Gift Lake Métis Settlement v Alberta, 2018 ABQB 58

Wiyasiwewin Mikiwahp Native Law Centre Case Watch

The Applicants’ claim that the membership provisions in ss 75, 90 and 91 of the Métis Settlements Act of Alberta are invalid due to the principle interjurisdictional immunity, is dismissed.

The Métis Settlements Act of Alberta, Chapter M-14 (MSA) provides for limitations on settlement membership, including an automatic termination provision under which membership automatically terminates if a person voluntarily registers as an Indian under the Indian Act. The Applicants are three former members of the Gift Lake Métis Settlement, whose memberships were terminated after each voluntarily registered as an Indian under the Indian Act to access health benefits. They asked for a declaration that certain membership sections of the MSA, are, in pith and substance, laws in relation to “Indians or Lands reserved for the Indians” and therefore outside provincial legislative competence, under section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity does not apply to the impugned membership provisions of the MSA as their pith and substance can be related to a matter that falls within the jurisdiction of the Alberta legislature. Further, the impact of these provisions does not impair the core power of the federal government under s. 91(24). Also, there is no principled basis on which the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity would have applied only to the impugned sections. Because the membership provisions are integral to the operation and purpose of the legislation, had the doctrine applied, it would have applied to the whole MSA, rendering the MSA entirely inapplicable to Alberta’s Métis population. Consequently, this group would have lost the benefits and protections the MSA affords them. Additionally, it would have would have created a legislative vacuum, as there is no corresponding federal legislation that would fill the void.

Unlike Indians, with whom the Federal Crown made treaties and granted reservations and other benefits, the Métis communities were not given a collective reservation or land base. They also did not enjoy the protection of the Indian Act, or any equivalent. Under the Accord, the Alberta government granted the Métis Settlements General Council fee simple title to the lands now occupied by eight Métis communities and passed legislation, including the MSA to protect Métis rights.

The MSA contains membership eligibility and termination provisions. An Indian registered under the Indian Act is not eligible to apply for membership in the Métis community except in limited circumstances, none of which apply in this case. Further, s. 90(1)(a) provides that if a person voluntarily becomes registered as an Indian under the Indian Act, that person’s Métis settlement membership terminates. There has been an amendment to the MSA in 2004, making the automatic termination provisions of s. 90 subject to a Métis Settlements General Council Policy that “provides otherwise”. However, there has been no alternative provision policy made so far that would alter the automatic termination provisions. As well, at this time, there is no way for the Applicants to withdraw their registration under the Indian Act.

The MSA recognizes and promotes the preservation of the distinct Métis culture and identity apart from other Aboriginal groups. The impugned provisions are necessary to achieve this objective. These sections only act to exclude specific individuals from membership in settlements and its benefits that are established under the MSA. The settlements under the MSA are creatures of provincial statute and were created and operate independently of Parliament’s jurisdiction over Indians under s 91(24). The fact that Métis are now recognized as Indians under s 91(24) does not change this. Membership in these settlements is not determinative of whether or not an individual is Métis and one can still be legally considered Métis under the test developed in R v Powley.

Francis v Canada, 2018 FC 49

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The Plaintiff’s motion failed for a declaration of an interim order for advanced costs. The circumstances surrounding the claim of an unjust infringement of treaty and Aboriginal rights was not sufficiently compelling or unique enough for the Court to grant this exceptional remedy.

The Plaintiff, Hubert Francis, is a Mi’kmaw and member of the Elsipogtog First Nation in the province of New Brunswick. On three occasions in 2015, officials from the Department of Fisheries and Oceans boarded his vessel and seized his catch for fishing without a valid fishing license. He asserts he is entitled to do so pursuant to treaty and Aboriginal rights. The Plaintiff and the Aboriginal crew of his vessel, have been charged with fishing without authorization in respect of the last two incidents, and are facing summary conviction proceedings under the Fisheries Act before the courts of the province of Québec.

The Plaintiff sought declarations that the prohibitions and restrictions placed upon him are an unjustifiable infringement of his treaty and Aboriginal rights. The Plaintiff asked for an interim order for advanced costs, relying on the principles in British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v Okanagan Indian Band, as he would otherwise be unable to proceed with this civil action. There is agreement among the parties that the Plaintiff must meet three criteria of the Okanagan test before the Court may order for advanced costs: (1) The party genuinely cannot afford to pay for the litigation, and no other realistic option exists for bringing the issues to trial; (2) The claim to be adjudicated is prima facie meritorious or of sufficient merit that it is contrary to the interests of justice for the litigation to be forfeited just because the litigant lacks financial means; (3) The issues raised transcend the individual interests of the particular litigant, are of public importance, and have not been resolved in previous cases.

