Tag Archives: Charter

R v Kapolak, 2020 NWTTC 12

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The NWT Territorial Court found a provision for sexual assault against a minor under the Criminal Code to breach s 12 of the Charter and therefore declined to apply it and ordered a conditional sentence for an Inuk offender with FASD.

Indigenous Law Centre
Indigenous CaseWatch Blog

This decision bears in mind the cognitive challenges associated with FASD with the Indigenous accused. It had to balance between the protection of Indigenous victims and the need to implement the Gladue principles for Indigenous offenders. Like provincial courts, the territorial court cannot strike down any provisions but it may become a persuasive precedent for other courts in the territories and elsewhere.

This case involved a single incident, and the victim suffered no apparent injury. This was a bold act, committed on a residential street, in the daytime, as opposed to a surreptitious act committed behind closed doors, on a sleeping victim, or in a context where the victim is physically isolated and cannot get away from the perpetrator. The victim initially did not feel threatened by the accused, because she was familiar with him, and likely because of his diminutive size and almost child-like appearance. But the accused then touched the victim’s body many times and in many places, and he failed to disengage when prompted verbally by her. She had to resort to physical violence to make him stop. This was a crime of opportunity, committed on impulse. The victim was in foster care at the time of the incident. She did not file a Victim Impact Statement, but it is inferred that she is from Inuit ancestry from her name.

Because the mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment for six months applies to all offenders having committed any form of sexual assault on a victim aged anywhere between 1 day and 16 years, it is vulnerable to Charter scrutiny. Imposing a sentence of six months in jail on this accused who is a first offender when there are many mitigating factors and when the circumstances of the offence, while being serious, are not too egregious, is fundamentally unfair and as a result, disproportionate. As a result, the accused’s right to be protected against cruel and unusual treatment or punishment is infringed by the mandatory minimum punishment found at section 271(b) of the Criminal Code. The provision is not saved by section 1 of the Charter, and accordingly the mandatory minimum punishment is declined.

The presence of an intellectual disability that affects the accused’s cognitive functions makes it difficult to assess the risk to reoffend. Although present, and in light of other circumstances, the risk is not viewed as high, or determinative. However, the offence of sexual assault is prevalent in Northern communities, 5.3 times the national ratio in 2017. The accused’s early guilty plea is highly mitigating, as it spared the victim from having to testify in court.

The personal circumstances of the accused, which include the diagnosis of Alcohol-Related Neuro-Developmental Disorder, suggest a reduced moral blameworthiness. For a first offender, sentencing usually focuses on rehabilitation. There is nothing to say that a community-based sentence would not work for this accused. The risk to reoffend that this accused presents because of the impulsivity associated with his condition, as well as his intellectual limitation, is compensated by the fact that he benefits from family support. He has a home in which supervision may occur, and he has shown that he is able to comply with conditions.

For an offender with challenges to his executive functions, repetition of instructions, structure, and professional follow-up, appear to be key. A carefully crafted conditional sentence order can bring the necessary restrictions to a person’s freedom while providing rehabilitative tools, and thus achieve deterrence.

The Supreme Court of Canada determined that the standard for finding that a sentence represents a cruel and unusual punishment is that it be grossly disproportionate. An option to preserve the constitutionality of offences that cast a wide net is to provide for residual judicial discretion to impose a fit and constitutional sentence in exceptional cases (R v Lloyd, 2016 1 RCS 13).

In this case, the offender presents with cognitive challenges, and is sentenced more than one year after the commission of the offence. The immediate link between consequence and cause may be lost and as a result a sentence of imprisonment may not achieve the necessary deterrence. Reducing the over-incarceration of Aboriginal offenders is as important an objective as that of protecting vulnerable victims, and must be given equal consideration. The accused is to serve a conditional sentence of imprisonment of 120 days, to be followed by a period of probation of 18 months.

R v Sabattis, 2020 ONCJ 242

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Application dismissed. The applicant, a young Indigenous first offender, has not established that the mandatory minimum sentence results in a grossly disproportionate sentence for either herself or for other persons in reasonably foreseeable cases.

