West v Cold Lake First Nations, 2021 CHRT 1

Complaint dismissed in its entirety. A Cree woman and member of Cold Lake First Nations, submitted a complaint to the Canadian Human Rights Commission that she was discriminated against contrary to her race, national or ethnic origin and family status in rejection of her band council nomination. Further, she submitted that the Nation retaliated due to her filing this complaint, by reassigning her daughter’s future house to another member of the Nation.

Indigenous Law Centre – CaseWatch Blog

In 2016, Bonnie West, a First Nations Cree woman and member of Cold Lake First Nations [“CLFN”], attempted to stand for election as councillor to sit on the CLFN band council. Her nomination was rejected by the elections officer, and Ms. West filed a complaint with the Canadian Human Rights Commission, which was referred to the Tribunal in 2019. She alleged that she was discriminated against contrary to section 5 of the Canadian Human Rights Act [“CHRA”] in the provision of services by the Nation on the grounds of her race, her national or ethnic origin, and her family status. Ms. West has also amended her complaint, adding an allegation of retaliation by CLFN, contrary to section 14.1 of the CHRA. Her daughter was not given access to a new house in the community, in contrast to what had been planned. Ms. West believes that CLFN acted in this manner in retaliation against her filing her complaint.

CLFN is a First Nations community in Alberta with a population of about 3,000 members both on and off the reserve. In 1986, CLFN adopted the Cold Lake First Nations Election Law [“1986 Election Law”], which was approved by order of the former Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs. In the 2016 election for CLFN’s chief and band council, a member of the Nation nominated Ms. West to run for election as a councillor on the band council. After she was nominated, another member of the Nation protested Ms. West’s nomination. The protest alleged that Ms. West was not a direct descendant of original treaty citizens, contrary to the 1986 Election Law. The elections officer at the time had to consider the matter and determine whether Ms. West fulfilled the requirements.

Even though the 1986 Election Law does not clearly stipulate what is meant by “original treaty citizens”, the evidence establishes on a balance of probabilities that this expression refers to the signatories of Treaty No. 6. He asked Ms. West to provide him with a document, specifically an affidavit supporting her nomination, within 48 hours. Ms. West filed a short sworn statement with the elections officer, in which she declared before a commissioner of oaths that she was eligible to stand as councillor given that she was a direct descendant of original treaty citizens. The evidence reveals that no other documents were submitted, such as Ms. West’s family tree or the document confirming her North American Indian Blood Quantum as she did at the hearing. The elections officer found that Ms. West did not fulfill the requirements. After receiving the elections officer’s decision by email, she asked him which additional documents were needed to establish that she could stand as a candidate for election. The evidence reveals that Mr. Adam did not answer her question.

Ms. West is challenging the rejection of her nomination, which resulted from the verification of whether she met the eligibility criteria set out in the 1986 Election Law. In applying the 1986 Election Law and the candidate eligibility criteria, the officer was merely ensuring that Ms. West met or complied with the criteria established by the Nation when it created and passed its own election law. Therefore, it appears that Ms. West’s challenge is more an issue with the 1986 Election Law itself and its selection criteria (Forward v Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2008 CHRT 5).

In this matter, the band council exercised its authority by enacting its own 1986 Election Law within its jurisdiction, which falls within the federal sphere (Francis v Mohawk Council of Kanesatake, 2003 FCT 115 (CanLII)). The fact that the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development allowed CLFN, by order in council, to adopt its own election law does not render the 1986 Election Law immune from scrutiny under the Charter (Ratt v Matchewan, 2010 FC 160 [“Ratt”]; Taypotat v Taypotat, 2013 FCA 192). The type of challenge Ms. West has brought should have been brought in the right forum, the Federal Court. The Federal Court has jurisdiction over the officer’s actions as well as over matters relating to the Nation’s elections (Ratt; Ballantyne v Nasikapow, 2000 CanLII 16594 (FC)). This jurisdiction of the Federal Court also extends to reviews relating to the application of the Charter and section 15, regarding equality rights.

 Ms. West alleged that she was a victim of retaliation under section 14.1 of the CHRA. The preponderance of evidence does not support Ms. West’s claims. Her daughter lives in the CLFN community and she was informed by a consultant for the Nation that she was to receive a house to replace the one she was living in. Reasons for reassigning the house to another member of the community were provided and were credible.