The Court concluded the Plaintiff cannot meet two of the three criteria required of the Okanagan test, therefore his motion fails. Although the Plaintiff only raised a nominal amount for a civil proceeding, there was no attempt by him to secure funding for his defense in the summary conviction proceedings. It has not been demonstrated that these issues cannot be determined fairly, adequately and without injustice in the context of the Quebec criminal proceedings. The failure of the Supreme Court to mention the availability of other fora under the specific heading of impecuniosity in both R v Caron and Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v Canada has little relevance to the issues. Advanced cost orders must be used only as a last resort to avoid an injustice, not because it is a “preferable” mode of determining issues, where an adequate alternative mode exists. It must be to prevent an injustice for the litigant and the public at large that would result from the failure of having issues of public importance properly resolved. It should not be used as a smart litigation strategy.

Although the declarations sought by the Plaintiff in his statement of claim are limited to his own rights, it remains that the rights he asserts are, by their nature, collective rights held by the relevant Aboriginal communities or collectives. As such, they cannot be advanced as the basis of a civil claim or a declaratory action without the support of the community or collective, which he does not have. Individuals can, without the support of the relevant collective that holds the rights, assert these communal rights and have them adjudicated, to the extent necessary, in defense to criminal or regulatory offence proceedings, but individuals may not invoke them as the basis of a claim for determination of rights (R v Chevrier and Queackar- Komoyue Nation v British Columbia). To recognize an individual’s right to institute and maintain, without the support of the appropriate collective, civil actions asserting Aboriginal rights whenever they are brought “in parallel” to criminal proceedings, would ignore the unique nature of those rights and undermine the authority of the lawful representatives of the relevant band or nation to determine when and how to assert these rights. Given the Plaintiff’s lack of standing to bring this action, the second criterion of the Okanagan test, that the claim be prima facie meritorious, has not been met.

CCAS v GH and TV, 2017 ONSC 742

Wiyasiwewin Mikiwahp Native Law Centre Case Watch

A mere claim that someone is “Native” is not enough for a court to consider that an Aboriginal child will be at a “disadvantage” when weighing legislative factors in child protection matters. There needs to be more evidence of what is important to the family, the child, and the Aboriginal community the child is said to be a member of.

The Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton (the Society) sought an order for Crown wardship with no access regarding the child EDV, born […], 2015, who was apprehended at birth. The mother, GH, and the father, TV, were known to the Society since 2012 regarding protection issues with the couple’s older children. After the Society commenced a protection application regarding EDV on May 5, 2015, it decided to pursue a summary judgment motion in relation to that application in February 2016. It is then that the Respondent father, TV, argued that EDV is a Métis child, and that as such, he should be treated in the same manner as children who fall within the definitions of “Indian”, “Native person” and “Native child” under Ontario’s former Child and Family Services Act (CFSA) [the CFSA has since been replaced by the Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYFSA) as of April 30, 2018]. All parties conceded that Métis children did not fall within the scope of those definitions as they stood at the time of the hearing, and that EDV therefore did not have “Indian” or “Native” status within the meaning of the CFSA.

TV alleged that the definitions of Indigenous identity in the CFSA violated s 15(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the basis that they did not extend to Métis children. He sought an order pursuant to section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 declaring these invalid and a remedy pursuant to section 24(1) of the Charter directing that EDV be treated as if he were an “Indian”, “Native person” or “Native child” for the purposes of these child protection proceedings. The Society did not take a formal position on the CFSA’s identity definitions, and it stated that it had in all material respects treated EDV as if he were “Indian” or “Native”. As well, the CFSA identified the cultural background and ethnicity of all children as an important factor in child protection proceedings, which was apparent from numerous provisions in the Act.