Indigenous Law Centre – CaseWatch Blog

A young Indigenous first offender was found guilty of impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle while her blood alcohol concentration exceeded 80 mg/100 ml of blood, contrary to s 253(1)(a) and s 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

In this matter, the applicant submits that a curative discharge is most appropriate, but this remedy is not available because the Criminal Law Amendment Act allows Ontario to decline to proclaim the Criminal Code provision for a curative discharge into force. As a mandatory minimum sentence for a first offence, the applicant must pay a $1000 fine, and receive a one-year driving prohibition. The applicant alleges that the Criminal Law Amendment Act, violates the applicant’s s 15 Charter rights by allowing the provinces to opt out of the curative discharge provisions. This disregards Gladue principles, causing “differential treatment” of Aboriginal offenders and other members of society in the sentencing process. As well, she submits that the mandatory minimum sentence subjects the applicant to cruel and unusual punishment contrary to s 12 of the Charter. In respect of both alleged breaches, the applicant submits that the provisions are not saved by s 1 of the Charter and therefore seeks the imposition of a curative discharge as a remedy.

The Court finds that the applicant has not established that the mandatory minimum sentence results in a grossly disproportionate sentence for either the offender or for other persons in reasonably foreseeable cases. Similarly, the applicant has not established that the non-proclamation of the curative discharge provisions results in a grossly disproportionate sentence contrary to s 12 of the Charter. Given the finding that there is no violation of s 12 or s 15 of the Charter, the Court is bound by the mandatory minimum sentence. Using the relevant sentencing principles including Gladue principles, and having regard to the circumstances of the offence and of the offender, it is the Court’s view an appropriate sentence is a $1200 fine, a 15-month driving prohibition, and probation for a period of two years with the requirement that the offender attend counselling as directed by her probation officer related to her consumption of alcohol and other counselling as directed.

The fine and prohibition imposed is greater than the statutory minimums to recognize the need for denunciation and deterrence, the aggravating factors of the case, and to give effect to s 255.1, which provides that evidence of a blood alcohol concentration in excess of 160 mg/100 ml of blood is a statutorily aggravating factor. This non-custodial sentence, which includes two years probation with a requirement for alcohol counselling, recognizes the importance of rehabilitation for this youthful first offender and takes into account the restorative Gladue principles. The Court is satisfied that alcohol counselling is a necessary rehabilitative component of the sentence. This sentence is still at the lowest end of the range of what is appropriate given the aggravating features of the offence, but also reflects the significant mitigating personal circumstances of the offender.

R v Duncan, 2020 BCSC 590

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Application granted. The Indigenous accused is to be released on bail, subject to stringent conditions, on the tertiary grounds for pre-trial custody in excess of 90 days and concerns surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic in jails.

Indigenous Law Centre – CaseWatch Blog

This matter is a detention review hearing pursuant to s 525 of the Criminal Code. The 32 year old accused from Musqueam First Nation has been in pre trial custody for ten months. His custody relates to multiple alleged offences, including breaking and entering. As per the Gladue factors, his life reflects the intergenerational legacy of the horrific historical treatment of Aboriginal peoples in this country. The accused has a lengthy criminal history.

Counsel for the accused provided new evidence combined with a change in circumstances that warrants a re-visiting and reassessment of the restrictive and supervised treatment program at VisionQuest as a viable and proportionate alternative to the accused’s continued detention. It has culturally relevant programming and a high level of supervision.

The overarching question before the Court is whether the continued detention of the accused until his trial(s) is still justified on one or more of the three grounds specified in s 515(10) of the Criminal Code (R v Myers, 2019 SCC 18). The Court is satisfied that a release plan requiring the accused’s participation in VisionQuest’s isolated residential treatment program combined with strict mobility restrictions would be a culturally responsive and appropriate application of the Gladue factors in this particular case.

