Tag Archives: Duty to consult

Taseko Mines Limited v Tsilhqot’in National Government, 2019 BCSC 1507

Posted on by
Reply

Interlocutory injunction granted in favour of the Tsilhqot’in Nation against Taseko Mines Limited work permit, on the basis that it infringes their Aboriginal rights.

Native Law Centre CaseWatch Blog

Taseko Mines Limited [“Taseko”] applied to prohibit members of the Tsilhqot’in Nation [“Tsilhqot’in”] from blockading its access to an area where the mining company wants to carry out an exploratory drilling program [“NOW program”]. Taseko has access pursuant to a notice of work permit [“NOW permit”] issued under the Mines Act. That application is now moot since the Court decided Tsilhqot’in’s application will succeed for an injunction prohibiting Taseko from carrying out its NOW program until the Tsilqot’in’s underlying claim to quash the NOW permit is heard.

In this matter, the issue is whether granting Tsilqot’in the interim injunction prohibiting Taseko from undertaking the NOW program would amount to a final determination of the action, which would effectively remove any benefit of proceeding to trial. The NOW permit will expire in July 2020, and if Taseko is enjoined until the action is heard, it is very unlikely the trial could be completed in time to for the 4-6 weeks required to complete the NOW program. In the Court’s view, the extension is essentially mechanical and concludes that Taseko will have until July 2022 to complete the NOW program, because Taseko can extend the NOW permit by two years under s 5(1) of the Permit Regulation.

Issues pertaining to infringement and justification, which will be the focus of the trial, are not new to the parties. Because some of the factual and legal elements have been argued before different courts for years, the discovery process will not be as time consuming as it would be if the issues were new to the parties. Based on the evidence and submissions before the Court, if the parties prioritize the matter, the timeline should be adequate to prepare for trial. The injunction is not tantamount to granting relief nor is it bound to impose a hardship removing any benefit of trial. The threshold merits test is the serious question to be tried standard (R v Canadian Broadcasting Corp, 2018 SCC 5). This threshold is relatively low as a prolonged examination of the merits is generally neither necessary nor desirable (RJR-MacDonald Inc  v Canada, [1944] 1 SCR 311).

It was determined that given the nature of the harm to the Tsilhqot’in, and the waiving of the undertaking as to damages, there was a material risk of irreparable harm to both parties. When there is a risk of both parties suffering a material risk of irreparable harm, the court should favor the status quo (AG British Columbia v Wale (1986), 9 BCLR (2d) 333 (CA)). It was determined that the NOW program would change the status quo as it would disturb the land. The Tsilhqot’in stand to suffer greater irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted. Despite that the Tsilhqot’in pursued a self-help remedy of a blockade outside the courts, the imperative of reconciliation was such that the balance of convenience was in the Tsilhqot’in’s favour.

Fort McKay Métis Community Association v Alberta Energy Regulator, 2019 ABCA 15

Posted on by
Reply

Permission to appeal denied. The Fort McKay Métis Community Association expressed fears about the potential impact of a project on their Aboriginal rights. It is yet to be answered whether such subjective fears interfere with an undefined Aboriginal right.

Wiyasiwewin Mikiwahp Native Law Centre Case Watch

The Fort McKay Métis Community Association (Fort McKay Métis) applied for permission to appeal a decision of the Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) that approved Prosper Petroleum Ltd.’s (“Prosper”) oil sands project (the “Project”). The Fort McKay Métis asserts that it has Métis Aboriginal rights to harvest for food in its community and traditional harvesting area and that the Project would adversely affect these constitutionally protected rights. The Project would be located near and operate within part of the Fort McKay First Nation’s reserves. Prosper applied to the AER for approvals in 2013 so it could proceed with the Project under the Oil Sands Conservation Act, the Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act, and the Water Act, which was granted. The Project, however, still needs Cabinet approval, and at the time of this current application, it has not yet been issued.

The AER found the Project to be in the public interest and was consistent with statutory objectives of protecting the environment and promoting sustainable resource development while considering economic growth. It approved the Project on the condition that Prosper will seek input from the Fort McKay Métis with respect to reclamation. The AER found the fear of contamination and other potential impacts to Métis Aboriginal rights was genuine, but implicitly not justified. The content of an Aboriginal right is a legal issue. The AER has a legal obligation to carry out its regulatory responsibilities in a manner consistent with s 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 (Chippewas of the Thames First Nation v Enbridge Pipelines Inc, [2017] 3 CNLR 45 (“Chippewas”)). The regulator must consider Aboriginal rights “as rights, rather than as an afterthought to the assessment” (Clyde River (Hamlet) v Petroleum Geo-Services Inc, [2017] 3 CNLR 65 (“Clyde River”)). None of the applicant’s authorities supported the view that genuine fears about the effects of the Project, which are not objectively reasonable, are sufficient by themselves to constitute interference with a right protected under s 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. An independent regulatory agency’s approval of an energy project could trigger the Crown’s duty to consult Aboriginal groups whose treaty and Aboriginal rights might be adversely affected by the project, and this agency could fulfill the Crown’s duty to consult on its behalf (Clyde River; Chippewas).

Pictou Landing First Nation v Nova Scotia (Aboriginal Affairs), 2018 NSSC 306

Posted on by
Reply

Application granted. A potential for adverse impact suffices to trigger the duty to consult. Although the question is open on whether “government conduct” attracting the duty to consult includes the legislative process, the doctrine does extend to strategic, higher level decisions that may have an impact on Aboriginal claims and rights.

Wiyasiwewin Mikiwahp Native Law Centre

Located at Abercrombie Point, Pictou County, is a bleached kraft pulp mill (“the mill”) that is owned and operated by Northern Pulp Nova Scotia Corporation (“Northern Pulp”). The Boat Harbour Act(“BHA”), provides that the use of the mill must cease on January 31, 2020. Northern Pulp, however, is in the planning stages to apply for an Environmental Assessment (“EA”) (Environmental Act) for the design, construction and operation of a new Effluent Treatment Facility (“ETF”), otherwise the current ETF must be closed as required by the Act. The Province is currently in active consultation with the Pictou Landing First Nation (“PLFN”) regarding this application and has confirmed $70,000.00 in capacity funding to support PLFN’s meaningful participation in that process. The Province has disclosed it is also engaged in confidential discussions directly with Northern Pulp regarding potential Crown funding to support construction of the new ETF (“Potential Crown Funding”), but no such decision has yet been made.

PLFN applied for judicial review of a decision by the office of Provincial Minister of Aboriginal Affairs to deny consultation with respect to the issue of whether the Province may fund the construction of a new EFT. PLFN took the position that any such Potential Crown Funding by the Province is a separate decision that triggers an independent duty to consult with the PLFN, as this decision will have the effect of continuing the operation of the mill beyond the 2020 deadline. It could further impact the asserted rights and interests of the PLFN, but the Province disagrees that any form of Potential Crown Funding would trigger an independent duty to consult with the PLFN, as it does not meet the established legal test. There is yet no additional or potential adverse impact on the PLFN’s rights and interests.

The Court concluded upon the facts that: 1) the current ETF is an integral part of the current operation of the mill as a whole; 2) that the current ETF must close no later than January 31, 2020; 3) that the new ETF which will replace the existing facility will be integral to the continued operation of the mill beyond the deadline, and it must replace those functions discharged by the current ETF; 4) each additional potential source of funding that is available for the project makes it more likely that the new ETF project will happen; and 5) that as a consequence of a Provincial decision to fund the project, even if it is not the only potential source of funding, it would make it more likely that the mill will remain open.

An application for judicial review is the appropriate mechanism by which to seek a determination as to whether there has been a breach of the duty to consult. The Court, however, is not being asked to review a completed process of consultation replete with an extensive activity record. This would ordinarily trigger the application of a standard of reasonableness. But in these circumstances, the extant case law frames the applicable standard of review as one of correctness. Either the duty to consult exists or it does not (Mi’kmaq of Prince Edward Island v Prince Edward Island [2018] PESC 20). The duty to consult is triggered at a low threshold, but it must remain a meaningful threshold. There must be some appreciable or discernible impact flowing from the impugned Crown conduct before a duty to consult will arise. This is both logical and practical because there has to be something for the Crown and the Aboriginal group to consult about. It is conceivable that the Crown may proceed after consultation with a new ETF against the strong opposition of PLFN. But if it did, there becomes an issue of compatibility with the honour of the Crown. “Meaningful consultation” requires a “meaningful effort by the government to act in a manner that is consistent with the honour of the Crown in that particular context” (Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada (GGC), [2019] 1 CNLR 277 (SCC)).

