms of recourse.

Brown J affirmed the conclusion that the constitutional principles of the separation of powers and parliamentary privilege prevent the judiciary from applying the duty to consult to the law-making process. He also opined that Crown conduct necessarily excludes parliamentary functions of the state and thus these functions cannot be subject to a duty to consult. Finally, he indicated that by leaving open the possibility that there may be other doctrines developed to enable review of the legislative process, even in the absence of a successful claim that Aboriginal or treaty rights have been unjustifiably infringed, the judgment written by Karakatsanis J undermines the conclusion that constitutional powers prevent judicial review of the legislative process. He stated that this position leaves the law in a state of considerable uncertainty and invites Aboriginal peoples to return to the courts to identify what “other form of recourse” might be available as an alternative to the duty to consult in the legislative context.

Writing for himself along with Moldaver and Cote JJ, Rowe J affirmed the arguments articulated by Brown J, and elaborated on three further points. First, he indicated that Aboriginal claimants continue to have remedies pursuant to the Sparrow, Haida and Rio Tinto decisions once legislation is enacted. Second, he outlined how the recognition of the duty to consult in the legislative process could be disruptive to the legislative process and pointed to numerous questions that are raised by imposing a duty of consultation on legislatures. Finally, he argued that providing the Mikisew Cree with the declaration they sought would demand that courts become interventionist in a manner that is not in keeping with the principle of separation of powers.

Abella and Martin JJ articulated a different vision for the judicial review of the legislative process. Writing for both Martin J and herself, Abella J held that any consideration of the duty to consult must begin with the Honour of the Crown and the overriding goal of reconciliation. In that light, she stated that the Court must reconcile the need to protect the legislative process from judicial interference with the need to protect Aboriginal rights within the legislative process. Abella J acknowledged that recognizing the honour of the Crown and duty to consult in this context may impact the legislative process, but held that the need for adjustments could not justify the erasure of constitutionally mandated rights. She noted that section 35 was recognized as a constitutional limit on the exercise of parliamentary sovereignty in the Sparrow decision and objected to parliamentary sovereignty now being used as a shield to prevent a claim for consultation. Abella J’s reasons highlight the essential role that the honour of the Crown and the duty to consult play in reconciling Aboriginal and Crown sovereignty. Abella and Martin JJ reasoned that the courts ought to play a role in evaluating whether legislative processes are in keeping with the special relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Crown.

The full reasons of the Supreme Court of Canada can be found here and a short summary is provided here.

Case Watch for September 2016

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The following decisions came across our desk over the past month:

Crown’s duty to consult & the constitutional competence of the NEB –

Tsleil-Waututh Nation v Canada (National Energy Board), 2016 FCA 219: The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed a statutory appeal from three interlocutory decisions of the National Energy Board (NEB) with respect to the Trans Mountain Pipeline proposal. Tsleil-Waututh Nation (TWN) challenged the NEB’s determination that the application for the project was sufficiently complete to proceed with an assessment and public hearing, a determination that included a listing and scoping of factors to be considered during the assessment, and an order detailing the steps and deadlines governing the assessment. While TWN raised complex arguments with regards to the NEB’s obligation to either discharge or assess Crown consultations, among others, the Court of Appeal dismissed its appeal largely on preliminary issues. The Court held that none of the challenged decisions were final and TWN ought to have first raised its concerns before the NEB itself rather than proceeding directly to the Court of Appeal. While the Court declined to intervene with respect to the Crown’s duty to consult at this stage, it did so without prejudice to TWN’s ability to challenge the final decisions of the Governor in Council on consultation for this project.