There also remains the question of the COVID-19 pandemic. Much of the case law that has developed thus far on this subject deals with the tertiary ground for detention. There are an increasing number of cases which have held that the risk of infection posed to inmates while incarcerated in detention centers awaiting trials is also a valid factor when considering the secondary ground for detention specified in s 515(10)(b) of the Criminal Code (R v TK, 2020 ONSC 1935).

The government is well aware of the risks involved and has implemented a number of measures designed to reduce the spread of the infection in jails. In this particular case Court already concluded that the accused’s proposed release plan satisfactorily addresses public safety concerns, however, COVID-19 concerns would have tipped the balance in favour of interim release rather than continued detention on secondary grounds. Although the break and enter offenses are serious, no physical violence was involved.

The accused is a drug addict with a criminal history of property crimes fuelled by his addiction. That addiction and most, if not all, of the disadvantages he has suffered in life are the product of the sad social problem that is the legacy of the mistreatment of Aboriginal peoples in Canada.

R v Hartling, 2020 ONCA 243

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Conviction appeal dismissed. Sentence appeal allowed in part along with a stay of a second breach of probation charge. The Crown tried to rely on the delays involved in obtaining a Gladue report to justify the post-verdict delay.

Indigenous Law Centre – CaseWatch Blog

Following an afternoon of heavy drinking with her adult son and boyfriend, the complainant was seriously assaulted. She told first responders that her son was responsible. The son was charged. The mother testified for the Crown that her son attacked her and her boyfriend following an argument. Months later the trial resumed. This time the mother testified for the defence. She changed her testimony and said that it was her boyfriend, not her son, who attacked her.

The trial judge convicted her son for aggravated assault against his mother, assault causing bodily harm against the boyfriend and two counts of breach of probation. He was given a global sentenced of 30 months in custody. After considerable delays, the trial judge found the appellant guilty of aggravated assault against his mother, her boyfriend along with resisting arrest and two counts of breach of probation. Following 8.2 months of pretrial custody, he was sentenced to 21.8 months of incarceration.

The son appealed his convictions and sentence. However, the post-verdict delay was determined unacceptable to this Court. It took 14 months after conviction for the sentence to be imposed. This delay was not caused by ineffective judicial management. It was not caused by the appellant, nor was it caused directly by the actions of the prosecutor. It was caused by the lack of institutional resources to obtain a Gladue report. Immediately upon conviction, trial counsel obtained an order for a Gladue report from the trial judge. However, court administration services denied funding. Ultimately, the appellant, with the assistance of his counsel, chose to pay privately. The issue of post-verdict delay was addressed by this Court in R V Charley, 2019 ONCA 726 [“Charley”], where a presumptive ceiling of five months was set for the time from verdict to sentence.

In an attempt to justify the delay, the Crown alleged extraordinary circumstances because of the issues with the Gladue report and because the case was already in the system when Charley was decided. The Court does not accept that the circumstances are exceptional. It cannot be said that it is exceptional to require a Gladue report in the Algoma district where there is a large Indigenous population. Gladue reports were created in order to address systemic injustice that uniquely affects Indigenous offenders, and which leads to overrepresentation in the criminal justice system. A long delay undermines the purpose of the Gladue report by creating another level of unfairness. Moreover, to submit that the preparation of such a report is exceptional is untenable.

The appellant was entitled to a Gladue report, the trial judge ordered it, and subsequently relied on it. According to R v Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, the new framework, including the presumptive ceiling, applies to cases currently in the system, subject to qualifications but these qualifications do not apply in this matter. A 14-month delay was unreasonable and breached the appellant’s s 11(b) Charter rights.

A stay of a valid conviction would impact public confidence in the administration of justice. The possibility of vacating a valid conviction based on sentencing delay is “an unjustified windfall” for the accused (Betterman v Montana, 578 US, 136 S. Ct. 1609). The appropriate and just remedy here should target the sentence, not the conviction. The appellant was convicted of a violent offence against his mother in her home. It would bring the administration of justice into disrepute to stay the conviction. For the remedy to target the sentence, it must be based on and align with sentencing principles. The sentence is reduced by five months.