A potential for adverse impact suffices to trigger the duty to consult as it extends to strategic, higher level decisions that may have an impact on Aboriginal claims and rights (Rio Tinto Alcan Inc v Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, [2010] 4 CNLR 250 (SCC)). As to what constitutes an “adverse effect”, the claimant must show a causal relationship between the proposed government conduct or decision and a potential for adverse impacts on pending Aboriginal claims or rights. Although there is a generous, purposive approach to this element, past wrongs, including previous breaches of the duty to consult, and speculative impacts does not suffice to be an adverse effect (R v Douglas, [2007] 3 CNLR 277 (BCCA)). The adverse effect must be on the future exercise of the right itself, but an adverse effect on a First Nation’s future negotiating position also does not suffice. Adverse impacts extend to any effect that may prejudice a pending Aboriginal claim or right. Often the adverse effects are physical in nature, however, it could also be in connection with what constitutes Crown conduct, high-level management decisions or structural changes to the resource’s management, even if these decisions have no immediate impact. This is because such structural changes to the resources management may set the stage for further decisions that will have a direct adverse impact on land and resources.

The Province’s interest as lender funding the new ETF will undoubtedly influence “higher level” strategic decision making. If the Province is to become the lender, not only is it providing the means by which the ETF will be built, but it will have an interest to ensure that the mill will continue to remain in operation into the future so as to at least recover the taxpayers’ investment. Separation of the potential funding issue would result in the loss of an opportunity for the two sides to discuss whether the financing, if it was to be provided by the Province, should or could be tied into a system of penalties or rewards for achieving, or failing to achieve, proposed emission or effluent discharge targets. This may, potentially, impact upon the likelihood that these targets would be attained. The bifurcation of issues of the “design and construction” from the “actual funding” of the ETF, artificially compartmentalizes a process which should be treated more holistically.

Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada (Governor General in Council), 2018 SCC 40

Posted on by
Reply

By Daniel Quainoo and Benjamin Ralston

The honour of the Crown is engaged in the development of legislation but not the Crown’s duty to consult

In Mikisew Cree the Supreme Court of Canada considered the question of whether the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate Aboriginal peoples extends to the legislative process. Mikisew Cree First Nation sought a declaration acknowledging the role of ministers in developing policy for the formulation of legislation as “Crown conduct” that triggers the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate. The Court also addressed whether s.18 of the Federal Courts Act provides the Federal Court with jurisdiction to review matters engaging the law-making process and whether enabling courts to review legislative processes would be in keeping with Canada’s constitutional order. While the Court was unanimous in deciding that the Federal Court lacked the jurisdiction to consider the question under s.18 of the Federal Courts Act, it was divided as to whether an executive actor could be said to have a duty to consult while participating in the legislative process and why.

In the result, a 7-2 majority of the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate Aboriginal peoples does not apply to any stage in the legislative process. At the same time, a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that the constitutional principle of the honour of the Crown applies to legislative processes even if these justices disagreed over whether the duty to consult was the appropriate means to uphold the principle in this context.

Karakatsanis J, writing the judgment for herself, Wagner CJ and Gascon J, held that the duty to consult cannot apply to the law-making process as this would contradict the constitutional principles of the separation of powers, parliamentary sovereignty and parliamentary privilege. She added that as a matter of pragmatism, imposing a duty to consult on the policy development stage of the legislative process could limit the possibility of meaningful accommodation since a proposed bill can be freely amended once introduced into Parliament. It would also lead to incongruous treatment of private member bills that do not involve any comparable Crown conduct to trigger the duty. Karakatsanis J concluded that the duty to consult doctrine is ill-suited to be applied directly to the law-making process.

At the same time, Karakatsanis J held that the constitutional principle of the honour of the Crown applies to the law-making process and that it would undermine the endeavour of reconciliation to allow the Crown to use legislation to circumvent its duty to consult and accommodate Aboriginal peoples. She pointed out the Ross River decision of the Yukon Court of Appeal where it was stated that legislation will be unconstitutional to the extent that it prevents meaningful consultation and accommodation from occurring. Karakatsanis J left open the possibility of other remedies for breaches of the honour of the Crown in the legislative context and suggested that the extent of any consultation may be a relevant consideration to other forms of recourse.

Brown J affirmed the conclusion that the constitutional principles of the separation of powers and parliamentary privilege prevent the judiciary from applying the duty to consult to the law-making process. He also opined that Crown conduct necessarily excludes parliamentary functions of the state and thus these functions cannot be subject to a duty to consult. Finally, he indicated that by leaving open the possibility that there may be other doctrines developed to enable review of the legislative process, even in the absence of a successful claim that Aboriginal or treaty rights have been unjustifiably infringed, the judgment written by Karakatsanis J undermines the conclusion that constitutional powers prevent judicial review of the legislative process. He stated that this position leaves the law in a state of considerable uncertainty and invites Aboriginal peoples to return to the courts to identify what “other form of recourse” might be available as an alternative to the duty to consult in the legislative context.

Writing for himself along with Moldaver and Cote JJ, Rowe J affirmed the arguments articulated by Brown J, and elaborated on three further points. First, he indicated that Aboriginal claimants continue to have remedies pursuant to the Sparrow, Haida and Rio Tinto decisions once legislation is enacted. Second, he outlined how the recognition of the duty to consult in the legislative process could be disruptive to the legislative process and pointed to numerous questions that are raised by imposing a duty of consultation on legislatures. Finally, he argued that providing the Mikisew Cree with the declaration they sought would demand that courts become interventionist in a manner that is not in keeping with the principle of separation of powers.

Abella and Martin JJ articulated a different vision for the judicial review of the legislative process. Writing for both Martin J and herself, Abella J held that any consideration of the duty to consult must begin with the Honour of the Crown and the overriding goal of reconciliation. In that light, she stated that the Court must reconcile the need to protect the legislative process from judicial interference with the need to protect Aboriginal rights within the legislative process. Abella J acknowledged that recognizing the honour of the Crown and duty to consult in this context may impact the legislative process, but held that the need for adjustments could not justify the erasure of constitutionally mandated rights. She noted that section 35 was recognized as a constitutional limit on the exercise of parliamentary sovereignty in the Sparrow decision and objected to parliamentary sovereignty now being used as a shield to prevent a claim for consultation. Abella J’s reasons highlight the essential role that the honour of the Crown and the duty to consult play in reconciling Aboriginal and Crown sovereignty. Abella and Martin JJ reasoned that the courts ought to play a role in evaluating whether legislative processes are in keeping with the special relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Crown.

The full reasons of the Supreme Court of Canada can be found here and a short summary is provided here.

Case Watch for November 2016

Posted on by
Reply

FROM OUR PUBLICATIONS DESK

Case Watch

The following decisions came across our desk over the past month:

Equality rights of Métis children & families in child protection –

Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton v GH, 2016 ONSC 6287: The Ontario Superior Court of Justice released a decision in a Crown wardship application where it was found that the definitions of “Indian”, “Native person”, and “Native child” in Ontario’s Child and Family Services Act were invalid on the basis that they unjustifiably infringe s 15 of the Charter. The Court found that the impugned definitions do not extend to all individuals who self-identify as being Aboriginal. In fact, all parties conceded that they do not extend to Métis children. The Court also found that the Act afforded significant special protections for individuals falling into these definitions at every stage of a child protection intervention. The Court recognized that all Aboriginal peoples, including Métis, have been subject to a legacy of prejudice, stereotyping, and disadvantage. With this context in mind, the Court determined that the definitions created distinctions based on the analogous ground of “Aboriginality without membership in a community designated as “Native” under the [Act]”. It also concluded that these distinctions created or perpetuated disadvantage for Métis children and their families due to their inability to access the special protections under the Act. In conducting this analysis, the Court noted that the Act clearly created these unfair and objectionable disadvantages on its face and this could be discerned through logical reasoning alone. There was no need for social science evidence and empirical data. As no s 1 argument was advanced, the infringement was not saved. A suspended declaration of invalidity was issued and it was ordered that the Métis child in this case be treated as if he were an Indian, Native person or Native child within the meaning of the Act.

Inadequate investigation of vote-buying allegations by INAC –

Good v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FC 1272: The Federal Court released a decision allowing in part an application for judicial review of INAC’s dismissal of an election appeal under the Indian Act. The applicant first unsuccessfully sought to appeal the March 2014 election of the Red Pheasant First Nation through INAC based on allegations of misconduct by the electoral officer and corruption in the form of vote-buying. She then sought judicial review of INAC’s rejection of that appeal. However, a subsequent election had since taken place in March 2016. The Court found that INAC’s delegate erred by choosing to dispense with any investigation of the applicant’s vote-buying allegations and proceeding to dismiss the appeal on the basis that corruption had not been proven on a balance of probabilities. The Court noted that this approach appears to have become settled practice within INAC’s Elections Unit. While the Court was sympathetic to INAC’s desire to streamline its management of appeals, it had significantly changed the very nature of the appeals process in a manner tantamount to attempting to amend the law via internal policy. The Court took no issue with how the delegate addressed the issue of electoral officer misconduct, but found that the delegate’s refusal to investigate conflicting evidence on vote-buying was unreasonable, based upon an error of law and procedurally unfair. While these issues were moot due to the subsequent election, the Court exercised its discretion to deal with the central controversy between the parties as roughly 40% of First Nations hold elections under the regime at issue in this case.