Modern treaty signatory added as defendant in Aboriginal rights case –

Cowichan Tribes v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 BCSC 1660: The British Columbia Supreme Court allowed an application from Tsawwassen First Nation (TFN) to be added as a defendant in an action brought by Cowichan Tribes and others for declarations of Aboriginal rights and title in what is now the City of Richmond. While Cowichan’s claims overlap with TFN’s territory, as defined in its modern treaty, Cowichan argued against joinder on the basis that its claims are narrowly defined and do not overlap with any TFN lands under its treaty. The Court accepted that TFN’s rights to the portion of its territory in conflict with Cowichan’s claims are largely consultative, but held that these are still section 35 rights to be accorded recognition. These rights were also sufficient to provide TFN with a direct interest in the litigation. TFN’s rights under the agreement fluctuate depending on the land-holding status of the area underpinning these rights, and the litigation could result in the introduction of an extra party into negotiations over fishing areas that TFN has rights to under its agreement.

Property taxation on reserve and statutory interpretation –

Musqueam Indian Band v Musqueam Indian Band (Board of Review), 2016 SCC 36: The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed an appeal from Musqueam Nation against a 2011 property taxation assessment of a golf and country club on its reserve land being calculated on the basis of its use as a golf and country club, as opposed to its value as residential land. The reserve land in question was surrendered in 1957 for lease to the golf and country club and its value for property tax purposes was consistently assessed on the basis of the restrictions under that lease from that point on. In 1996, however, Musqueam amended its property assessment bylaw to reduce the types of restrictions that an assessor could consider to “any restriction placed on the use of the land and improvements by the band” (emphasis added). In 2011, Musqueam challenged the consideration of the restrictions under the lease in a property tax assessment on the basis that the lease was negotiated between the Crown and the golf and country club and its restrictions were therefore not imposed “by the band”. Musqueam also argued that the 1996 amendment was made to account for its newly recognized land management powers under the Framework Agreement on First Nations Land Management. Both arguments were rejected.

Determination between competing 60’s scoop class actions –

Thompson v Manitoba (Minister of Justice), 2016 MBQB 169: The Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench exercised its discretion to permit one of two class actions to proceed with respect to individuals affected by the 60’s scoop in Manitoba (Meeches v Canada). It also stayed the other proposed class action (Thompson v Manitoba), issued a declaration that no further proposed 60’s scoop class actions are to be commenced in Manitoba on the same facts without leave, and granted leave to amend Meeches to ensure it covers the class members from Thompson. While Thompson was filed first, counsel did not take steps to seek certification in a timely manner. Meeches was also framed more consistently with the Brown case that has already been certified in Ontario with respect to 60’s scoop survivors there.

Addressing FASD in context to Gladue factors –

R v Drysdale, 2016 SKQB 312: The Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench extensively considered the Gladue factors and Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD) of an Aboriginal man in sentencing him for assault and threatening to use a weapon, relying on a full Gladue report and four witnesses for this purpose. The Court held that in the circumstances, a “needs based” as opposed to a retributive sentence was appropriate. The Court held that “a Gladue impacted individual affected by FASD has a reduced moral and legal responsibility” with respect to actions such as those underlying the offence in this case, which exhibited impulsiveness and a disconnect between actions and consequences common among FASD affected individuals. The Court also considered the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Call to Action 34, which focuses on better addressing the needs of offenders with FASD, in crafting its sentence.

First Nations advisory organization declared provincial entity –

Treaty 8 Tribal Association v Barley, 2016 FC 1090: The Federal Court allowed an application for judicial review of a federal adjudicator’s conclusion that the Treaty 8 Tribal Association was a federal undertaking for the purpose of the application of the Canada Labour Code. The adjudicator was held to have failed to apply the functional test to determine whether the nature, operations and habitual activities of the Association fell under the head of power of “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians”. The Association provides advisory, administrative, advocacy and other services to its members and other First Nations, but does not provide services under the Indian Act nor within the realm of First Nations governance or reserve land. The habitual activities of the Association did not fall under subsection 91(24) of the Constitution Act either.