After considering many factors, including Gladue principles, the Court concluded it should not deal with abstract questions, especially in the context of a constitutional question. Absent a more complete record, the s 15 claim could not succeed. This may not have been the result if there were a fuller evidentiary record, but the issue in this case was too theoretical. When considering Gladue principles in sentencing matters, they do not on their own justify a different sentence for Aboriginal offenders, but provide the necessary context for understanding and evaluating the case-specific information presented by counsel. It is difficult to apply the context referred to in R v Gladue and R v Ipeelee to the disposition stage of a child protection hearing. The child protection court is directed to order in the best interests of a child. Taking judicial notice of the historical reasons that may have contributed to an Aboriginal parent’s current circumstances is less likely to be helpful to the child protection judge faced with the decision of whether to return a young child to the parent than it may be to a sentencing judge grappling with whether to order a custodial sentence and, if so, its duration.

As for the issue of EDV’s “Native” status, it was noted that the Métis Ontario coordinator of their Healthy Babies Healthy Children Program contacted the Catholic Children’s Aid Society in 2012. The representative told them that TV had self-reported that he was a member of the Métis Eastern Woodlands of Nova Scotia, and as a result of that self-report, she was working with this family. However, no one pursued the issue until 2016 when the matter came up for summary judgment before Justice Chappel, where the parties consented to a finding that the child was Métis. There were extensive efforts to serve and seek out the involvement of the Eastern Woodlands Métis of Nova Scotia. However, the response was that they were not going to participate, they did not have any placement options, and that they were supporting the plan of the Catholic Children’s Aid Society to have the child EDV adopted. Justice Chappel ordered that the child EDV be considered “Native” for the purposes of this and any other child protection application.

The Society made every effort to see if other Métis communities would participate in the litigation or provide the family with a placement option. No one came forward. TV never followed up on any suggestions given for obtaining assistance for his many issues. He did not describe his family background at all, or give any testimony about his Aboriginal background or any connections that he had or has in a Métis community other than his relatively brief contact with the Métis Ontario Healthy Babies Healthy Children Program. The Court stated that it had compassion toward and recognition of the importance of “Native” heritage and families but this special status does not equate to a blanket exemption from legislation carefully crafted to protect vulnerable and often damaged children. The paramount purpose of the CFSA is to promote the best interests, protection, and well-being of children. Where a person is directed in the Act to make an order or determination in the best interest of a child and the child is an “Indian” or “Native person”, the person shall take into consideration the importance, in recognition of the uniqueness of “Indian” and “Native” culture, heritage and traditions, presevering the child’s cultural identity.

In SB and BRM v Children’s Aid Society of Algoma and Mississauga First Nation, the Court addressed an appeal from an order for Crown wardship without access to the parents. The position of the Band was that access should continue so as to maintain the child’s connection to her Aboriginal community and to avoid the long-term consequences of cultural dislocation and estrangement from her roots, including from her siblings who resided on the reserve. However, there must be evidence of the nature of the involvement of the child’s family in the “Native” community which is lacking in this case. The mere claim that someone is “Native” does not allow the Court to consider the relevant factors within the legislative scheme, without some evidence of what is important to the family, the child, and the Aboriginal community the child is said to be a member of.

The Court decided that it was in the best interest of EDV to be made a Crown ward with no access, the Society was directed to make every effort to ensure that any foster parent and/or adoptive placement was willing to educate the child on his Aboriginal heritage and culture, to expose the child to this culture on an age-appropriate basis and provide the child with knowledge of any governmental benefits available to the child as a result of his “Native” status.

Children’s Aid Society of the Regional Municipality of Waterloo v CT, 2017 ONCA 931

Self-identification of Indigenous ancestry submitted at the appeal level of court, does not alone constitute as fresh evidence to overturn a trial decision when there has been no error of law. Trial decision of no access for a Crown ward restored.

This is the second appeal from a trial decision involving a 10-year-old girl that was made a Crown ward with no access for the purpose of adoption. The biological parents appealed the no access order. The first appeal judge concluded that, although the trial judge did not err, the parents should have access. He outlined what he considered to be: a miscarriage of justice; the trial judge’s interference, bias and abuse of the trial process; procedural delay; and the incompetence of trial counsel. He invited costs submissions personally against trial counsel for the parents. This appeal restores the trial judge’s order of no access; dismisses the parents’ cross-appeal; and allows the cross-appeal of counsel on ineffective assistance and the consequent costs order.

After the initial trial, the parents filed affidavits that declared for the first time that the father was Cree and the mother was Mi’kmaq. The reasons from the first appeal judge are a scathing review of Ontario’s child welfare system and an apology to the parents for the manner in which they were “treated, ignored, demeaned and disbelieved.” He considered fresh evidence, including an affidavit which indicated that the child loves her parents, wanted to see her parents, but also wanted to be adopted by the proposed adoptive parent. By this time, the child had been with the proposed adoptive parent for almost two years and was flourishing.