Relevance of Aboriginal equity stake to remedy in consultation case –

Michipicoten First Nation v Ontario (Minister of Natural Resources and Forests), 2016 ONSC 6899: The Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed an application for judicial review of provincial approvals for the Bow Lake Wind Farm Project on the shared traditional territory of the Michipicoten and Batchewana First Nations in northeastern Ontario. Michipicoten argued that the Crown breached its duty to consult and sought to quash the approvals, preclude further approvals until more consultation takes place, and have the court remain seized of remedies or order removal of the infrastructure, remediation of the lands, and costs. The Court noted that Michipicoten had inexplicably delayed several months in pursuing and perfecting its application for judicial review, which caused the proponent and Batchewana, which has a 50% interest in the project, serious harm. For this reason, the Court dismissed the application on its own motion. In the alternative, the Court went on to conclude that consultation was adequate as Michipicoten failed to provide any evidence of potential adverse impacts on its Aboriginal or treaty rights in spite of many requests to do so. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the remedy sought in terms of decommissioning the project was inappropriate. Michipicoten argued that a proponent’s commercial interests may not come into play in determining the balance of convenience in a consultation dispute between the Crown and an Aboriginal community. However, the Court found this principle inapplicable in this case since Batchewana would face irreparable harm if the relief sought was granted.

Validity of a Will under the Indian Act not providing for spouse –

Poitras v Khan, 2016 SKQB 346: The Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench allowed an application for letters probate under a Will created pursuant the Indian Act. The testator met the man who became her husband and married him after she had already made her Will. Under provincial legislation, the testator’s spousal relationship would have automatically revoked her Will. However, the testator was a status Indian living on reserve and there was no such provision under the Indian Act to invalidate her Will automatically. Under the Indian Act, the Minister had the power to declare the Will void if it imposed hardship on persons to whom the testator had responsibility or was contrary to the interests of the band or the public. In this case, the Minister had referred the matter to the Court, conferring its power to declare the Will void on the Court. The testator’s husband, Mr. Khan, sought to invoke this power on the basis that he was not provided for in the Will. The Court confirmed the validity of the Will, but also noted that Mr. Khan could still potentially seek a claim for one half of the testator’s family property accrued from the date of marriage until death under provincial legislation.

Canadian Human Rights Tribunal’s jurisdictional limits re: Indian Act –

Beattie v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FC 1328: The Federal Court dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal where a complaint was dismissed as being solely a challenge to legislation beyond the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The applicant, Mr. Beattie, sought to register two leases and an assignment of lease in the Indian Lands Registry. The Registrar rejected the applications on the basis that the leases did not include the Crown as a party and no ministerial approval had been provided. Since the leases could not be registered, the assignment could not be registered either. As a result of this decision, the applicants brought a complaint to the Tribunal alleging that the respondent had discriminated against them on the basis of their race, national or ethnic origin by denying a service customarily available to the public. The Tribunal dismissed the complaints on the basis that they were beyond its jurisdiction since they were challenging the Indian Act itself, which obliged the Registrar to reject the leases and assignment. The Court was satisfied that the Tribunal’s decision was reasonable and it was reasonable to rely on other Federal Court and Tribunal decisions where such challenges to legislation were dismissed as beyond the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The Court also rejected the applicants’ assertion that title to the reserve lands at issue in this dispute were vested in an individual pursuant to either a Certificate of Possession or customary tenure.

Court’s duty to explicitly consider & inquire into Gladue factors –

R v Park, 2016 MBCA 107: The Manitoba Court of Appeal allowed an appeal from sentence for impaired driving and drug possession due in part to the sentencing judge’s failure to adequately consider Gladue factors. It was conceded that defence counsel during the sentencing hearing did not address Gladue factors other than to note that the accused was Aboriginal. No Gladue report was ordered. The Crown argued that defence counsel expressly waived the Gladue rights of the accused whereas counsel for the accused on appeal argued that the Court had a duty to make further inquiry when no advocacy was provided on Gladue factors during sentencing. The Court of Appeal found there was no express waiver in this case. Defence counsel at sentencing acknowledged there were Gladue factors but focused on other arguments. A waiver must be express and clear. Both defence and Crown counsel have an obligation to bring forward Gladue information. Where that does not happen, the Court may need to go further and has a duty to at least make further inquiries. The Court must also make explicit its consideration of Gladue factors and its determination that it has adequate information on those factors before it. It is unsatisfactory for both the offender and the public to have to infer such circumstances were properly considered. The sentencing judge failed to expressly confirm that Gladue factors were considered and failed to clarify defence’s reliance on Gladue, which in turn had an impact on the sentence. The sentence was varied.

No need for ‘linkage’ between Gladue factors & offence –

R v Predham, 2016 ABCA 371: The Alberta Court of Appeal allowed an appeal from sentence with respect to convictions for driving while disqualified, breach of recognizance, failure to appear and possession of a stolen licence plate. The appellant argued that the sentencing judge erred in failing to give appropriate weight to his Gladue factors, among other things. In particular, the appellant took issue with the sentencing judge’s reasons where it was suggested that Gladue factors were less relevant to the offence of driving while disqualified in the absence of alcohol, drugs or violence. The sentencing judge stated that there must be “some relationship between the Gladue factors and the offending in order for there to be that sort of linkage”. The Court of Appeal held that it was an error of law to require a linkage between Gladue factors and the offending conduct. The Court stated that it is also an error to carve out a certain category of offences as being immune from the Gladue analysis. The Court was also satisfied that the sentencing judge’s error influenced his ultimate decision. The sentence was varied.

Injunction against Cleveland baseball team’s name & logo denied –

Cardinal v Major League Baseball, 2016 ONSC 6929: The Ontario Superior Court issued its reasons for dismissing an urgent interim injunction application to restrain the Cleveland baseball team, Rogers Communications, and Major League Baseball (MLB) from displaying the team’s name or logo during a game in Toronto and while the underlying federal and provincial human rights complaints proceed. In the underlying complaints, the applicant, Douglas J. Cardinal, is alleging that the use of the team’s name and logo constitutes prohibited discrimination and harassment against him on the grounds of race, ancestry, colour, ethnic and national origins, and constitutes a publication or display intended to incite infringement of the Ontario Human Rights Code. The Court held that it had jurisdiction over the application, rejecting MLB’s argument that it ought to allow the United States Supreme Court to determine the underlying issues in this case based on principles of comity. The Court was also satisfied that the parties raised serious issues to be tried in terms of whether a service had been offered and whether the team’s name and/or logo offend the provisions of federal and Ontario human rights legislation, as well as the relevance of MLB’s freedom of expression to the dispute. However, the Court did not accept the applicant’s assertion that he would sustain irreparable harm if an injunction was not granted, noting that damages were available and disputes over use of the impugned name and logo have been ongoing for years. The Court noted that the applicant sought a change to the status quo and his last minute application, if granted, would materially prejudice the respondents. The issue of delay went to both the question or irreparable harm and the balance of convenience.

Settlement approved in Newfoundland & Labrador school claims –

Anderson v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 NLTD(G) 179: The Newfoundland and Labrador Supreme Court approved the terms of a $50 million settlement in a class action brought by Aboriginal individuals who attended schools, dormitories or orphanages in the province between 1949 and 1980. The plaintiffs claimed that Canada breached a fiduciary duty to the students who attended these facilities to protect them from actionable physical or mental harm. The Court was satisfied that the settlement was fair, reasonable, made in good faith, and in the best interests of the class as a whole. It was also satisfied that the fees and disbursements of the plaintiffs’ counsel were fair and reasonable. The settlement includes both General Compensation Payments for years that students resided at the facilities at issue, and Abuse Compensation Payments that depend on the harm individual students suffered. The settlement provides for a confidential paper-based claims process and Canada is committed to funding mutually agreeable commemoration and healing initiatives over and above its compensation funding.