Defamation by way of band council resolution –

Hazel v Rainy River First Nations, 2016 ONSC 5875: The Ontario Superior Court of Justice rejected the defendant First Nations’ motion for summary judgment and instead allowed summary judgment in favour of the plaintiffs in a defamation claim. The defendant First Nations described the plaintiffs as “undesirables” in a band council resolution (BCR), declared them trespassers on its territory, and resolved that they were to be removed and charged as trespassers if they were found on its territory. The Court held that placing the BCR into a book available to community members was a sufficient act of publication for the purposes of sustaining an action for defamation regardless of whether anyone had looked at the BCR in question. The Court also held that there was no dispute that describing the plaintiffs as “undesirables” was defamatory. Arguments with respect to qualified privilege, issue estoppel and abuse of process were all rejected.

Severance of criminal charges in context to constitutional challenge –

R c Rice, 2016 QCCS 4610 (in English): The Superior Court of Quebec severed criminal charges against three men from Kahnawake in relation to the alleged sale of tobacco to non-Aboriginals without collecting and remitting the retail consumer tax from these sales to the federal and provincial authorities. The defendants raised a constitutional challenge in this case involving various rights asserted on behalf of the Mohawk Nation, including rights of self-determination and internal sovereignty, a right to harvest, produce and sell tobacco products, and a right to exemption from taxation under s 87 of the Indian Act. The Court held that there was no reasonable likelihood that the s 35 rights claimed, assuming they were proven, would be unjustifiably infringed by the defendants’ obligations to collect and remit consumer taxes from non-Aboriginal customers. The Court also held that there was no reasonable likelihood of the s 87 exemption being successfully invoked against the defendants’ obligations to collect and remit taxes from non-Aboriginal customers. The Court was unable, however, to conclude that there was no reasonable likelihood of the defendants being able to prove that s 87 exempted them from the imposition of duties on tobacco products. The two charges related to the last argument were severed from the others and the Court ordered for a trial to proceed separately with respect to the charges that were not implicated by this argument.

Metis Settlement’s jurisdiction to specify membership requirements –

Kikino Metis Settlement v Metis Settlements Appeal Tribunal (Membership Panel), 2016 ABCA 260: The Alberta Court of Appeal has granted permission to appeal on a question of law from a decision of the Metis Settlements Appeal Tribunal setting aside a membership decision by the Kikino Metis Settlement. Kikino has passed a bylaw that appears to provide it with discretion to reject an application for membership from a candidate who is otherwise eligible to apply under the Metis Settlements Act and meets the minimum standards for admission under the Act. An otherwise eligible applicant who was rejected for reasons not set out in the Act successfully challenged her rejection before the Appeal Tribunal. The Court of Appeal will allow an appeal to proceed on two questions: 1) whether a Metis settlement can establish membership criteria that is more onerous than the minimum standards under the Act; and 2) if so, whether the criteria applied to the applicant rejected in this case was a lawful exercise of Kikino’s jurisdiction under its membership bylaw.

Placement of Métis child with non-Aboriginal adoptive parents –

LM v British Columbia (Director of Child, Family and Community Services), 2016 BCCA 367: The British Columbia Court of Appeal dismissed two appeals related to the intention of the Director of Child, Family and Community Services to place a Métis child from British Columbia in the care of a non-Aboriginal couple in Ontario that has already adopted two of the child’s siblings. The appellants have been the child’s foster parents since two days after her birth and one of the appellants is also of Métis heritage. The first appeal was dismissed primarily because the appellants were found to be seeking an adoption order for which there was no basis in the statutory scheme. The Court of Appeal rejected an argument that the lower court had not paid adequate attention to the child’s Métis heritage, concluding that this was not relevant to the Director’s decision that the appellants were challenging on judicial review. The Court of Appeal rejected the second appeal on the basis that the Charter arguments that the appellants wished to raise were correctly found to be subject to res judicata and there was an insufficient evidentiary record to decide these argument on appeal in any event.