Dumais et al v Kehewin Band Council et al, 2020 FC 25

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Motion dismissed. The reasons for dismissal is not the merits of the Plaintiffs’ grievances against Kehewin Band Council et al for refusing them memberships under Bill C-31, but rather this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain them.

Indigenous Law Centre – CaseWatch Blog

The Plaintiffs have asked for default judgement against the Kehewin Band and Band Council [“Kehewin”]. Due to the historical gender discrimination that existed against women with registered Indian status under the enfranchisement, or “marrying out”, provisions of the Indian Act, SC 1956. In 1985, however, the Indian Act was amended, also known as Bill C-31, to be consistent with s 15 of the Charter. Bill C-31 automatically restored band membership to the women who had lost their Indian status directly through enfranchisement.

Kehewin refused to recognize Bill C-31 or accept any of its eligible individuals or their children as band members. As a result, the Plaintiffs commenced the underlying action in 2000 seeking declaratory relief and damages against Kehewin and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development [“Canada”]. The Plaintiffs claim there was a fiduciary duty owed towards them and there was a breach of that duty.

In this matter, the Plaintiffs seek default judgment for damages resulting from Kehewin’s discrimination and associated denial of all tangible and intangible benefits of band membership. The action against Canada has been held in abeyance pending disposition of the present motion. The action moved forward by fits and bounds for almost a decade. Throughout this period, Kehewin engaged in a deliberate and systematic pattern of delay, using all possible means to frustrate the Plaintiffs’ efforts to conduct an orderly and complete discovery.

Kehewin never formally took control of its membership lists. Kehewin rebuffed all attempts to restore membership to the Plaintiffs, refusing to comply with Bill C-31 or recognize Canada’s authority. Kehewin also failed to file an action or application to challenge the constitutionality of Bill C-31. Kehewin simply ignored Bill C-31. Kehewin refused to recognize any Bill C-31 eligible individuals as Kehewin Band members. Kehewin’s adoption and application of their Kehewin Law #1 made it impossible for individuals reinstated to registered Indian status or Kehewin Band membership under Bill C-31 to qualify for Kehewin Band membership.

The applicable test to establish if this Court has jurisdiction is set out by the Supreme Court of Canada: 1) there must be a statutory grant of jurisdiction by the federal Parliament; 2) there must be an existing body of federal law which is essential to the disposition of the case and which nourishes the statutory grant of jurisdiction; and 3) the law on which the case is based must be “a law of Canada” as the phrase is used in s 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 (ITO-Int’l Terminal Operators v Miida Electronics, [1986] 1 SCR 752 [“ITO”]).

The Plaintiffs rely on the provisions of ss 17(4) and paragraph 17(5)(b) of the Federal Courts Act [“FCA”] to find jurisdiction. First, the nature of the proceeding generally contemplated by ss 17(4) is an interpleader. To the extent any obligation may be owed by Kehewin or Canada to the Plaintiffs, are concurrent, not conflicting. The obligation can only be owed to one. It is the claims as against Canada by other parties which must be in conflict to fulfill the requirements of ss 17(4) (Roberts v Canada, [1989] 1 SCR 322). While Kehewin takes a different legal position regarding the Plaintiffs’ status as band members, this does not create a conflicting claim as against Canada. Therefore, this Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the Plaintiffs’ action against Kehewin under ss 17(4) of the FCA.

Next, paragraph 17(5)(b) of the FCA grants concurrent jurisdiction to the Federal Court to entertain claims against persons in relation to the performance of their duties as an officer, servant or agent of the Crown. Band councils have been recognized as legal entities separate and distinct from their membership with the capacity to sue and be sued by courts at all levels. On the one hand, they may act from time to time as an agent of the Crown with respect to carrying out certain departmental directives, orders of the Minister and the regulations passed for the benefit of its members. On the other hand, the band councils do many acts which are done in the name of and which represent the collective will of the band members, all of which is directly related to the elective process provided for in the Indian Act whereby the band members elect its governing body. The element of control is key to a finding of agency (Stoney Band v Stoney Band Council, [1996] FCJ No 1113).