Tax Court’s exclusive jurisdiction over tax assessment challenges –

Horseman v Canada, 2016 FCA 252: The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from a decision to strike the appellant’s claims as falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Court of Canada. The appellant received a Notice of Assessment and Requirement to Pay $59,000.06 of outstanding GST. He initiated this Federal Court action for a declaration that the Requirement to Pay is null and void and contrary to the Indian Act, Treaty No. 8, and s 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The Court found that this challenge was properly characterized as an indirect challenge to a tax assessment, making it plain and obvious that the Tax Court had exclusive jurisdiction. The Tax Court has jurisdiction to consider the constitutional validity, applicability or operability of federal legislation and regulations and can issue remedies if a notice of constitutional question is properly served. It is also well-established that the Tax Court can determine claims under s 87 of the Indian Act over the applicability of tax requirements, or involving tax exemption claims under Treaty No. 8. Such assertions are properly tested in the Tax Court.

Provincial human rights tribunal’s jurisdictional limits re band store –

Dinsmore v Slenyah Store, 2016 BCHRT 176: The British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal dismissed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination in the area of employment on the basis of colour or race with respect to a business in Fraser Lake, British Columbia known as the Slenyah Store. The business was operated by the Stellat’en First Nation up until April 2014. The majority of its customers are status Indians who are able to purchase gas and cigarettes at tax exempt rates there. In 2013, the store was in serious financial difficulty. It was kept afloat via overdraft protection from Stellat’en and Stellat’en paid the store’s back taxes to get it out of its financial difficulties. In 2014, the store was incorporated to be operated at arm’s length through a limited partnership. As a result of these changes, all the store’s employees were laid off by Stellat’en and encouraged to reapply for positions with the limited partnership that would operate the store going forward. The Tribunal found that while the store was operated by Stellat’en it was an integral part of the First Nation’s overall governance and operations. Its purpose was to permit members to avail themselves of their tax-free status, it was financially integrated with the First Nation, its employees were employees of the First Nation, and its operations were continuously concerned with the status, rights and privileges of Stellat’en’s members. As a result, the store fell under federal jurisdiction and outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction while it was operated by Stellat’en. While operated at arm’s length through a limited partnership, however, the store was a provincial undertaking subject to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The Tribunal went on to dismiss the complaint against both entities on the ground that it had no reasonable prospect of success if it were to proceed on its merits.

__________________________________________________________________

This Case Watch blog post has been brought to you by the Native Law Centre in partnership with Pro Bono Students Canada – University of Saskatchewan

Case Watch for October 2016

Posted on by
Reply

FROM OUR PUBLICATIONS DESK

Case Watch

The following decisions came across our desk over the past month:

Jurisdiction of superior courts over transboundary Aboriginal rights –

Uashaunnuat (Innus of Uashat and Mani-utenam) c Iron Ore Company of Canada, 2016 QCCS 5133 (in French only): The Superior Court of Quebec dismissed an application from the defendants to strike portions of the plaintiffs’ claims. The Innu plaintiffs are suing the defendants, a mining company and a railway company, for $900M in damages for alleged harms to their section 35 rights within their traditional territory, the Nitassinan, which covers a large portion of the Quebec-Labrador peninsula. The defendants argued that to the extent the plaintiffs’ claims relate to land outside Quebec’s borders, those claims are outside the jurisdictional competence of the Quebec Superior Court, as per the Quebec Civil Code. The claims are premised on asserted Aboriginal rights and title, as well as treaty rights. In determining this application, the Court noted the need to consider the Aboriginal perspective when addressing section 35 rights, the sui generis nature of these rights, and the fact that recognition of these rights is ancillary to the primary focus of this litigation, which is on damages. The Court also rejected forum non conveniens and Crown immunity arguments. It noted in the latter case that the section 35 rights of the Innu are existing rights, not rights created by the courts, and should therefore not differ as between Quebec and Labrador.

Freedom of expression in context to injunction application for blockade –

Siksika Nation v Crowchief, 2016 ABQB 596: The Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench granted the Siksika Nation an interlocutory injunction against a group of its members to prevent them from interfering with its contractor’s efforts to rebuild homes in an on reserve development. The respondent stated that his purpose for initiating the blockade was to draw attention to alleged issues of oversight, accountability and transparency with respect to the applicant’s use of financial resources on this project, among other things. The respondent invoked his Charter right to freedom of expression in defence of the protest and blockade. The Court found that the applicant was able to meet the test for an interlocutory injunction. The Court also held that the Charter did not apply in the circumstances, since the injunction was aimed at ensuring the applicant and its contractor could fulfill the terms of a private agreement, and the applicant was not seeking to prevent the respondents from pursuing legal avenues to express their dissent. The Court further concluded that the injunction would be a justifiable infringement of the respondents’ Charter rights even if the Charter had applied.

Annuity claims and the unique context of each Numbered Treaty –

Horseman v Canada, 2016 FCA 238: The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from a Federal Court decision that declined to certify a proposed class proceeding for treaty annuities owed under each of the Numbered Treaties. The Federal Court had concluded that there was insufficient commonality between the circumstances of each treaty’s annuity clause for the purposes of a class action. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision and substantially agreed with the Federal Court’s analysis. It held that treaty interpretation requires an intensive inquiry into the mutual intent of the parties and the purposes for which they entered treaty. Due to the unique historical, cultural, and economic context surrounding each treaty, class proceedings would likely not have issues of commonality unless they were limited to a particular Numbered Treaty.

Admission of extrinsic evidence re: duty to consult on judicial review –

Sipekne’katik v Nova Scotia (Minister of Environment), 2016 NSSC 260: The Supreme Court of Nova Scotia allowed the admission of affidavit evidence beyond the record in a statutory appeal from ministerial approvals under Nova Scotia’s Environment Act. The approvals were for the development of an underground natural gas storage facility. Sipekne’katik claim Aboriginal and treaty rights to hunt and fish in the area where the project will be developed. The Court held that evidence beyond the record would only be admissible in exceptional circumstances, such as breaches of natural justice and procedural fairness. All parties relied on the Crown’s duty to consult falling within the broad heading of a “breach of procedural fairness” in order to argue that their respective affidavits were admissible. The Court noted that affidavit evidence would not be admissible merely because the honour of the Crown was raised as an issue. They must relate to the scope and content of the duty to consult and whether that duty has been fulfilled. Under this test the Court accepted all the affidavits, subject to the striking of some argumentative portions.

Injunction granted against logging blockade –

D.N.T. Contracting Ltd v Abraham, 2016 BCSC 1917: The Supreme Court of British Columbia granted a logging company’s application for an injunction prohibiting members of the Takla Lake First Nation (TLFN) from blocking, physically impeding, or delaying access to harvesting sites under a timber licence. Members of the TLFN stated that their burial sites and traditional territory were within the cut block boundaries of the licence. They also stated that TLFN receives a larger number of consultation referrals than they can manage due to their small size and financial management issues from previous administrators. TLFN indicated it was willing to negotiate with the applicant and allow the logging if accommodation could be reached. The Court held that the blockade constituted irreparable harm as further delays would threaten the economic standing of the company’s operations and harm it significantly. The Court held that TLFN should have brought its issues forward during the consultation process before the licences were approved, rather than threatening the administration of justice by blocking access to the harvesting sites long after the time for consultation had passed.

Appraisal of lease rates for on reserve recreational properties –

Schnurr v Canada, 2016 FC 1079: The Federal Court resolved three common issues in a class action lawsuit filed by a group of on reserve cottagers. The plaintiffs are disputing a rental increase proposal of up to 700% for each year of a five-year rental term. The primary issue was the appropriate methodology for determining the fair market rental value of the leased properties. The Court determined that the appropriate method was to consider comparable lease rates on comparable property. The Court sided with the plaintiffs’ real estate appraiser because of his greater knowledge of the subject property, and familiarity with the Saskatchewan market and the recreational lands in the province. It did not accept the argument that provincial park rates should be excluded from the calculation due to policy constraints on those rates.

Public interest standing on judicial review of Chief Coroner’s decision –

Blackjack v Yukon (Chief Coroner), 2016 YKSC 53: The Yukon Supreme Court dismissed an application to strike the Little Salmon Carmarks First Nation (LSCFN) from an application for judicial review on the basis that it had no standing. Theresa Blackjack and LSCFN jointly filed a petition for judicial review of the Chief Coroner’s decision to close an investigation into the death of Theresa’s daughter, Cynthia Blackjack, without ordering an inquest. The Chief Coroner asserted that LSCFN had no standing in relation to the subject matter of the petition. The Court concluded that LSCFN had public interest standing to proceed with the petition because LSCFN raised a serious justiciable issue, had a real stake or genuine interest in that issue, and the proposed suit was a reasonable and effective way to bring the issue before the courts.