Stays of proceedings for unreasonable delay (section 11(b)) –

R c Gilpin, 2016 QCCQ 9459 (in French only): The Court of Quebec allowed an application to stay criminal proceedings against two men in the judicial district of Abitibi on the basis that delays in these proceedings had violated their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s 11(b) of the Charter. The Court applied the analysis recently mandated by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Jordan to conclude that the delays in each applicant’s case were beyond the presumptive ceiling for reasonable delay, and there were insufficient exceptional circumstances to rebut this presumption of unreasonableness. The Court acknowledged past jurisprudence where the unique circumstances of communities in northern Quebec were found to justify trials taking longer, but concluded that these circumstances will no longer be considered “exceptional” for the purposes of applying s 11(b).

R c Rice, 2016 QCCS 4659 (in English): The Superior Court of Quebec allowed a s 11(b) application to stay criminal proceedings against three men from Kahnawake on charges relating to the alleged sale of tobacco to non-Aboriginals without collecting and remitting the retail consumer tax from these sales to the federal and provincial tax authorities. The Court held that even prior to the Supreme Court’s recent Jordan decision, the delays in this case would have been sufficient to ground an application for a stay of proceedings under s 11(b). While the defendants had presented a tardy constitutional challenge to the charges against them, this had no bearing on any delays they faced for the purpose of the s 11(b) analysis.

Stays of proceedings pending appellate decision on Métis rights –

Québec v Savard, 2016 QCCS 4391 (in French only): The Superior Court of Quebec allowed an application to stay proceedings in which Quebec is seeking to evict the applicant from a hunting camp. The applicant’s sole defense rests on his assertion that he is a member of the Métis community of Domaine du Roy and Seigneurie de Mingan and his community has Métis hunting rights that are protected under s 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. Another member of this same community, Ghislain Corneau, was unsuccessful in defending himself from a parallel application for eviction from the hunting camp before the Superior Court of Quebec early last year (see Québec c Corneau). In Corneau, the Superior Court ruled that the Métis community to which Mr. Corneau and Mr. Savard belong does not meet the Supreme Court of Canada’s Powley test. Mr. Corneau has since appealed that decision to the Quebec Court of Appeal and an appellate decision remains outstanding. The proceedings against Mr. Savard have been stayed until the Court of Appeal renders its judgment in Corneau.

Note that parallel applications were granted in two other proceedings: Québec v Bouchard, 2016 QCCS 4392 & Québec v Desbiens, 2016 QCCS 4393

Case Watch for August 2016

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Case Watch

The following decisions came across our desk over the past month:

Crown’s duty to consult in multi-stage permitting process –

Listuguj Mi’gmaq First Nation v New Brunswick, 2016 NBQB 138: The New Brunswick Court of Queen’s Bench dismissed an application for judicial review to quash three provincial approvals granted to Chaleur Terminals Inc for the construction of a rail terminal and transfer system in Belledune, New Brunswick. The applicants argued that these approvals were issued without any meaningful consultation or accommodation of the Aboriginal and treaty rights and title of three Mi’gmaq communities along the Gaspé peninsula of Quebec. The Court rejected this application on the basis that the Crown had met the low level of consultation that it had pre-determined to be adequate for this project in 2014. The Crown first conducted its own assessment of the appropriate level of consultation in July 2014 and issued a certificate for the project to proceed at that time. The applicants never challenged those 2014 decisions and were now out of time to do so. The application was allowed to proceed with respect to three approvals from 2015 that involved excavation, the clearing of the site, and the installation of oil tanks. However, there was no new information brought to the province’s attention that would justify deeper consultation on the 2015 approvals and the province met the low level of consultation mandated by its 2014 determination.

Use of actuarial risk assessment tools for Aboriginal offenders –

Canada v Ewert, 2016 FCA 203: The Federal Court of Appeal allowed the Crown’s appeal from a Federal Court decision that concluded that the use of certain actuarial tools for assessing recidivism and psychopathy was unreliable with respect to Aboriginal inmates, and thereby unjustifiably infringed upon their section 7 rights and breached the statutory obligations of the Correctional Service of Canada. The Federal Court had held that Mr. Ewert was not required “to establish definitively” that the assessment tools were biased, but the Court of Appeal disagreed. It allowed the appeal on the basis that Mr. Ewert was required to prove on a balance of probabilities that the actuarial tools generate or were likely to generate false results for Aboriginal inmates, and failed to do so.