The test for fresh evidence in a child protection matter is more flexible than in other types of cases. Statutory requirements for access to a Crown ward according to the Child and Family Services Act (the Act), however, puts the onus on the parents who seek access to present evidence that satisfies the test in CAS Hamilton v CG. First, the relationship between the person and the child must be beneficial and meaningful to the child, as opposed to the person seeking access. Second, the access must not impair the child’s opportunities for adoption. There was uncontroverted evidence that the adoptive mother would not adopt if there was contact with the parents, which would then make the access order statutorily impossible. The first appeal judge nonetheless ordered access and erred in doing so. Simply put, when a Crown wardship order is granted with access, the parental relationship with the child is preserved. When a Crown ward is sought to be placed for adoption, the goal is permanency and the success of the adoption.

The parents submitted on the first appeal, and before this court, that a child’s Indigenous heritage introduces different considerations into the access analysis. There is potential harm to Indigenous children if adopted by non-Indigenous families, as they often experience challenges, risks, and vulnerabilities that other children adopted across cultural and racial boundaries do not have. The parents argued that if they do not have access to the child, she is likely to suffer from a lack of connection to her Indigenous culture, heritage and community. Courts recognize the pervasive effects of the historical and continuing harms to First Nations families. This does not, however, automatically exempt Indigenous children from the access provisions for Crown wards under the Act.

A parallel can be drawn with the court’s approach to the sentencing of Indigenous offenders. In R v Ipeelee, the Supreme Court describes the proper approach where courts must take judicial notice of such matters as the history of colonialism, displacement, residential schools and how that history continues to translate into lower educational attainment, lower incomes, higher unemployment, higher rates of substance abuse and suicide, and higher levels of incarceration for Aboriginal peoples. These matters, on their own, do not necessarily justify a different sentence for Aboriginal offenders but provide the necessary context for understanding and evaluating the case-specific information presented by counsel. While Gladue principles do not directly apply to access to a Crown ward, the Supreme Court’s comments about context and the need for case-specific evidence are instructive.

The first appeal judge made no mention that the parents or the child were in any way involved in an Indigenous community or its culture. There is no evidence that the parents had any connection to their culture, that the child was ever exposed to the Indigenous culture, or that anyone from the Indigenous community had ever been involved with the parents or the child. Because of this, the second appeal judge found that there was no evidentiary record in this case to balance the importance of the uniqueness or preservation of the Aboriginal heritage of the child when considering the other factors set out in the CFSA.

Although the second appeal judge recognized that Indigenous membership has expanded to include self- identification, there still must be evidence in relation to the child so a determination can be made as to whether access is beneficial and meaningful to her. The first appeal judge erred by ordering access based on nothing but the parents’ self-identification with Indigenous heritage in the absence of any evidence on this issue specific to this child.

Conseil des Atikamekw d’Opitciwan c Weizineau, 2018 QCCS 4170

Wiyasiwewin Mikiwahp Native Law Centre

Judicial authorization granted to banish a defendant from the Opitciwan First Nation in accordance with a Band Council by-law.

The Opitciwan First Nation is an Aboriginal people of Canada who benefit from the rights arising from s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, including the right to self-government. Under this principle of self-government and in accordance with the power conferred by s. 81 of the Indian Act, the Band Council adopted a by-law “respecting the expulsion of persons found guilty of trafficking certain drugs and other substances”, that allows the Band to banish any person found guilty of such offences by a court from their reserve for a period of sixty months. This by-law came into effect on January 1, 2017.

The defendant was found guilty of trafficking narcotics on March 22, 2017, by the Court of Quebec. On August 1, 2017, the Band Council adopted a resolution in accordance with the above by-law to expel her from the community until March 22, 2022. Despite the various attempts to apply the by-law and resulting resolution, the plaintiff ignored these requests by hiding in private homes in the Opitciwan community. Consequently, the Band Council has failed to expel her.