Limitations period for negligence claim based on sexual assault:

Fox v Narine, 2016 ONSC 6499: The Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed an application to strike a statement of claim alleging that a shelter was negligently operated when the late plaintiff was sexually assaulted there. The plaintiff was subsequently murdered. The Court held that there was a sufficiently proximate relationship between the late plaintiff and the shelter where she was staying at the time of her assault. There was also no reason to override or limit the scope of the duty of care. The statutory provision that would allow this action to proceed was created to improve the protection that the law offers to victims of sexual violence. While a limitation period under the Trustee Act, 2002 would ordinarily have barred the claim from being brought more than two years after the plaintiff was killed, there is no limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002 where an action is based on sexual assault. The more general statute must yield to the more specific one, which was the limitations legislation in this case.

Canada not estopped from estoppel argument in Treaty 8 tax litigation –

Tuccaro v Canada, 2016 FCA 259: The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from an interlocutory order of the Tax Court of Canada. Mr. Tuccaro unsuccessfully sought to strike portions of Canada’s reply where it was asserted that he was estopped from asserting a treaty right to tax exemption under Treaty 8. Mr. Tuccaro argued that this issue was definitively addressed in a past Federal Court of Appeal decision in this litigation with respect to an appeal from another motion to strike, and Canada was therefore estopped from raising its estoppel argument. Both the Tax Court and the Federal Court of Appeal disagreed. The Court of Appeal did not find it plain and obvious that Canada would be estopped from raising its estoppel argument, especially considering the discretion that a trial judge maintains over whether it accepts such an argument. The Court of Appeal also suggested that Mr. Tuccaro’s argument could have grave consequences if it were accepted. It could force litigants to raise grounds that they know have no chance of meeting the stringent test for motions to strike in order to avoid potential issue estoppel arguments on those unpleaded grounds.

Duty to reference Gladue factors in reasons for sentence –

R v Wheatley, 2016 BCCA 397: The British Columbia Court of Appeal allowed an appeal from a sentence of 18 months imprisonment for breach of a residency requirement in a long-term supervision order. The sentencing judge made no mention at all of Mr. Wheatley’s Aboriginal background or his traumatic upbringing, although this was established during the sentencing hearing and the subject of submissions. The judge was clearly aware of the law, having been the sentencing judge for one of the sentences on appeal in the Supreme Court’s Ipeelee decision. However, the importance of Mr. Wheatley’s Aboriginal background and the traumas he suffered growing up appear to have been “lost in the shuffle” when it came to the imposition of a sentence. The Court of Appeal held that “[t]oday, reference to an Aboriginal offender’s circumstances should be seen as mandatory”. The sentencing judge erred in failing to particularly consider Mr. Wheatley’s Aboriginal circumstances and Gladue factors, resulting in an unfit sentence.

Gladue factors applied in determining whether s 24(1) of Charter supported curative discharge –

R v Daybutch, 2016 ONCJ 595: The Ontario Court of Justice ordered a curative discharge for Ms. Daybutch with respect to her convictions for impaired driving offences, finding it to be both appropriate for the defendant and in the public interest. Earlier in these proceedings the Court had concluded that Ontario was in violation of the s 15 equality rights of Indigenous people in Ontario by failing to request the proclamation into force of a curative discharge option for impaired driving offences. This decision on sentence adopted a remedial approach under s 24(1) of the Charter. The Court had before it a Gladue report on Ms. Daybutch that indicated how her offences related to the systemic and background factors she faced as an Aboriginal woman. The Court took the view that the use of a curative discharge where warranted for Aboriginal offenders would permit sentencing judges to act in a Charter-compliant manner in accordance with the Supreme Court’s directions in Gladue and Ipeelee.

_______________________________________________________________________

This Case Watch blog post has been brought to you by the Native Law Centre in partnership with Pro Bono Students Canada – University of Saskatchewan

Case Watch for September 2016

Posted on by
Reply

 FROM OUR PUBLICATIONS DESK

Case Watch

The following decisions came across our desk over the past month:

Crown’s duty to consult & the constitutional competence of the NEB –

Tsleil-Waututh Nation v Canada (National Energy Board), 2016 FCA 219: The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed a statutory appeal from three interlocutory decisions of the National Energy Board (NEB) with respect to the Trans Mountain Pipeline proposal. Tsleil-Waututh Nation (TWN) challenged the NEB’s determination that the application for the project was sufficiently complete to proceed with an assessment and public hearing, a determination that included a listing and scoping of factors to be considered during the assessment, and an order detailing the steps and deadlines governing the assessment. While TWN raised complex arguments with regards to the NEB’s obligation to either discharge or assess Crown consultations, among others, the Court of Appeal dismissed its appeal largely on preliminary issues. The Court held that none of the challenged decisions were final and TWN ought to have first raised its concerns before the NEB itself rather than proceeding directly to the Court of Appeal. While the Court declined to intervene with respect to the Crown’s duty to consult at this stage, it did so without prejudice to TWN’s ability to challenge the final decisions of the Governor in Council on consultation for this project.

Modern treaty signatory added as defendant in Aboriginal rights case –

Cowichan Tribes v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 BCSC 1660: The British Columbia Supreme Court allowed an application from Tsawwassen First Nation (TFN) to be added as a defendant in an action brought by Cowichan Tribes and others for declarations of Aboriginal rights and title in what is now the City of Richmond. While Cowichan’s claims overlap with TFN’s territory, as defined in its modern treaty, Cowichan argued against joinder on the basis that its claims are narrowly defined and do not overlap with any TFN lands under its treaty. The Court accepted that TFN’s rights to the portion of its territory in conflict with Cowichan’s claims are largely consultative, but held that these are still section 35 rights to be accorded recognition. These rights were also sufficient to provide TFN with a direct interest in the litigation. TFN’s rights under the agreement fluctuate depending on the land-holding status of the area underpinning these rights, and the litigation could result in the introduction of an extra party into negotiations over fishing areas that TFN has rights to under its agreement.

Property taxation on reserve and statutory interpretation –

Musqueam Indian Band v Musqueam Indian Band (Board of Review), 2016 SCC 36: The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed an appeal from Musqueam Nation against a 2011 property taxation assessment of a golf and country club on its reserve land being calculated on the basis of its use as a golf and country club, as opposed to its value as residential land. The reserve land in question was surrendered in 1957 for lease to the golf and country club and its value for property tax purposes was consistently assessed on the basis of the restrictions under that lease from that point on. In 1996, however, Musqueam amended its property assessment bylaw to reduce the types of restrictions that an assessor could consider to “any restriction placed on the use of the land and improvements by the band” (emphasis added). In 2011, Musqueam challenged the consideration of the restrictions under the lease in a property tax assessment on the basis that the lease was negotiated between the Crown and the golf and country club and its restrictions were therefore not imposed “by the band”. Musqueam also argued that the 1996 amendment was made to account for its newly recognized land management powers under the Framework Agreement on First Nations Land Management. Both arguments were rejected.

Determination between competing 60’s scoop class actions –

Thompson v Manitoba (Minister of Justice), 2016 MBQB 169: The Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench exercised its discretion to permit one of two class actions to proceed with respect to individuals affected by the 60’s scoop in Manitoba (Meeches v Canada). It also stayed the other proposed class action (Thompson v Manitoba), issued a declaration that no further proposed 60’s scoop class actions are to be commenced in Manitoba on the same facts without leave, and granted leave to amend Meeches to ensure it covers the class members from Thompson. While Thompson was filed first, counsel did not take steps to seek certification in a timely manner. Meeches was also framed more consistently with the Brown case that has already been certified in Ontario with respect to 60’s scoop survivors there.

Addressing FASD in context to Gladue factors –

R v Drysdale, 2016 SKQB 312: The Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench extensively considered the Gladue factors and Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD) of an Aboriginal man in sentencing him for assault and threatening to use a weapon, relying on a full Gladue report and four witnesses for this purpose. The Court held that in the circumstances, a “needs based” as opposed to a retributive sentence was appropriate. The Court held that “a Gladue impacted individual affected by FASD has a reduced moral and legal responsibility” with respect to actions such as those underlying the offence in this case, which exhibited impulsiveness and a disconnect between actions and consequences common among FASD affected individuals. The Court also considered the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Call to Action 34, which focuses on better addressing the needs of offenders with FASD, in crafting its sentence.

First Nations advisory organization declared provincial entity –

Treaty 8 Tribal Association v Barley, 2016 FC 1090: The Federal Court allowed an application for judicial review of a federal adjudicator’s conclusion that the Treaty 8 Tribal Association was a federal undertaking for the purpose of the application of the Canada Labour Code. The adjudicator was held to have failed to apply the functional test to determine whether the nature, operations and habitual activities of the Association fell under the head of power of “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians”. The Association provides advisory, administrative, advocacy and other services to its members and other First Nations, but does not provide services under the Indian Act nor within the realm of First Nations governance or reserve land. The habitual activities of the Association did not fall under subsection 91(24) of the Constitution Act either.