Gladue factors in sentencing –

R v Okimaw, 2016 ABCA 246: The Alberta Court of Appeal allowed the sentence appeal of an Aboriginal offender on the grounds that, among other things, the sentencing judge failed to give weight to specific Gladue factors. The Court of Appeal used this decision as an opportunity to provide a “practical framework” for the consideration of Gladue factors. It was not enough for the sentencing judge to merely acknowledge “the existence of systemic factors”; the judge had a duty to consider how unique systemic and background factors played a role in bringing the particular Aboriginal offender before the courts. The Court of Appeal found that this necessary context was effectively absent from, or at least given insufficient weight in the decision under review. The Court of Appeal also clarified that it is not incumbent on a Gladue report writer to explain the impact of Gladue factors on moral blameworthiness. It is the sentencing judge that has the duty to carry out an “individualized assessment” of Gladue factors and this duty cannot be delegated. In this case, the Court of Appeal found that the impact of Mr. Okimaw’s Gladue factors were “largely self-explanatory”.

R v Alec, 2016 BCCA 347: The British Columbia Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal of an Aboriginal offender who was sentenced without the aid of a Gladue report. A report was allowed as fresh evidence on appeal. However, the Court of Appeal held that a “formal” Gladue report was not necessary for sentencing Aboriginal offenders. The Court held that the sentencing judge was clearly aware of Mr. Alec’s Aboriginal circumstances and his “disconnection” from his First Nation, and it was open to the sentencing judge to assume that Mr. Alec would not participate in the preparation of a report given his previous reluctance to do so.

R v Sateana, 2016 NUCJ 20: The Nunavut Court of Justice considered Gladue factors in sentencing an Aboriginal man for manslaughter. The Court stated that the systemic factors that influence criminality in Nunavut are well known and well documented, including the inter-generational impact of residential schools, over-crowded and sub-standard housing, poverty, high rates of domestic violence and sexual abuse, and high rates of alcohol and substance abuse. However, the Court held that a Gladue analysis is something “which this court is called upon to give effect to on a regular basis, but which it is unable to implement in any meaningful way”. While Mr. Sateana had appeared before the Court many times before the events leading to his manslaughter conviction, the Court “would have been unable to craft sentences which addressed his deep seated issues and alcohol addiction because the territory has no treatment or rehabilitation facilities and few counselling and mental health services.” Mr. Sateana was sentenced to 13 years incarceration.

Gladue factors in relation to solitary confinement –

Hamm v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 ABQB 440: The Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench allowed an application for habeas corpus from three self-represented inmates placed in solitary confinement, two of whom were Aboriginal. The Court ordered the release of these three inmates from segregation as the institution had failed to provide them with the high level of procedural fairness they were owed before being placed into solitary confinement. Among other concerns, the Court held that “given the potential rehabilitation benefits and other benefits of access to [A]boriginal spiritual and cultural programs, each [A]boriginal inmate should have had a Gladue type assessment of what placements would be appropriate.” The Court also concluded that it was “unreasonable for a correctional institution to deny transparency in relation to its decisions concerning whether, and how, and where, [A]boriginal offenders should be further deprived of liberty”.