Houle v Swan River First Nation, 2020 CanLII 88240 (FC)

The Court ordered that two consolidated applications for judicial review in relation to an election dispute will be treated as an action. The Applicants seek a declaration that the First Nation’s customary election regulations are contrary to section 15 of the Charter and the Defendants plan to bring a defence based on sections 1 and 25 of the Charter, as well as section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. As the Charter argument is being raised for the first time on judicial review and section 35 rights can only be determined at trial, the matter will proceed as an action. 

Indigenous Law Centre CaseWatch Blog

Swan River First Nation [“SRFN”] and the Swan River First Nation Chief and Council [“Respondents”], have brought a motion under the Federal Courts Rules [“Rules”] for an Order pursuant to the Federal Courts Act directing that two consolidated applications for judicial review [“Applications”] be treated and proceeded with as an action.

Shawna Jean and Robert Houle [“Applicants”] in the underlying Applications, are seeking an Order to set aside the decision of the Electoral Officer of the SRFN that refused to accept their nominations as Chief and Councillor of the SRFN respectively in the 2019 General Election. The Applicants had not been residing on the SRFN Reserve for at least one year prior to May 3, 2019 in accordance with section 9.1(a)(2) of the Swan River First Nation Customary Election Regulations [“Election Regulations”]. Additionally, they seek declarations that they are eligible to run as candidates for the position of Chief and Councillor in the 2019 General Election, and that section 9.1(a)(2) of the Election Regulations contravenes section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms [“Charter”]. They contend that the impugned provision discriminates on the basis of Aboriginal residency and is therefore unconstitutional and is of no force or effect.

The Respondents intend to defend the Applications on the basis of sections 1 and 25 of the Charter and s 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 in accordance with their asserted Aboriginal and Treaty rights. They argue that the procedures of an action are required to have a fair and just determination of the particular Aboriginal and Treaty rights defences being advanced and that the unique nature of these particular Applications is such that the rationales in support of the speedy judicial review process are not applicable.

The Applicants oppose the Respondents’ motion to have the Applications be treated and proceeded with as an action. They argue that the Respondents’ request to convert is premature because the Court has yet to determine whether there is a section 15 Charter violation. The Applicants also dispute the Respondents’ view of the customs, practices, traditions and history of the SRFN. According to the Applicants, the restriction of residency was not a traditional practice of the SRFN or its predecessor, the KEE NOO SHAY OOs’ Band, prior to Treaty No. 8, but rather the result of misinterpretation of Treaty No. 8 by government officials. The Applicants say that the judicial review procedure contains adequate mechanisms for the Respondents to outline their claim to Aboriginal and Treaty rights.

Section 18.4(2) of the Federal Courts Act vests the Court with the discretionary authority to order the conversion of an application for judicial review into an action “if it considers it appropriate” (Canada (AG) v Lafrenière, 2018 FCA 151). This Court has previously found that applications for judicial review that raise issues of proof of Aboriginal rights can only be determined by way of an action (Soowahlie Indian Band v Canada (Attorney General), 2001 CanLII 22168 (FC)). In this matter, the procedures of a judicial review application do not provide sufficient procedural safeguards to ensure fairness to the parties on the Applications, nor do they enable the Court to make a proper determination of the issues of Aboriginal and Treaty rights before the Court in this proceeding, thereby this Court concludes that the Applications shall be treated and proceeded with as an action.

Good v Canada, 2018 FC 1199

Application dismissed. The applicant did not discharge her burden to satisfactorily prove that the First Nations Election Act was contravened during a First Nation’s Chief and Band Council election.

Wiyasiwewin Mikhiwahp Native Law Centre
Case Watch

Michelle Good has appealed all of the last three elections of the Red Pheasant First Nation [RPFN], but this is the first appeal she has applied for under the First Nations Elections Act [FNEA]. She is a practicing lawyer in British Columbia, and is a band member of the RPFN. On November 5, 2015, the RPFN Band Council signed a Band Council Resolution [BCR] in favour of opting into the FNEA, a statutory regime that legislates a process for First Nations to elect their Band Council members. After receiving the BCR, the Minister added the RPFN to the FNEA Schedule. An election followed on March 18, 2016. After the election results became known, Good filed an application under s 30 of the FNEA in the Federal Court to review the election. She went on to allege that the election and the election process contravened numerous sections of the FNEA. Good has applied for nine different declarations and an order that a new election be called as her only relief.