Defamation by way of band council resolution –

Hazel v Rainy River First Nations, 2016 ONSC 5875: The Ontario Superior Court of Justice rejected the defendant First Nations’ motion for summary judgment and instead allowed summary judgment in favour of the plaintiffs in a defamation claim. The defendant First Nations described the plaintiffs as “undesirables” in a band council resolution (BCR), declared them trespassers on its territory, and resolved that they were to be removed and charged as trespassers if they were found on its territory. The Court held that placing the BCR into a book available to community members was a sufficient act of publication for the purposes of sustaining an action for defamation regardless of whether anyone had looked at the BCR in question. The Court also held that there was no dispute that describing the plaintiffs as “undesirables” was defamatory. Arguments with respect to qualified privilege, issue estoppel and abuse of process were all rejected.

Severance of criminal charges in context to constitutional challenge –

R c Rice, 2016 QCCS 4610 (in English): The Superior Court of Quebec severed criminal charges against three men from Kahnawake in relation to the alleged sale of tobacco to non-Aboriginals without collecting and remitting the retail consumer tax from these sales to the federal and provincial authorities. The defendants raised a constitutional challenge in this case involving various rights asserted on behalf of the Mohawk Nation, including rights of self-determination and internal sovereignty, a right to harvest, produce and sell tobacco products, and a right to exemption from taxation under s 87 of the Indian Act. The Court held that there was no reasonable likelihood that the s 35 rights claimed, assuming they were proven, would be unjustifiably infringed by the defendants’ obligations to collect and remit consumer taxes from non-Aboriginal customers. The Court also held that there was no reasonable likelihood of the s 87 exemption being successfully invoked against the defendants’ obligations to collect and remit taxes from non-Aboriginal customers. The Court was unable, however, to conclude that there was no reasonable likelihood of the defendants being able to prove that s 87 exempted them from the imposition of duties on tobacco products. The two charges related to the last argument were severed from the others and the Court ordered for a trial to proceed separately with respect to the charges that were not implicated by this argument.

Metis Settlement’s jurisdiction to specify membership requirements –

Kikino Metis Settlement v Metis Settlements Appeal Tribunal (Membership Panel), 2016 ABCA 260: The Alberta Court of Appeal has granted permission to appeal on a question of law from a decision of the Metis Settlements Appeal Tribunal setting aside a membership decision by the Kikino Metis Settlement. Kikino has passed a bylaw that appears to provide it with discretion to reject an application for membership from a candidate who is otherwise eligible to apply under the Metis Settlements Act and meets the minimum standards for admission under the Act. An otherwise eligible applicant who was rejected for reasons not set out in the Act successfully challenged her rejection before the Appeal Tribunal. The Court of Appeal will allow an appeal to proceed on two questions: 1) whether a Metis settlement can establish membership criteria that is more onerous than the minimum standards under the Act; and 2) if so, whether the criteria applied to the applicant rejected in this case was a lawful exercise of Kikino’s jurisdiction under its membership bylaw.

Placement of Métis child with non-Aboriginal adoptive parents –

LM v British Columbia (Director of Child, Family and Community Services), 2016 BCCA 367: The British Columbia Court of Appeal dismissed two appeals related to the intention of the Director of Child, Family and Community Services to place a Métis child from British Columbia in the care of a non-Aboriginal couple in Ontario that has already adopted two of the child’s siblings. The appellants have been the child’s foster parents since two days after her birth and one of the appellants is also of Métis heritage. The first appeal was dismissed primarily because the appellants were found to be seeking an adoption order for which there was no basis in the statutory scheme. The Court of Appeal rejected an argument that the lower court had not paid adequate attention to the child’s Métis heritage, concluding that this was not relevant to the Director’s decision that the appellants were challenging on judicial review. The Court of Appeal rejected the second appeal on the basis that the Charter arguments that the appellants wished to raise were correctly found to be subject to res judicata and there was an insufficient evidentiary record to decide these argument on appeal in any event.

Stays of proceedings for unreasonable delay (section 11(b)) –

R c Gilpin, 2016 QCCQ 9459 (in French only): The Court of Quebec allowed an application to stay criminal proceedings against two men in the judicial district of Abitibi on the basis that delays in these proceedings had violated their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s 11(b) of the Charter. The Court applied the analysis recently mandated by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Jordan to conclude that the delays in each applicant’s case were beyond the presumptive ceiling for reasonable delay, and there were insufficient exceptional circumstances to rebut this presumption of unreasonableness. The Court acknowledged past jurisprudence where the unique circumstances of communities in northern Quebec were found to justify trials taking longer, but concluded that these circumstances will no longer be considered “exceptional” for the purposes of applying s 11(b).

R c Rice, 2016 QCCS 4659 (in English): The Superior Court of Quebec allowed a s 11(b) application to stay criminal proceedings against three men from Kahnawake on charges relating to the alleged sale of tobacco to non-Aboriginals without collecting and remitting the retail consumer tax from these sales to the federal and provincial tax authorities. The Court held that even prior to the Supreme Court’s recent Jordan decision, the delays in this case would have been sufficient to ground an application for a stay of proceedings under s 11(b). While the defendants had presented a tardy constitutional challenge to the charges against them, this had no bearing on any delays they faced for the purpose of the s 11(b) analysis.

Stays of proceedings pending appellate decision on Métis rights –

Québec v Savard, 2016 QCCS 4391 (in French only): The Superior Court of Quebec allowed an application to stay proceedings in which Quebec is seeking to evict the applicant from a hunting camp. The applicant’s sole defense rests on his assertion that he is a member of the Métis community of Domaine du Roy and Seigneurie de Mingan and his community has Métis hunting rights that are protected under s 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. Another member of this same community, Ghislain Corneau, was unsuccessful in defending himself from a parallel application for eviction from the hunting camp before the Superior Court of Quebec early last year (see Québec c Corneau). In Corneau, the Superior Court ruled that the Métis community to which Mr. Corneau and Mr. Savard belong does not meet the Supreme Court of Canada’s Powley test. Mr. Corneau has since appealed that decision to the Quebec Court of Appeal and an appellate decision remains outstanding. The proceedings against Mr. Savard have been stayed until the Court of Appeal renders its judgment in Corneau.

Note that parallel applications were granted in two other proceedings: Québec v Bouchard, 2016 QCCS 4392 & Québec v Desbiens, 2016 QCCS 4393

Case Watch for August 2016

Posted on by
Reply

 FROM OUR PUBLICATIONS DESK

Case Watch

The following decisions came across our desk over the past month:

Crown’s duty to consult in multi-stage permitting process –

Listuguj Mi’gmaq First Nation v New Brunswick, 2016 NBQB 138: The New Brunswick Court of Queen’s Bench dismissed an application for judicial review to quash three provincial approvals granted to Chaleur Terminals Inc for the construction of a rail terminal and transfer system in Belledune, New Brunswick. The applicants argued that these approvals were issued without any meaningful consultation or accommodation of the Aboriginal and treaty rights and title of three Mi’gmaq communities along the Gaspé peninsula of Quebec. The Court rejected this application on the basis that the Crown had met the low level of consultation that it had pre-determined to be adequate for this project in 2014. The Crown first conducted its own assessment of the appropriate level of consultation in July 2014 and issued a certificate for the project to proceed at that time. The applicants never challenged those 2014 decisions and were now out of time to do so. The application was allowed to proceed with respect to three approvals from 2015 that involved excavation, the clearing of the site, and the installation of oil tanks. However, there was no new information brought to the province’s attention that would justify deeper consultation on the 2015 approvals and the province met the low level of consultation mandated by its 2014 determination.

Use of actuarial risk assessment tools for Aboriginal offenders –

Canada v Ewert, 2016 FCA 203: The Federal Court of Appeal allowed the Crown’s appeal from a Federal Court decision that concluded that the use of certain actuarial tools for assessing recidivism and psychopathy was unreliable with respect to Aboriginal inmates, and thereby unjustifiably infringed upon their section 7 rights and breached the statutory obligations of the Correctional Service of Canada. The Federal Court had held that Mr. Ewert was not required “to establish definitively” that the assessment tools were biased, but the Court of Appeal disagreed. It allowed the appeal on the basis that Mr. Ewert was required to prove on a balance of probabilities that the actuarial tools generate or were likely to generate false results for Aboriginal inmates, and failed to do so.