Gladue factors & pledges of on-reserve property in bail hearing –

R v Hope, 2016 ONCA 648: The Ontario Court of Appeal granted an Aboriginal man release from custody pending a new trial on charges that include second degree murder. The Court of Appeal took note of the various contexts in which it has previously applied Gladue principles, including bail hearings, and stated that Gladue principles informed certain aspects of its analysis in this case. Ultimately, the Court concluded that detention pending appeal was not necessary in the public interest in this case. The Court also dismissed the Crown’s concerns with the fact that the individuals offering sureties and pledges against the equity in their homes on Mr. Hope’s behalf were of Aboriginal descent and lived on reserve. Section 89 of the Indian Act protects property on reserve from being subject to a charge by anyone other than an “Indian” or a band. The Court of Appeal held that this should not interfere with an Aboriginal person’s ability to secure release from detention, and what mattered was that these individuals expressed a willingness to pledge the “not insignificant” equity in their properties, not whether the Crown could execute against those properties.

Extinguishment of Aboriginal rights –

Québec (Procureure générale) c Lachapelle, 2016 QCCS 3961 (in French only): The Quebec Superior Court granted an application to evict two individuals from a hunting camp in the Eastmain River basin in northern Quebec. One of the respondents was a member of the Algonquins of Barriere Lake and asserted that the hunting camp was incidental to an Aboriginal right to hunt. However, the respondent failed to provide any evidence in support of a site-specific hunting right in the area in question. The Court noted that the camp was located approximately 1200km away from the respondent’s reserve and fell within Cree territory recognized under the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA). The Court also held that even if the respondent had proven a site-specific right in the area where the camp is located, the Court could not recognize it in light of the extinguishment clause in the JBNQA. The respondent declined the opportunity to challenge the JBQNA’s constitutionality. The Court did note, however, that the JBQNA’s constitutionality is at issue in another proceeding before the Superior Court.

Exceptions to the tax exemption under section 87 of the Indian Act –

Bell v Canada, 2016 TCC 175: The Tax Court of Canada dismissed an appeal from tax assessments based on the tax exemption for personal property situated on reserve (section 87 of the Indian Act). The appeal concerned whether the exemption could be applied to annual bonuses received by a status “Indian”, Ms. Bell, from a company she owned and operated with her non-status spouse. Ms. Bell worked out of an office located on reserve. Ms. Bell received regular bi-weekly pay from the company as well as the balance of the company’s annual income as year end bonuses. The Minister allowed her to rely on the tax exemption for her regular pay but not for her year end bonuses. The Tax Court upheld the Minister’s decision on the basis that there was no substantive connection between the bonuses and the reserve land where Ms. Bell was working. The Tax Court also found that the bonuses exceeded reasonable remuneration and were therefore abusive of the tax exemption.

Crowns added as parties in private law action involving Aboriginal rights –

Saik’uz First Nation v Rio Tinto Alcan Inc, 2016 BCSC 1474: The BC Supreme Court allowed an application to add both the federal and provincial Crowns as defendants to a tort action against Rio Tinto Alcan in relation to impacts on the Nechako River and its fishery resources. The action is premised in part on asserted Aboriginal rights and title. The Court noted that the plaintiffs acknowledged that the consequences of this “major and complex case”, which would define the intersection between Aboriginal rights and tort law, may be huge. This may warrant inclusion of the Crown on its own. Further, the plaintiffs had already formally invited the Crown to participate through the Notice of Constitutional Challenge they issued in order to challenge the applicability of certain statutes. Under British Columbia’s Water Act, the province also asserts ownership over the water under dispute in this action, thereby warranting its involvement. Finally, the Court held that even where a formal declaration of Aboriginal title is not sought in the pleadings, the federal and provincial Crowns are still necessary parties to the determination of issues relating to Aboriginal title.

Injunction against First Nation’s interference with use of road –

Revolution Infrastructure Inc v Lytton First Nation, 2016 BCSC 1562: The BC Supreme Court allowed an application from Revolution Infrastructure for an interlocutory injunction restraining the Lytton First Nation from prohibiting or interfering with its use of an access road and ranch on which it operates a composting facility. Lytton First Nation asserts Aboriginal rights and title to the valley in which the facility and road are located and asserts a right to control access on this basis, as well as the basis that the road crosses its reserve lands. Lytton has enacted a band bylaw requiring Revolution to obtain a permit to use the road. The Court held that there are several serious questions to be tried in this case, including the nature of Aboriginal title and whether the band bylaw was validly enacted. The Court also held that interference with Revolution’s access to the road would result in irreparable harm. Finally, the Court held that the balance of convenience favoured Revolution as Lytton’s actions had disrupted the status quo of its use of the road without interference since 2009, the road had been used by the public for a significant period before then, and a facilitation process was in place that could potentially address the issues between the parties.