The difficulty with the Plaintiffs’ argument is that no facts have ever been advanced in their pleadings which could support a finding of agency, nor does the notice of motion seek a declaration or finding of agency. It is not open to the Plaintiffs on a motion for default judgment to now assert liability of Kehewin based on agency. The introduction of this new theory of liability at this late stage of the proceeding is problematic. In any event, the facts established by the Plaintiffs on this motion do not support a conclusion that Kehewin was under the control of Canada when it refused to provide benefits to the Plaintiff. Regrettably, the Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the first branch of the ITO test.

R v Marr, 2019 NSSC 327

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Trial adjournment in order for the Respondent’s to make a Rowbotham application for state-funded counsel quashed and remitted back to the trial judge. It is insufficient to simply assert a complex constitutional defence, when the charge itself is not serious.

Indigenous Law Centre
Indigenous CaseWatch Blog

The Respondents are members of the Sipekne’katik First Nation and designated to partake in the Food, Social and Ceremonial fishery for lobster, which permits the fishing of 60 lobsters per day per fisher. The Respondents were charged with two sets of offences pertaining to catching and retaining more than 60 lobsters per day, contrary to s 7 of the Aboriginal Communal Fishing Licenses Regulations. The central issue was whether the trial judge erred in finding that a Rowbotham order was necessary to ensure a fair trial in the circumstances.

The complexity arised from the proposed constitutional defence. As per the air of reality to the defence put forward by the Respondents, there had been no indication of the substance of the defence, only a bare assertion of an Aboriginal or treaty right. There was no direction of how the Aboriginal or treaty rights are allegedly violated by the charges, and therefore impossible to say there was a proposed defence that is factually and legally relevant to the charges. The court on a Rowbotham application cannot simply assume that an Aboriginal person charged with a fisheries offence might have a treaty or Aboriginal rights defence as a basis to order state-funded counsel.

Further, with the bare assertion of an Aboriginal or treaty right, the court would have no way to assess the seriousness or complexity of the proposed defence. The charges were neither serious nor complex. They were straightforward, and there was no prospect of a sentence of imprisonment upon conviction. The only source of complexity was the potential defence to charges that are not, in themselves, serious or complex. Thus, the Respondents did not meet the Rowbotham test, and as such, the trial judge erred in law in finding that a Rowbotham order was necessary to ensure a fair trial.

The Respondents submit the application must be viewed through the prism of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples [“Declaration”]. As the Respondents provided no argument as to why the Declaration would mandate any particular result, as well as the Declaration is not legally binding, it is therefore not relevant on a Rowbotham application. The last argument raised by the Respondents pointed to sections 7 and 11(d) Charter violations. They did not provide authority for their argument that s 7 is engaged by an alleged violation of an Aboriginal or treaty right. As the court in Rowbotham effectively treated sections 7 and 11(d) as a joint guarantee of fair trial rights, the Respondents argument that a Rowbotham order can rest on a violation of section 11(d) alone, misconstrues the language of the decision.

R v Balfour and Young, 2019 MBQB 167

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Ms. Balfour’s and Mr. Young’s s 11(e) Charter rights were violated. A stay of proceedings is moot, but an order of costs is just. Consideration should be given to an independent review of the system affecting in-custody accused on remand in northern Manitoba.

Indigenous Law Centre – CaseWatch Blog

Ms. Balfour and Mr. Young are residents of different northern Manitoba Indigenous communities. Each were arrested and charged with Criminal Code offences. Their cases are completely unrelated except they both experienced difficulty having timely bail applications. Each had made an application for a declaration that their ss 7, 9, 11(e) and 12 rights as guaranteed by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms had been violated. Each sought a judicial stay of proceedings of their charges, and costs.