Gladue factors in sentencing –

R v Okimaw, 2016 ABCA 246: The Alberta Court of Appeal allowed the sentence appeal of an Aboriginal offender on the grounds that, among other things, the sentencing judge failed to give weight to specific Gladue factors. The Court of Appeal used this decision as an opportunity to provide a “practical framework” for the consideration of Gladue factors. It was not enough for the sentencing judge to merely acknowledge “the existence of systemic factors”; the judge had a duty to consider how unique systemic and background factors played a role in bringing the particular Aboriginal offender before the courts. The Court of Appeal found that this necessary context was effectively absent from, or at least given insufficient weight in the decision under review. The Court of Appeal also clarified that it is not incumbent on a Gladue report writer to explain the impact of Gladue factors on moral blameworthiness. It is the sentencing judge that has the duty to carry out an “individualized assessment” of Gladue factors and this duty cannot be delegated. In this case, the Court of Appeal found that the impact of Mr. Okimaw’s Gladue factors were “largely self-explanatory”.

R v Alec, 2016 BCCA 347: The British Columbia Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal of an Aboriginal offender who was sentenced without the aid of a Gladue report. A report was allowed as fresh evidence on appeal. However, the Court of Appeal held that a “formal” Gladue report was not necessary for sentencing Aboriginal offenders. The Court held that the sentencing judge was clearly aware of Mr. Alec’s Aboriginal circumstances and his “disconnection” from his First Nation, and it was open to the sentencing judge to assume that Mr. Alec would not participate in the preparation of a report given his previous reluctance to do so.

R v Sateana, 2016 NUCJ 20: The Nunavut Court of Justice considered Gladue factors in sentencing an Aboriginal man for manslaughter. The Court stated that the systemic factors that influence criminality in Nunavut are well known and well documented, including the inter-generational impact of residential schools, over-crowded and sub-standard housing, poverty, high rates of domestic violence and sexual abuse, and high rates of alcohol and substance abuse. However, the Court held that a Gladue analysis is something “which this court is called upon to give effect to on a regular basis, but which it is unable to implement in any meaningful way”. While Mr. Sateana had appeared before the Court many times before the events leading to his manslaughter conviction, the Court “would have been unable to craft sentences which addressed his deep seated issues and alcohol addiction because the territory has no treatment or rehabilitation facilities and few counselling and mental health services.” Mr. Sateana was sentenced to 13 years incarceration.

Gladue factors in relation to solitary confinement –

Hamm v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 ABQB 440: The Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench allowed an application for habeas corpus from three self-represented inmates placed in solitary confinement, two of whom were Aboriginal. The Court ordered the release of these three inmates from segregation as the institution had failed to provide them with the high level of procedural fairness they were owed before being placed into solitary confinement. Among other concerns, the Court held that “given the potential rehabilitation benefits and other benefits of access to [A]boriginal spiritual and cultural programs, each [A]boriginal inmate should have had a Gladue type assessment of what placements would be appropriate.” The Court also concluded that it was “unreasonable for a correctional institution to deny transparency in relation to its decisions concerning whether, and how, and where, [A]boriginal offenders should be further deprived of liberty”.

Gladue factors & pledges of on-reserve property in bail hearing –

R v Hope, 2016 ONCA 648: The Ontario Court of Appeal granted an Aboriginal man release from custody pending a new trial on charges that include second degree murder. The Court of Appeal took note of the various contexts in which it has previously applied Gladue principles, including bail hearings, and stated that Gladue principles informed certain aspects of its analysis in this case. Ultimately, the Court concluded that detention pending appeal was not necessary in the public interest in this case. The Court also dismissed the Crown’s concerns with the fact that the individuals offering sureties and pledges against the equity in their homes on Mr. Hope’s behalf were of Aboriginal descent and lived on reserve. Section 89 of the Indian Act protects property on reserve from being subject to a charge by anyone other than an “Indian” or a band. The Court of Appeal held that this should not interfere with an Aboriginal person’s ability to secure release from detention, and what mattered was that these individuals expressed a willingness to pledge the “not insignificant” equity in their properties, not whether the Crown could execute against those properties.

Extinguishment of Aboriginal rights –

Québec (Procureure générale) c Lachapelle, 2016 QCCS 3961 (in French only): The Quebec Superior Court granted an application to evict two individuals from a hunting camp in the Eastmain River basin in northern Quebec. One of the respondents was a member of the Algonquins of Barriere Lake and asserted that the hunting camp was incidental to an Aboriginal right to hunt. However, the respondent failed to provide any evidence in support of a site-specific hunting right in the area in question. The Court noted that the camp was located approximately 1200km away from the respondent’s reserve and fell within Cree territory recognized under the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA). The Court also held that even if the respondent had proven a site-specific right in the area where the camp is located, the Court could not recognize it in light of the extinguishment clause in the JBNQA. The respondent declined the opportunity to challenge the JBQNA’s constitutionality. The Court did note, however, that the JBQNA’s constitutionality is at issue in another proceeding before the Superior Court.

Exceptions to the tax exemption under section 87 of the Indian Act –

Bell v Canada, 2016 TCC 175: The Tax Court of Canada dismissed an appeal from tax assessments based on the tax exemption for personal property situated on reserve (section 87 of the Indian Act). The appeal concerned whether the exemption could be applied to annual bonuses received by a status “Indian”, Ms. Bell, from a company she owned and operated with her non-status spouse. Ms. Bell worked out of an office located on reserve. Ms. Bell received regular bi-weekly pay from the company as well as the balance of the company’s annual income as year end bonuses. The Minister allowed her to rely on the tax exemption for her regular pay but not for her year end bonuses. The Tax Court upheld the Minister’s decision on the basis that there was no substantive connection between the bonuses and the reserve land where Ms. Bell was working. The Tax Court also found that the bonuses exceeded reasonable remuneration and were therefore abusive of the tax exemption.

Crowns added as parties in private law action involving Aboriginal rights –

Saik’uz First Nation v Rio Tinto Alcan Inc, 2016 BCSC 1474: The BC Supreme Court allowed an application to add both the federal and provincial Crowns as defendants to a tort action against Rio Tinto Alcan in relation to impacts on the Nechako River and its fishery resources. The action is premised in part on asserted Aboriginal rights and title. The Court noted that the plaintiffs acknowledged that the consequences of this “major and complex case”, which would define the intersection between Aboriginal rights and tort law, may be huge. This may warrant inclusion of the Crown on its own. Further, the plaintiffs had already formally invited the Crown to participate through the Notice of Constitutional Challenge they issued in order to challenge the applicability of certain statutes. Under British Columbia’s Water Act, the province also asserts ownership over the water under dispute in this action, thereby warranting its involvement. Finally, the Court held that even where a formal declaration of Aboriginal title is not sought in the pleadings, the federal and provincial Crowns are still necessary parties to the determination of issues relating to Aboriginal title.

Injunction against First Nation’s interference with use of road –

Revolution Infrastructure Inc v Lytton First Nation, 2016 BCSC 1562: The BC Supreme Court allowed an application from Revolution Infrastructure for an interlocutory injunction restraining the Lytton First Nation from prohibiting or interfering with its use of an access road and ranch on which it operates a composting facility. Lytton First Nation asserts Aboriginal rights and title to the valley in which the facility and road are located and asserts a right to control access on this basis, as well as the basis that the road crosses its reserve lands. Lytton has enacted a band bylaw requiring Revolution to obtain a permit to use the road. The Court held that there are several serious questions to be tried in this case, including the nature of Aboriginal title and whether the band bylaw was validly enacted. The Court also held that interference with Revolution’s access to the road would result in irreparable harm. Finally, the Court held that the balance of convenience favoured Revolution as Lytton’s actions had disrupted the status quo of its use of the road without interference since 2009, the road had been used by the public for a significant period before then, and a facilitation process was in place that could potentially address the issues between the parties.

No jurisdiction for provincial tribunal with respect to on-reserve clinic –

Cahoose v Ulkatcho Indian Band, 2016 BCHRT 114: The BC Human Rights Tribunal dismissed a complaint against the Ulkatcho Indian Band and others on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter. The complainant had been employed in the band’s healthcare clinic on reserve. The tribunal held that there was no dispute over the proper approach for determining the limits of its jurisdiction. Instead, the key issue was which entity the so-called “functional test” needed to be applied to. The complainant argued that the First Nations Health Authority administered the clinic. However, the tribunal found no evidence of the Authority acting as a service provider. Instead, it concluded that the band was the employer of the clinic’s staff and the entity providing medical services on the reserve. Finally, the tribunal concluded that the band’s operations were seen to be federal when the functional test was applied.