An election to be set aside requires meeting a statutory test under ss 31 and 35(1) of the FNEA. The two-part test requires the Applicant to establish that a provision was contravened and that the contravention likely affected the election result. Contraventions unlikely to have affected the result of the election will not trigger overturning the election. The requisite standard of proof for establishing this test is the balance of probabilities. In interpreting the FNEA, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal noted that the presumption of regularity is reflected in the onus and evidentiary burden imposed on an applicant to demonstrate that a contravention has occurred that likely affected the result of an election. Once an applicant establishes a prima facie case, the burden switches to the respondent to refute it. The type of contravention is important and relevant as not every contravention will justify triggering the overturning of the election. This Court retains discretion on overturning elections, even in situations involving fraud or other forms of corruptions.

Evidence in a judicial review proceeding is dealt with by the Court through examination of the affidavits before it. In this matter, the record before the Court was complicated by numerous affidavits which included redacted affidavits, supplementary affidavits, and late filed affidavits. Many of the affidavits contain hearsay evidence, argument, and irrelevant or inflammatory comments. The Court found this unacceptable, inappropriate, and not a good use of judicial resources. Not only is such a record unfair to the Judge, but it is also unfair to the Respondents as the Respondents cannot know exactly what the relevant allegation is, or the specific evidence that supports the allegation.

A main allegation in many of the affidavits revolved around cash being given to band members by the Chief and Council at the time of the election and with respect to the appeal. Money given to assist band members in need has been the tradition for many years, and evidence was led by both parties to the effect that the RPFN is not a wealthy First Nation. Many of its members are in need of assistance for food, gas, and other necessities. People text or solicit the Chief and Council for cash and if the requests are deemed as legitimate, typically money will be given from their own pockets or accounts, and on occasion from a band account. This practice does not stop during election campaigning. The Court had to determine in each situation whether the contributions by the individuals were philanthropic, or for the purposes of vote purchasing. The Respondents provided a methodical refutation to these allegations.

There were also allegations of unlawful control of enough blank ballots to control the outcome of the election. The allegations had reasonable explanations given by the Respondents and the Court preferred their evidence. It is not a violation of the FNEA or any common-law principles to be asked to join a slate of candidates. This political maneuvering would appear to be what occurs in many elections, and is a recognized part of the political process. It was also alleged that fraud occurred from the overbroad use of Form 5D (Form to Request a Mail-in Ballot) and Form 8C (Declaration of Person Delivering a Mail-in Ballot Package) which allowed illegally obtained ballot forms to be placed in the ballot box, therefore controlling the outcome of the election. Walking in ballots and completing the 8C Form in itself is not evidence of fraud, especially given that most of the band members live off reserve. Good also alleged that people were given the paper with the slate of candidates that they were to vote for, but there was no evidence of this that was acceptable to the Court. There is no prohibition against entering a polling station with a slip of paper in and of itself.

The substantive allegation surrounding vote buying was supported by excerpted Facebook posts. This is not reliable evidence, as it is inherently suspect. An individual can post on Facebook that they have sold their vote, and another individual can “corroborate” a potentially false narrative without any underlying substrata of truth to the event. While it has been held that Facebook posts can result in legal action, such as in the employment context, it is highly distinguishable from individuals attempting to “set-up” others on social media platforms to establish the corrupt nature of elections on the RPFN. Good was not present at the actual election and her only knowledge was garnished from following social media. There was also alleged vote-buying at the Ramada Inn in the hospitality room put on by the Chief. Having a “come and go” hospitality room is not out of the ordinary for candidates in any and all political forums, and it is not found on these facts that the hospitality room or the events that occurred within comprised an inducement to buy a vote.

The remaining evidence does not support a contravention of the FNEA, and in the alternative, it does not affect the results of the election. There were several other affidavits that were not specifically addressed as that evidence was related to issues not relevant or not before the Court. The Court commented that this election was a complex web of intrigue and that the band is clearly divided in its loyalty and this toxic environment can never be in the best interests of the band.