The focus of the Court’s analysis was on s 11(e) of the Charter, the right of a person charged with an offence not to be denied reasonable bail, as it is broad enough to encompass the specific elements of this matter in a holistic manner. The Court found that Ms. Balfour and Mr. Young rights were violated and the Crown did not seek justification for the violation under s 1 of the Charter.

Remand custody is substantially unlike being a sentenced prisoner in a correctional facility or penitentiary. Particularly in northern Manitoba, being in remand custody awaiting some court process or trial is physically and emotionally stressful for many reasons, especially for first offenders and young offenders. An in-custody remand cannot be routine or perfunctory, the remand must be for a good reason. Lack of court resources or time is not a good or valid reason (R v Reilly, 2019 ABCA 212). Such remands cannot be done consecutively with the effect of sidestepping the accused’s right to object or consent to longer delays. This also applies to remands for less than three clear days, where an accused need not consent.

Northern Manitoba residents who are held waiting for bail are moved repeatedly, often driving great distances while locked in crammed vans and in foul weather. It is unsafe for Sheriffs and accused alike, and adds to the chaos of the northern justice system as personal or video appearances are unreliable. Many accused do not stay in remand in the north but are transferred to central or southern Manitoba. Almost all are away from their home community such that personal visits with their counsel, family, children or supports are few and far between, if at all. Telephone communication to lawyers or families is difficult, infrequent and expensive. Accused are housed with all manner of inmates from a mix of backgrounds and temperaments; some of whom are violent, addicted to drugs or alcohol, or have mental health issues. Lawyers deposed that many clients have lost their employment, or have been attacked or threatened, while in remand waiting for bail hearings. Some accused consider pleading guilty just to get out of remand custody.

The remedy for a stay of proceedings is moot. An appropriate remedy under s 24(1) of the Charter, may generally include a stay of proceedings, a reduction of a sentence, or costs. At a minimum, judicial condemnation is required and the Court finds the bail practices in play in northern Manitoba should shock the conscience of any reasonable person. The violations of Ms. Balfour’s and Mr. Young’s Charter rights were directly related to long-standing and glaring systemic issues. Although the breaches were predictable, the issue of processing the potential release of an arrested person is vital. A bail system must be designed to ensure no person’s liberty is improperly usurped. This is of special concern, as many of the communities in the Thompson judicial area of northern Manitoba are Indigenous and many of those citizens suffer the effects of colonization (R v Gladue, [1999] 2 CNLR 252; R v Ipeelee, [2012] 2 CNLR 218).

No other remedy than costs remains available. In the end, Ms. Balfour and Mr. Young will receive nothing for the breaches of their individual Charter rights, but their lawyers will be reimbursed their expenses and receive partial compensation for their efforts.

Sheck v Canada (Minister of Justice), 2019 BCCA 364

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Application allowed. An order for the surrender of an Indigenous person to face charges of money laundering in the United States is remitted to the Minister of Justice for reconsideration.

Native Law Centre CaseWatch Blog

This is a judicial review of the decision of the Minister of Justice [“Minister”] that ordered Mr. Sheck’s surrender to the United States of America [“USA”] on charges of money laundering. The relief sought is to have the surrender order quashed, or in the alternative, have the matter remitted back to the Minister for reconsideration. The majority of this Court determined that the Minister failed to appreciate the disparity of the more severe sentence the accused would likely be given in the USA if convicted. As well, the Minister failed to consider the accused and his children’s Indigenous heritage and the context of the historical mistreatment by Canada of Indigenous families which forcibly separated children from their parents and culture.

The standard of review with respect to the Minister’s surrender decision is not in dispute. The Minister’s decision is entitled to deference, and interference is warranted only in exceptional cases of “real substance”. This Court considered whether the Minister’s decision fell within a range of reasonable outcomes, and if the correct legal test was applied (Lake v Canada (Minister of Justice), 2008 SCC 23 [“Lake”]; s 57(7) of The Extradition Act). This standard of review recognizes that the decision to surrender the accused is largely political and involved the Minister’s superior expertise with respect to Canada’s international obligations and interests (India v Badesha, 2017 SCC 44). The Minister must take into account Canada’s international obligations, but also consider the rights of the person sought.