No jurisdiction for provincial tribunal with respect to on-reserve clinic –

Cahoose v Ulkatcho Indian Band, 2016 BCHRT 114: The BC Human Rights Tribunal dismissed a complaint against the Ulkatcho Indian Band and others on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter. The complainant had been employed in the band’s healthcare clinic on reserve. The tribunal held that there was no dispute over the proper approach for determining the limits of its jurisdiction. Instead, the key issue was which entity the so-called “functional test” needed to be applied to. The complainant argued that the First Nations Health Authority administered the clinic. However, the tribunal found no evidence of the Authority acting as a service provider. Instead, it concluded that the band was the employer of the clinic’s staff and the entity providing medical services on the reserve. Finally, the tribunal concluded that the band’s operations were seen to be federal when the functional test was applied.

Jurisdiction of self-governing First Nation tribunal –

Kwanlin Dün First Nation v Kwanlin Dün First Nation Judicial Council, 2016 YKSC 35: The Yukon Supreme Court dismissed an appeal from the Kwanlin Dün First Nation (KDFN) against two decisions of its Judicial Council that set aside its termination of two tenancy agreements. KDFN argued that the Judicial Council had no jurisdiction to decide matters relating to landlord and tenancy issues since KDFN has not enacted any laws on this subject matter and provincial legislation therefore applies. The Court found this dispute raised a question of true jurisdiction that must be reviewed on a standard of correctness. It held that the Judicial Council, by virtue of KDFN’s Constitution and its Judicial Council Act, had the power to review administrative decisions by the KDFN, including those it makes in a landlord and tenant context, to ensure its Constitution and laws are complied with. The Court went on to conclude that the Judicial Council had not exceeded its jurisdiction by ruling on matters of procedural fairness and KDFN’s constitutional values in context to the tenancy disputes at issue. The Judicial Council did not rule on specific landlord-tenant issues.

Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement –

Fontaine v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 MBQB 159: The Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench allowed a Request for Directions with respect to a claim that an individual was wrongfully denied compensation under the IRSSA for sexual abuse at a residential school. The adjudicator accepted that a nun grabbed the claimant’s genitals while he was at residential school, but was not satisfied that the act had a “sexual purpose”. This decision was upheld on review and re-review. The Court found that it had the jurisdiction to review the re-review adjudicator’s decision on a standard of reasonableness. It went on to conclude that the first adjudicator’s interpretation of the IRSSA as requiring a “sexual purpose” for sexual touching to be compensable was fundamentally inconsistent with the plain language of the IRSSA and with the criminal law jurisprudence that the adjudicator purported to apply. It was therefore unreasonable for the re-review adjudicator to uphold this decision. The Court sent the claim back to be reconsidered in accordance with its reasons.

Fontaine v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 ONSC 5359: The Ontario Superior Court of Justice addressed the results of an investigation into the legal services provided by Douglas J. Keshen and his former law firm with respect to claims under the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement (IRSSA). The report resulting from the investigation was “largely a vindication for Mr. Keshen”. However, there were two exceptions to this: 1) Mr. Keshen was found to have facilitated third party loans on the basis of a promise to repay the loans from IRSSA awards, which is prohibited under the IRSSA; and 2) Mr. Keshen’s practice of reporting to clients orally rather than in writing did not fully meet the Law Society of Upper Canada’s guidelines for lawyers acting on IRSSA files. No costs were ordered for either party and Mr. Keshen was not ordered to pay the costs of the investigation.