Case Watch for November 2016

FROM OUR PUBLICATIONS DESK

Case Watch

The following decisions came across our desk over the past month:

Equality rights of Métis children & families in child protection

Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton v GH, 2016 ONSC 6287: The Ontario Superior Court of Justice released a decision in a Crown wardship application where it was found that the definitions of “Indian”, “Native person”, and “Native child” in Ontario’s Child and Family Services Act were invalid on the basis that they unjustifiably infringe s 15 of the Charter. The Court found that the impugned definitions do not extend to all individuals who self-identify as being Aboriginal. In fact, all parties conceded that they do not extend to Métis children. The Court also found that the Act afforded significant special protections for individuals falling into these definitions at every stage of a child protection intervention. The Court recognized that all Aboriginal peoples, including Métis, have been subject to a legacy of prejudice, stereotyping, and disadvantage. With this context in mind, the Court determined that the definitions created distinctions based on the analogous ground of “Aboriginality without membership in a community designated as “Native” under the [Act]”. It also concluded that these distinctions created or perpetuated disadvantage for Métis children and their families due to their inability to access the special protections under the Act. In conducting this analysis, the Court noted that the Act clearly created these unfair and objectionable disadvantages on its face and this could be discerned through logical reasoning alone. There was no need for social science evidence and empirical data. As no s 1 argument was advanced, the infringement was not saved. A suspended declaration of invalidity was issued and it was ordered that the Métis child in this case be treated as if he were an Indian, Native person or Native child within the meaning of the Act.

Inadequate investigation of vote-buying allegations by INAC

Good v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FC 1272: The Federal Court released a decision allowing in part an application for judicial review of INAC’s dismissal of an election appeal under the Indian Act. The applicant first unsuccessfully sought to appeal the March 2014 election of the Red Pheasant First Nation through INAC based on allegations of misconduct by the electoral officer and corruption in the form of vote-buying. She then sought judicial review of INAC’s rejection of that appeal. However, a subsequent election had since taken place in March 2016. The Court found that INAC’s delegate erred by choosing to dispense with any investigation of the applicant’s vote-buying allegations and proceeding to dismiss the appeal on the basis that corruption had not been proven on a balance of probabilities. The Court noted that this approach appears to have become settled practice within INAC’s Elections Unit. While the Court was sympathetic to INAC’s desire to streamline its management of appeals, it had significantly changed the very nature of the appeals process in a manner tantamount to attempting to amend the law via internal policy. The Court took no issue with how the delegate addressed the issue of electoral officer misconduct, but found that the delegate’s refusal to investigate conflicting evidence on vote-buying was unreasonable, based upon an error of law and procedurally unfair. While these issues were moot due to the subsequent election, the Court exercised its discretion to deal with the central controversy between the parties as roughly 40% of First Nations hold elections under the regime at issue in this case.

Relevance of Aboriginal equity stake to remedy in consultation case –

Michipicoten First Nation v Ontario (Minister of Natural Resources and Forests), 2016 ONSC 6899: The Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed an application for judicial review of provincial approvals for the Bow Lake Wind Farm Project on the shared traditional territory of the Michipicoten and Batchewana First Nations in northeastern Ontario. Michipicoten argued that the Crown breached its duty to consult and sought to quash the approvals, preclude further approvals until more consultation takes place, and have the court remain seized of remedies or order removal of the infrastructure, remediation of the lands, and costs. The Court noted that Michipicoten had inexplicably delayed several months in pursuing and perfecting its application for judicial review, which caused the proponent and Batchewana, which has a 50% interest in the project, serious harm. For this reason, the Court dismissed the application on its own motion. In the alternative, the Court went on to conclude that consultation was adequate as Michipicoten failed to provide any evidence of potential adverse impacts on its Aboriginal or treaty rights in spite of many requests to do so. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the remedy sought in terms of decommissioning the project was inappropriate. Michipicoten argued that a proponent’s commercial interests may not come into play in determining the balance of convenience in a consultation dispute between the Crown and an Aboriginal community. However, the Court found this principle inapplicable in this case since Batchewana would face irreparable harm if the relief sought was granted.

Validity of a Will under the Indian Act not providing for spouse –

Poitras v Khan, 2016 SKQB 346: The Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench allowed an application for letters probate under a Will created pursuant the Indian Act. The testator met the man who became her husband and married him after she had already made her Will. Under provincial legislation, the testator’s spousal relationship would have automatically revoked her Will. However, the testator was a status Indian living on reserve and there was no such provision under the Indian Act to invalidate her Will automatically. Under the Indian Act, the Minister had the power to declare the Will void if it imposed hardship on persons to whom the testator had responsibility or was contrary to the interests of the band or the public. In this case, the Minister had referred the matter to the Court, conferring its power to declare the Will void on the Court. The testator’s husband, Mr. Khan, sought to invoke this power on the basis that he was not provided for in the Will. The Court confirmed the validity of the Will, but also noted that Mr. Khan could still potentially seek a claim for one half of the testator’s family property accrued from the date of marriage until death under provincial legislation.