Pursuant to s 7 of the Charter, a person is not to be deprived of the right to life, liberty and security of the person except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. In the extradition context, the Minister is not to surrender a person if surrender would “shock the conscience” (Lake) or not to surrender the person if the consequences of surrender would be “contrary to the principles of fundamental justice” (MM v United States of America, 2015 SCC 62 [“MM”]). This necessarily includes, when relevant, the best interests of that person’s children who may be affected by the extradition (MM).

The accused faces a potential sentence of 27 years imprisonment if convicted in the USA. If he enters a guilty plea in a timely manner, that might be reduced to a range of 19 to 27 years imprisonment. In contrast, the Minister considered only the maximum sentence an offender would face in Canada for a corresponding offence of ten years under s 462.31 of the Criminal Code. Mr. Sheck is Indigenous, employed, has a long-term spousal relationship, and supports and is actively involved in parenting four children. It is unlikely that Mr. Sheck’s circumstances would result in the maximum sentence in Canada of ten years’ imprisonment. The authorities suggest that a sentence for money laundering alone in Canada could range from a conditional sentence of less than two years, to a custodial sentence of 18 months to five years (R v Rathor, 2011 BCPC 338; R v Garnett, 2017 NSCA 33; R v Lawrence, 2018 ONCA 676; R v Barna, 2018 ONCA 1034; R v Bui, 2006 BCCA 245; R v Abdel, 2019 ONSC 690; R v Williams, 2019 NBPC 1; R v Rosenfeld, 2009 ONCA 307). The Minister cannot have truly appreciated the gross disparity between the two potential sentences the accused would face.

The Minister also failed to consider the impact of separating the accused from his children in the context of their common Indigenous heritage. Historically, the government-approved residential school program separated Indigenous children from their parents and communities, depriving them of their Indigenous culture and often subjected them to abuse. In numerous contexts, not just sentencing or extradition, the courts are called upon to consider the legacy of harm to the Indigenous peoples in Canada when determining a legal right or remedy (United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child; Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015 [“TRC Report”]). Specifically, in the “Calls to Action”, the TRC Report identified five action items relating to Indigenous child welfare, including keeping Indigenous families together where safe to do so.

Troller v Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation, 2019 MBQB 157

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Application denied. The actions of the Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation to limit the Applicant’s freedom of expression on his personalized license plate are a reasonable restriction in a free and democratic society.

Native Law Centre CaseWatch Blog

The Applicant is a resident of Winnipeg, Manitoba and an enthusiast of Star Trek, a science fiction television and movie franchise. He requested, and was granted, a personalized licence plate [“PLP”] from Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation [“MPI”] with the combination of letters and a number “ASIMIL8”. He asserts that this combination is a reference to a Star Trek character, the Borg and displayed the PLP for almost two years without incident. However, he was notified by MPI that the PLP was considered offensive and was demanded its immediate surrender, to which the Applicant complied.

The Supreme Court of Canada instructed a court as to how it should address an alleged violation of freedom of expression; s 2(b) of the Charter (Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (AG), [1989] 1 SCR 927 [“Irwin Toy”]). This Court found that “ASIML8” does attempt to convey a meaning and meets the first step, as the word itself does not attempt to convey a violent form of expression. This expression is within the protected sphere of conduct. The second step was to determine if the method of expression or the location of the expression is entitled to s 2(b) protection. The third step as outlined in Irwin Toy, was to determine whether the purpose or effect of the government action was to restrict freedom of expression. It was established that MPI’s purpose was to restrict the Applicant’s expression. The s 2(b) analysis in this case turns on the second step, the location of this expression.

