R v Sabattis, 2020 ONCJ 242

Application dismissed. The applicant, a young Indigenous first offender, has not established that the mandatory minimum sentence results in a grossly disproportionate sentence for either herself or for other persons in reasonably foreseeable cases.

Indigenous Law Centre – CaseWatch Blog

A young Indigenous first offender was found guilty of impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle while her blood alcohol concentration exceeded 80 mg/100 ml of blood, contrary to s 253(1)(a) and s 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

In this matter, the applicant submits that a curative discharge is most appropriate, but this remedy is not available because the Criminal Law Amendment Act allows Ontario to decline to proclaim the Criminal Code provision for a curative discharge into force. As a mandatory minimum sentence for a first offence, the applicant must pay a $1000 fine, and receive a one-year driving prohibition. The applicant alleges that the Criminal Law Amendment Act, violates the applicant’s s 15 Charter rights by allowing the provinces to opt out of the curative discharge provisions. This disregards Gladue principles, causing “differential treatment” of Aboriginal offenders and other members of society in the sentencing process. As well, she submits that the mandatory minimum sentence subjects the applicant to cruel and unusual punishment contrary to s 12 of the Charter. In respect of both alleged breaches, the applicant submits that the provisions are not saved by s 1 of the Charter and therefore seeks the imposition of a curative discharge as a remedy.

The Court finds that the applicant has not established that the mandatory minimum sentence results in a grossly disproportionate sentence for either the offender or for other persons in reasonably foreseeable cases. Similarly, the applicant has not established that the non-proclamation of the curative discharge provisions results in a grossly disproportionate sentence contrary to s 12 of the Charter. Given the finding that there is no violation of s 12 or s 15 of the Charter, the Court is bound by the mandatory minimum sentence. Using the relevant sentencing principles including Gladue principles, and having regard to the circumstances of the offence and of the offender, it is the Court’s view an appropriate sentence is a $1200 fine, a 15-month driving prohibition, and probation for a period of two years with the requirement that the offender attend counselling as directed by her probation officer related to her consumption of alcohol and other counselling as directed.

The fine and prohibition imposed is greater than the statutory minimums to recognize the need for denunciation and deterrence, the aggravating factors of the case, and to give effect to s 255.1, which provides that evidence of a blood alcohol concentration in excess of 160 mg/100 ml of blood is a statutorily aggravating factor. This non-custodial sentence, which includes two years probation with a requirement for alcohol counselling, recognizes the importance of rehabilitation for this youthful first offender and takes into account the restorative Gladue principles. The Court is satisfied that alcohol counselling is a necessary rehabilitative component of the sentence. This sentence is still at the lowest end of the range of what is appropriate given the aggravating features of the offence, but also reflects the significant mitigating personal circumstances of the offender.