The Court ordered the defendant to leave the borders of the Opitciwan Indian Reserve and to remain outside these borders until such time as sanctioned by the Band Council. Any peace officer or bailiff is authorized to assist the plaintiff in the execution of this judgment, the whole at the plaintiff’s mere verbal request and regardless of the premises in which the defendant is to be found, such that they may be entered and the defendant escorted to the border of the Opitciwan Indian Reserve. As well, the Court acknowledges the plaintiff’s undertaking to execute the expulsion measures in such a way that the defendant will not be left alone or without support at the borders of the Opitciwan Indian Reserve.

Law Society of British Columbia v Coutlee, 2018 LSBC 33

Wiyasiwewin Mikiwahp Native Law Centre Case Watch

A law society hearing panel agreed to adjourn a hearing and recommend that it be reconstituted with an Indigenous member on the basis that its lack of Indigenous representation raised an apprehension of institutional bias.

A Hearing Panel of the Law Society of British Columbia (the Panel) granted an application to adjourn the hearing of a disciplinary citation against the Respondent, that concerned a failure to abide by practice restrictions. The decision to adjourn the hearing was in reaction to the second of two applications made by the Respondent at the outset of the hearing of the citation. The Respondent’s first application was dismissed. It asked that the citation be withdrawn or stayed as being baseless and in breach of natural justice and procedural fairness. The Respondent’s second application was for a determination that the Hearing Panel should include a person who is either an Indigenous lawyer or Elder. The Respondent did not assert any actual bias in the members of the Panel. Yet he argued that he would be more confident in the decision of the Panel, if reconstituted as requested, as being non-discriminatory and having weighed the evidence fairly. Counsel for the Law Society took no position on this application except to oppose any decision by the Panel that would result in an adjournment of the hearing of the citation.

The Respondent referred to the analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R v Kokopenace as a basis for his right to be treated differently, at least to the extent of ensuring that he is “tried” or heard by a panel that includes an Elder. The Respondent argued that this give him more confidence that the Panel was not biased against him as an Indigenous person. Counsel for the Law Society distinguished Kokopenace as dealing with an accused’s right to a fair trial under Section 11 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, submitting that this does not apply to the proceedings before a Law Society hearing panel because they do not attract true penalty consequences.

In reaching its decision, the Panel did not rely on Kokopenace, but they were guided by challenges identified in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Final Report. The Panel also concluded that specifically addressing cultural competencies on the Panel is warranted in this case.

The Panel granted the Respondent’s application by adjourning the hearing and making a recommendation to the President’s Designate that the Panel be reconstituted to include an Indigenous person. The Panel found that a failure to reconstitute the Panel with an Indigenous member would be inconsistent with the values and objectives of the Law Society that are made evident in its commitment to its Truth and Reconciliation Advisory Committee Report.

Yahey v British Columbia, 2018 BCSC 278

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Case Watch

First Nation granted stay of hearing fees for treaty litigation, until question of whether these are contrary to the Honour of the Crown can be resolved.

In the case of Yahey, the Blueberry River First Nation (BRFN) brought an application to stay hearing fees on the basis that there are unsettled legal issues surrounding the provincial hearing fee scheme. Procedurally, relief from fees can be sought either by way of a court order or an application based on undue hardship under Rule 20-5 of British Columbia’s Supreme Court Civil Rules. By way of background, this application came on the heels of an amendment to Rule 20-5 to allow for an undue hardship exemption from hearing fees. Justice Burke concluded that the stay ought to be provided.

BRFN’s position was that there are open questions as to whether it is dishonourable for the Crown to require First Nations to pay a fee to litigate their treaty rights. In addition, BRFN pointed out that conclusions from other ongoing constitutional litigation regarding the breadth of the term “undue hardship” (Cambie Surgeries Corp. v British Columbia) would bring greater clarity to its application for relief from fees. In determining whether or not a stay could be provided, Justice Burke applied the legal test set out in the case of RJR-MacDonald Inc. v Canada (Attorney General). This test requires a court to consider whether (a) there is a serious question to be tried; (b) irreparable harm will result if the stay is not granted; and (c) the balance of convenience favours granting the stay.

Justice Burke found that the application of this test favoured providing BRFN with the stay they sought. Justice Burke concluded that BRFN established there was a serious issue to be tried—that is, whether the Honour of the Crown demands Indigenous peoples to not pay a fee in order to have their constitutional rights adjudicated. This question was not addressed in Cambie Surgeries and remains unaddressed to date. Justice Burke went on to find that the irreparability of harm and balance of convenience in this case weighed in favour of providing the stay. She found BRFN would have to either allocate resources to pay the hearing fees, or bring an application for relief from paying the fees, or bring an application for relief on unsettled law. Further, she noted that if Cambie Surgeries could provide some guidance, then requiring the payment of fees would be an inefficient use of resources. Finally, Justice Burke raised a question of fairness of process. Citing RJR MacDonald, she indicated that a perception of unfairness might arise from the fact that losses associated with paying the fees prematurely might not be cured later. These factors meant that the balance of convenience weighed in favour of BRFN.