Canadian Human Rights Tribunal’s jurisdictional limits re: Indian Act –

Beattie v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FC 1328: The Federal Court dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal where a complaint was dismissed as being solely a challenge to legislation beyond the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The applicant, Mr. Beattie, sought to register two leases and an assignment of lease in the Indian Lands Registry. The Registrar rejected the applications on the basis that the leases did not include the Crown as a party and no ministerial approval had been provided. Since the leases could not be registered, the assignment could not be registered either. As a result of this decision, the applicants brought a complaint to the Tribunal alleging that the respondent had discriminated against them on the basis of their race, national or ethnic origin by denying a service customarily available to the public. The Tribunal dismissed the complaints on the basis that they were beyond its jurisdiction since they were challenging the Indian Act itself, which obliged the Registrar to reject the leases and assignment. The Court was satisfied that the Tribunal’s decision was reasonable and it was reasonable to rely on other Federal Court and Tribunal decisions where such challenges to legislation were dismissed as beyond the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The Court also rejected the applicants’ assertion that title to the reserve lands at issue in this dispute were vested in an individual pursuant to either a Certificate of Possession or customary tenure.

Court’s duty to explicitly consider & inquire into Gladue factors –

R v Park, 2016 MBCA 107: The Manitoba Court of Appeal allowed an appeal from sentence for impaired driving and drug possession due in part to the sentencing judge’s failure to adequately consider Gladue factors. It was conceded that defence counsel during the sentencing hearing did not address Gladue factors other than to note that the accused was Aboriginal. No Gladue report was ordered. The Crown argued that defence counsel expressly waived the Gladue rights of the accused whereas counsel for the accused on appeal argued that the Court had a duty to make further inquiry when no advocacy was provided on Gladue factors during sentencing. The Court of Appeal found there was no express waiver in this case. Defence counsel at sentencing acknowledged there were Gladue factors but focused on other arguments. A waiver must be express and clear. Both defence and Crown counsel have an obligation to bring forward Gladue information. Where that does not happen, the Court may need to go further and has a duty to at least make further inquiries. The Court must also make explicit its consideration of Gladue factors and its determination that it has adequate information on those factors before it. It is unsatisfactory for both the offender and the public to have to infer such circumstances were properly considered. The sentencing judge failed to expressly confirm that Gladue factors were considered and failed to clarify defence’s reliance on Gladue, which in turn had an impact on the sentence. The sentence was varied.

No need for ‘linkage’ between Gladue factors & offence –

R v Predham, 2016 ABCA 371: The Alberta Court of Appeal allowed an appeal from sentence with respect to convictions for driving while disqualified, breach of recognizance, failure to appear and possession of a stolen licence plate. The appellant argued that the sentencing judge erred in failing to give appropriate weight to his Gladue factors, among other things. In particular, the appellant took issue with the sentencing judge’s reasons where it was suggested that Gladue factors were less relevant to the offence of driving while disqualified in the absence of alcohol, drugs or violence. The sentencing judge stated that there must be “some relationship between the Gladue factors and the offending in order for there to be that sort of linkage”. The Court of Appeal held that it was an error of law to require a linkage between Gladue factors and the offending conduct. The Court stated that it is also an error to carve out a certain category of offences as being immune from the Gladue analysis. The Court was also satisfied that the sentencing judge’s error influenced his ultimate decision. The sentence was varied.