The test for location, with respect to expression on government-owned property, is whether the place is public and where one would expect constitutional protection for free expression on the basis that expression in that place does not conflict with the purposes which s 2(b) is intended to serve: 1) democratic discourse, (2) truth finding and (3) self-fulfillment. To answer this question, the following factors were considered: a) the historical or actual function of the place; and b) whether other aspects of the place suggest that expression within it would undermine the values underlying free expression (Montréal (City) v 2952-1366 Québec Inc, 2005 SCC 62). The presence of a PLP, like advertising on a bus, is in the public space, not a private space.

Section 1 Charter rights and freedoms, however, are limited in scope and sets Canadian jurisprudence apart from American jurisprudence on free expression. The Court found that Charter protections were engaged, and the proportionate balancing required an understanding by the Court of the PLP program (Doré v Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12; Loyola High School v Quebec (AG), 2015 SCC 12). The MPI brochure sets out the restrictions for a PLP. Its review committee takes extensive steps to avoid unintended meanings outside of their collective knowledge. The Court accepted that “ASIMIL8” was originally approved because the search term entered was “asimilate” as opposed to “assimilate”. The error itself is of no import because MPI reserves the right to recall a PLP and the length of time it took in making the decision was not crucial. MPI believed that when they became apprised of a complaint, this decision required immediate attention and “falls within a range of reasonable alternatives” (RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada (AG), [1995] 3 SCR 199).

MPI submits that offensiveness is a matter of community standards and the word “assimilate” when considered in the context of Canadian history is on its face objectionable. The assimilation of Aboriginal people was the official policy of the Government of Canada and the Prime Minister in 2008 formerly apologized on behalf of all Canadians for its implementation and ongoing effects (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015 [“TRC Report”]). Given the history of assimilate, the mere presence of “ASIMIL8” is contrary to a respectful and welcoming environment.

The Court accepts that by choosing to display the PLP on his vehicle, the Applicant was not denigrating Indigenous people. The standard of review, however, is reasonableness. The action of the Registrar in revoking the PLP was determined to be reasonable. The Path to Reconciliation Act played a significant part in the decision. The policy of the assimilation of Indigenous people appears 151 times in the TRC report. The word assimilate has taken on a new meaning within this country. In order to meet the Doré test, the Charter right must be minimally impaired. Following the surrender of the “ASIMIL8” PLP, Troller chose a different word to express his love of the Borg character in Star Trek and was issued a new PLP.

R v Newborn, 2019 ABCA 123

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Appeal dismissed. An accused is entitled to a fairly chosen representative jury, not to one with a particular composition. As well, the jury is entitled to have competing evidence on a critical issue before them.

Native Law Centre CaseWatch Blog

The Appellant was charged with murder for physically beating a man so severely that he died from the injuries two days later. The offence occurred on a train in front of other passengers, and was recorded by security cameras. The Appellant argued that the Crown could not prove the intent necessary for murder as the accused had a limited intellectual capacity with an IQ of 59 and a moderate cognitive impairment. The Appellant also challenged the jury selection process arguing that his right to a trial by an independent and impartial jury selection under s 11 (d) and (f) of the Charter had been violated, arguing that s 4(h)(i) of the Jury Act excludes persons who have been convicted of a criminal offence. This according to the Appellant is unconstitutional because it disproportionately excluded Aboriginal persons.

An accused is entitled to a fairly chosen representative jury, not to one with a particular composition (R v Kokopenance, 2015 SCC 28). The focus is on the process to select the jury, which must include the delivery of notices to citizens randomly selected from broadly based sources and the deliberate or systemic exclusion of segments of the population is not acceptable. Some limits on jury eligibility, however, are permissible.

It was concluded that the Appellant did not offer any satisfactory rational while his expert witness opinion would be admissible and beneficial to the jury, but the Crown’s rebuttal evidence on the same topic would not. While the Crown and defence experts approached the issue from slightly different perspectives, that does not reflect any error. Neither the Crown nor the defence is required to approach an issue in the way the other side frames it (R v DD, 2000 SCC 43). All of the evidence was relevant and admissible, despite its different assumptions and approaches. ­­The jury was given acceptable instructions regarding expert evidence from the trial judge.