Corporation de développement économique Montagnaise c Robertson, 2017 QCCS 2736

A clear and unequivocal express waiver is necessary in order to waive the protection against seizure of property on reserve under section 89 of the Indian Act.

The issue in this case was whether the property of Mr. Édouard Robertson, who lives on the Mashteuiatsh territory reserve and has status under the Indian Act, could be seized by an Indigenous economic development corporation (Corporation de développement économique Montagnaise or “CDEM”) in spite of section 89 of the Indian Act. In three separate judgments, Mr. Robertson was found to owe CDEM more than $265,000 with interest and costs. He argued that because he has status under the Indian Act, his property cannot be seized by any person other than an Indian or band under the Indian Act. CDEM’s position was that by consenting to a universal movable hypothec on his business property (a form of security similar to a mortgage), Mr. Robertson waived the benefit of his rights under section 89 of the Indian Act.

Justice Bouchard found that the hypothec did not constitute a waiver of Mr. Robertson’s right to protection against seizure under section 89 of the Indian Act. As a result, the property located on the reserve could not be subject to seizure. In reviewing the case law to date, Justice Bouchard, cited a 1995 Sioui decision for the proposition that “tacit” waivers will not suffice in terms of section 89’s protection against seizure. Justice Bouchard did point out that express waivers were possible and section 89 should not be read more broadly than is necessary, particular in cases involving credit matters, as set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in McDiarmid Lumber Ltd v God’s Lake First Nation. Ultimately, however, Justice Bouchard concluded that in the absence of a clear and unequivocal waiver by Mr. Robertson, there could be no seizure. The language in the universal hypothec was not sufficiently clear to constitute a clear waiver and Mr. Robertson’s property could therefore not be seized.

Alberta (Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act, Director) v JR, 2018 ABPC 258

United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Calls to Action, and Gladue principles inapplicable to child protection matter.

JR and AL are the parents of seven children ranging in age from nine months to nine years. Both parents have been diagnosed with cognitive and intellectual disabilities. Throughout their time spent together and apart, JR and AL suffered from multiple addictions, which aggravated domestic violence issues between them. All seven children have spent considerable time in state care due to the domestic violence and addictions suffered by their parents. The youngest children even tested positive for methamphetamines post-birth. The oldest children display severe behavioural issues and are likely to struggle in future years, thereby needing a stable and safe environment.

The applicant, Kasohkowew Child Wellness Society (KCWS), exists pursuant to a tripartite agreement between the Province of Alberta, the Government of Canada and the Samson Cree Nation. KCWS brought an application under the Child Youth and Family Enhancement Act RSA 2000 c C-12 (CYFEA), for a permanent guardianship order for all seven children and this was ultimately granted by the Court. Counsel for AL opposed the application, making submissions in favour of less invasive action based on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) Calls to Action, and the principles set out in R v Gladue, [1999] 1 SCR 688.

With respect to UNDRIP, counsel for AL pointed to Article 7.2, which states “Indigenous individuals have the collective right to live in freedom, peace and security as distinct peoples and shall not be subjected to any act of genocide or any other act of violence including forcibly removing children of the group to another group (emphasis added)”. In response, the Court pointed out that KCWS is a delegated First Nations authority established under a tripartite agreement to provide child, youth and family services to Samson Cree Nation. The Court found it difficult to assume that such an authority would be at all involved in discriminating against its own people. Instead, the Court assumed that the director would only remove children and place them with non-Aboriginal foster parents as a last resort, and that the director found it in the best interests of the children to do so. The Court held that UNDRIP is aspirational and does not trump the best interests or physical and mental safety of the child.

Counsel for AL quotes several TRC Calls to Action that relate to reducing the number of Aboriginal children in care. She pointed out that some of the child welfare workers directly involved with the family were not Cree or even Aboriginal. However, the TRC Calls to Action she quoted only calls for child welfare workers to be properly educated and trained in the history and subsequent impacts of the residential school system, and about the potential for Aboriginal communities and families to provide more appropriate solutions to family healing. The TRC did not say that all child welfare workers must be Aboriginal.