Injunction against Cleveland baseball team’s name & logo denied –

Cardinal v Major League Baseball, 2016 ONSC 6929: The Ontario Superior Court issued its reasons for dismissing an urgent interim injunction application to restrain the Cleveland baseball team, Rogers Communications, and Major League Baseball (MLB) from displaying the team’s name or logo during a game in Toronto and while the underlying federal and provincial human rights complaints proceed. In the underlying complaints, the applicant, Douglas J. Cardinal, is alleging that the use of the team’s name and logo constitutes prohibited discrimination and harassment against him on the grounds of race, ancestry, colour, ethnic and national origins, and constitutes a publication or display intended to incite infringement of the Ontario Human Rights Code. The Court held that it had jurisdiction over the application, rejecting MLB’s argument that it ought to allow the United States Supreme Court to determine the underlying issues in this case based on principles of comity. The Court was also satisfied that the parties raised serious issues to be tried in terms of whether a service had been offered and whether the team’s name and/or logo offend the provisions of federal and Ontario human rights legislation, as well as the relevance of MLB’s freedom of expression to the dispute. However, the Court did not accept the applicant’s assertion that he would sustain irreparable harm if an injunction was not granted, noting that damages were available and disputes over use of the impugned name and logo have been ongoing for years. The Court noted that the applicant sought a change to the status quo and his last minute application, if granted, would materially prejudice the respondents. The issue of delay went to both the question or irreparable harm and the balance of convenience.

Settlement approved in Newfoundland & Labrador school claims –

Anderson v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 NLTD(G) 179: The Newfoundland and Labrador Supreme Court approved the terms of a $50 million settlement in a class action brought by Aboriginal individuals who attended schools, dormitories or orphanages in the province between 1949 and 1980. The plaintiffs claimed that Canada breached a fiduciary duty to the students who attended these facilities to protect them from actionable physical or mental harm. The Court was satisfied that the settlement was fair, reasonable, made in good faith, and in the best interests of the class as a whole. It was also satisfied that the fees and disbursements of the plaintiffs’ counsel were fair and reasonable. The settlement includes both General Compensation Payments for years that students resided at the facilities at issue, and Abuse Compensation Payments that depend on the harm individual students suffered. The settlement provides for a confidential paper-based claims process and Canada is committed to funding mutually agreeable commemoration and healing initiatives over and above its compensation funding.

Tax Court’s exclusive jurisdiction over tax assessment challenges –

Horseman v Canada, 2016 FCA 252: The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from a decision to strike the appellant’s claims as falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Court of Canada. The appellant received a Notice of Assessment and Requirement to Pay $59,000.06 of outstanding GST. He initiated this Federal Court action for a declaration that the Requirement to Pay is null and void and contrary to the Indian Act, Treaty No. 8, and s 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The Court found that this challenge was properly characterized as an indirect challenge to a tax assessment, making it plain and obvious that the Tax Court had exclusive jurisdiction. The Tax Court has jurisdiction to consider the constitutional validity, applicability or operability of federal legislation and regulations and can issue remedies if a notice of constitutional question is properly served. It is also well-established that the Tax Court can determine claims under s 87 of the Indian Act over the applicability of tax requirements, or involving tax exemption claims under Treaty No. 8. Such assertions are properly tested in the Tax Court.

Provincial human rights tribunal’s jurisdictional limits re band store –

Dinsmore v Slenyah Store, 2016 BCHRT 176: The British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal dismissed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination in the area of employment on the basis of colour or race with respect to a business in Fraser Lake, British Columbia known as the Slenyah Store. The business was operated by the Stellat’en First Nation up until April 2014. The majority of its customers are status Indians who are able to purchase gas and cigarettes at tax exempt rates there. In 2013, the store was in serious financial difficulty. It was kept afloat via overdraft protection from Stellat’en and Stellat’en paid the store’s back taxes to get it out of its financial difficulties. In 2014, the store was incorporated to be operated at arm’s length through a limited partnership. As a result of these changes, all the store’s employees were laid off by Stellat’en and encouraged to reapply for positions with the limited partnership that would operate the store going forward. The Tribunal found that while the store was operated by Stellat’en it was an integral part of the First Nation’s overall governance and operations. Its purpose was to permit members to avail themselves of their tax-free status, it was financially integrated with the First Nation, its employees were employees of the First Nation, and its operations were continuously concerned with the status, rights and privileges of Stellat’en’s members. As a result, the store fell under federal jurisdiction and outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction while it was operated by Stellat’en. While operated at arm’s length through a limited partnership, however, the store was a provincial undertaking subject to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The Tribunal went on to dismiss the complaint against both entities on the ground that it had no reasonable prospect of success if it were to proceed on its merits.

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This Case Watch blog post has been brought to you by the Native Law Centre in partnership with Pro Bono Students Canada – University of Saskatchewan