As for the potential applicability of R v Gladue, submissions of this type are usually in the context of criminal law cases, not child protection matters. The Court noted that the purpose of the CYFEA is not to punish parents, but to protect children and achieve what is in their best interests. In this case that would be stable, permanent and nurturing relationships and continuity of care for all seven children. As far as the negative impacts regarding the transmission of Cree culture, steps had been taken to keep the children together as much as possible. It was necessary to have the two youngest children placed in a group home, but the older five children are all together in one foster home. In terms of the preservation of the uniqueness of the children’s Aboriginal culture, heritage, spirituality and traditions, the Court was convinced that all appropriate steps were taken by KCWS to ensure these needs are met for the children.

WSÁNEĆ School Board v BC Government and Service Employees’ Union, 2017 FCA 210

The Doré framework is applicable when an administrative tribunal’s decision making engages the underlying principles and values of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, and such decisions are to be reviewed on the same standard of reasonableness.

This case involved an application for judicial review by the WSÁNEĆ School Board (the WSB) seeking to set aside a decision of the Canada Industrial Relations Board (CIRB). Specifically, the WSB challenged a decision of the CIRB to dismiss an application from the WSB in which it sought to exclude employees teaching WSÁNEĆ language, beliefs, and culture in the SENĆOŦEN Immersion Program from the all-employee bargaining unit of the BC Government and Service Employees’ Union (BCGSEU).

The WSB argued that including the SENĆOŦEN employees in an all-employee bargaining unit would negatively impact the constitutional rights of the WSÁNEĆ First Nations to control the transmission of their language and culture, as entrenched in ss 25 and 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The WSB submitted that the Canada Labour Code must be interpreted and applied in a manner that respects these constitutional rights and takes into account the values and principles that underpin them, including the need for reconciliation. The WSB also asserted that the CIRB had breached its procedural fairness rights by failing to grant it an oral hearing. The WSB had unsuccessfully sought an oral hearing before the CIRB on the basis that this would allow for an explanation of the WSÁNEĆ beliefs and teachings in accordance with their oral traditions.

The Federal Court of Appeal held that the CIRB’s decision to dismiss the application was reasonable and that the CIRB was not obligated to provide an oral hearing.

Writing for the court, Gleason JA accepted that correctness is the appropriate standard for determining whether an oral hearing is required as part of procedural fairness though he also stated that the circumstances in which a party’s procedural fairness rights may be said to be violated are narrow. With respect to the merits of the CIRB decision, Gleason JA noted that reasonableness was generally the applicable standard to CIRB decisions that interpret and apply the Canada Labour Code and held that WSB’s invocation of ss 25 and 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 did not require him to reach a different conclusion here.

The WSB did not seek to have the CIRB rule on the scope of its Aboriginal rights to control education nor did it argue that such rights brought the labour relations of the SENĆOŦEN employees outside the purview of the Code. Instead, WSB invoked principles and values enshrined in ss 25 and 35 of the Constitution Act 1982, and argued that these required the CIRB to determine that the SENĆOŦEN employees should be excluded from BCSGEU. Gleason JA found this argument to be analogous to the those advanced in Doré v Barreau du Quebec, 2012 SCC 12, [2012] 1 SCR with respect to the need for an administrative tribunal to balance Charter values against other administrative law considerations. He accepted that the Doré framework could be applied to principles and values underlying s 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

Gleason JA invoked the principle that employee units should not be fractured without compelling evidence. As indicated by the CIRB, compelling evidence might include geographic factors, specific statutory provisions and the likelihood that a larger unit may not be viable. Ultimately, Gleason JA found that there was no evidence the WSB would lose their control over the way the SENĆOŦEN employers performed their duties. He also pointed out that the application may have been premature as there was no way to know whether the BCGSEU would accept terms and conditions that the WSB sought for the SENĆOŦEN employees and the WSB raised concerns about an eventual strike that were premature and theoretical in the absence of any evidence that a strike was likely.

With respect to procedural fairness, Gleason JA noted that the request for an oral history was neither clearly made nor well supported by the evidence. Moreover, he pointed out that it was well within the Court’s powers under the Canada Industrial Relations Board Regulations to decide the matter without an oral hearing, which the WSB knew prior to making their application.