Jurisdiction of self-governing First Nation tribunal –

Kwanlin Dün First Nation v Kwanlin Dün First Nation Judicial Council, 2016 YKSC 35: The Yukon Supreme Court dismissed an appeal from the Kwanlin Dün First Nation (KDFN) against two decisions of its Judicial Council that set aside its termination of two tenancy agreements. KDFN argued that the Judicial Council had no jurisdiction to decide matters relating to landlord and tenancy issues since KDFN has not enacted any laws on this subject matter and provincial legislation therefore applies. The Court found this dispute raised a question of true jurisdiction that must be reviewed on a standard of correctness. It held that the Judicial Council, by virtue of KDFN’s Constitution and its Judicial Council Act, had the power to review administrative decisions by the KDFN, including those it makes in a landlord and tenant context, to ensure its Constitution and laws are complied with. The Court went on to conclude that the Judicial Council had not exceeded its jurisdiction by ruling on matters of procedural fairness and KDFN’s constitutional values in context to the tenancy disputes at issue. The Judicial Council did not rule on specific landlord-tenant issues.

Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement –

Fontaine v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 MBQB 159: The Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench allowed a Request for Directions with respect to a claim that an individual was wrongfully denied compensation under the IRSSA for sexual abuse at a residential school. The adjudicator accepted that a nun grabbed the claimant’s genitals while he was at residential school, but was not satisfied that the act had a “sexual purpose”. This decision was upheld on review and re-review. The Court found that it had the jurisdiction to review the re-review adjudicator’s decision on a standard of reasonableness. It went on to conclude that the first adjudicator’s interpretation of the IRSSA as requiring a “sexual purpose” for sexual touching to be compensable was fundamentally inconsistent with the plain language of the IRSSA and with the criminal law jurisprudence that the adjudicator purported to apply. It was therefore unreasonable for the re-review adjudicator to uphold this decision. The Court sent the claim back to be reconsidered in accordance with its reasons.

Fontaine v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 ONSC 5359: The Ontario Superior Court of Justice addressed the results of an investigation into the legal services provided by Douglas J. Keshen and his former law firm with respect to claims under the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement (IRSSA). The report resulting from the investigation was “largely a vindication for Mr. Keshen”. However, there were two exceptions to this: 1) Mr. Keshen was found to have facilitated third party loans on the basis of a promise to repay the loans from IRSSA awards, which is prohibited under the IRSSA; and 2) Mr. Keshen’s practice of reporting to clients orally rather than in writing did not fully meet the Law Society of Upper Canada’s guidelines for lawyers acting on IRSSA files. No costs were ordered for either party and Mr. Keshen was not ordered to pay the costs of the investigation.

Case Watch for July 2016

Posted on by
Reply

 FROM OUR PUBLICATIONS DESK

Case Watch

The following decisions came across our desk over the past month:

Crown’s duty to consult –

Gitxaala Nation v Canada, 2016 FCA 187: The Federal Court of Appeal quashed the Order in Council and Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity for the Northern Gateway pipeline project that was proposed to be constructed between Bruderheim, Alberta and Kitimat, British Columbia. The Court found that the federal Crown’s consultation on the project fell “well short of the minimum standards prescribed by the Supreme Court in its jurisprudence”. Among other issues, the Crown failed to engage in a respectful and meaningful dialogue on the First Nations applicants’ asserted Aboriginal title and governance rights, instead choosing to restrict itself to the discussion of mitigation of environmental impacts as a form of accommodation. The Crown also failed to provide any reasons for its conclusion that its duty to consult and accommodate had been met prior to issuing the Order in Council.

Pimicikamak Cree Nation v Manitoba, 2016 MBQB 128: The Court of Queen’s Bench of Manitoba dismissed Pimicikamak Cree Nation’s application for judicial review of the provincial Crown’s decision to enter into a settlement agreement with Manitoba Hydro and the Incorporated Community Council of Cross Lake. One issue in the litigation was the concern raised by Pimicikamak, representing the traditional government of the Cross Lake Cree, that the Cross Lake community (a municipality made up primarily of Aboriginal people) was not a collective entity capable of representing Aboriginal people or settling their claims, and was fragmenting the Aboriginal people in the area. The Court rejected Pimicikamak’s arguments that Crown consultation on the settlement agreement started too late, was not meaningful or sufficient, and foreclosed accommodation. The Court also upheld the Crown’s decision not to entertain changes to the agreement that Pimicikamak proposed, finding that Pimicikamak was attempting to negotiate in a way that would cause the Crown to abandon the settlement agreement it had negotiated in principle with other parties.

Sipekne’katik v Nova Scotia (Environment), 2016 NSSC 178: In the underlying matter, Sipekne’katik has appealed the Crown’s approval of a natural gas storage facility at Fort Ellis, Nova Scotia, alleging that the provincial Crown breached its duty to consult and failed to provide the First Nation with procedural fairness with respect to the project’s approval. In this case, Sipekne’katik applied for a stay of the approval pending its appeal. The Supreme Court of Nova Scotia rejected Sipekne’katik’s application on the basis that Sipekne’katik failed to provide sufficient evidence of irreparable harm. Among other things, the Court held that the project had mitigation measures in place designed to reduce or avoid any adverse impacts, and there was insufficient evidence of irreparable harm to the Crown’s ability to engage in meaningful consultation if the stay was not granted.

Limitation on human rights jurisdiction –

Canadian Human Rights Commission v Canada, 2016 FCA 200: The Federal Court of Appeal upheld the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal’s dismissal of two complaints regarding section 6 of the Indian Act, which prevents the complainants from registering their children under the Act. The complaints were dismissed on the basis that the Federal Court of Appeal had already previously concluded that federal human rights legislation does not authorize complaints directed at legislation per se, and the complaints were characterized as just that. While the Court took note of the “sorry state of the case law and its lack of guidance on when decisions of human rights tribunals interpreting provisions in human rights legislation will be afforded deference”, it concluded that the tribunal’s decisions ought to be reviewed on a standard of reasonableness. It then determined that the dismissals were reasonable.

Federal Court jurisdiction –

Dickson v Canada, 2016 FC 836: The Federal Court allowed an appeal from an order striking certain defendants from the statement of claim in an action for damages over the Minister of National Revenue’s refusal to renew a federal tobacco manufacturing licence. The claim was originally struck as against all defendants except the federal Crown on the basis that the liability of the other defendants was grounded in provincial law. On appeal, however, the Court held that the plaintiffs’ claim against several of these defendants was “in pith and substance” based on federal law and governed by a detailed federal statutory framework essential to the outcome of the case – namely, the Indian Act.

Proper factual basis for Charter litigation –

Re Constitutionality of Abegweit First Nation Custom Election Rules, 2016 FC 750: The Federal Court addressed an application for a reference under s 18.3 of the Federal Courts Act regarding the constitutionality of Abegweit First Nation’s custom election rules in terms of its treatment of off reserve members. More specifically, Chief and Council were seeking a declaration that restrictions against off reserve members voting or running in the First Nation’s custom elections were contrary to the right to equality under s 15 of the Charter. In 2009, council attempted to amend the custom rules restricting off reserve members from participating in elections to bring them in line with new jurisprudence on this issue, but the amendments were rejected in a plebiscite vote. The Court held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine this matter because it did not originate from any ongoing proceeding and there was no proper factual basis to determine the Charter issue.

Kikino Metis Settlement v Husky Oil Operations Ltd, 2016 ABCA 228: The Alberta Court of Appeal determined an application for permission to appeal an order of the Metis Settlements Appeal Tribunal Land Access Panel in relation to annual compensation rates for surface lease sites. The Court granted leave to appeal from the Panel on three grounds in relation to statutory interpretation of the Metis Settlements Act. However, the Court denied Kikino the opportunity to appeal from the Panel on the ground that s 125 of the Act infringes s 15 of the Charter. Kikino sought to compare the timeline for compensation reviews under the Metis Settlements Act with the comparable provisions of the Surface Rights Act for the purposes of its Charter argument. The Court found that there was no proper factual foundation to address the Charter argument on appeal.

Gladue factors –

R v Fehr, 2016 SKPC 87: The Saskatchewan Provincial Court addressed Gladue factors in context to the sentencing of an Aboriginal offender for robbery. Among other factors, the Court noted that Ms. Fehr had been apprehended at the age of 3, and lived in 13 different foster homes between the ages of 3 and 5 before being adopted at age 5 by a Caucasian family, along with her two sisters. In taking note of Ms. Fehr’s Gladue factors, the Court noted that she was “raised by a loving family not of her own culture” and “separated from her [A]boriginal community”. In the Court’s view, “Native children raised by non-[N]ative families face unique challenges of identity, community, and social development”.

R v Robinson, 2016 BCSC 1269: The British Columbia Supreme Court addressed Gladue factors in context to the sentencing of an Aboriginal offender for breaking and entering and mischief. The Court found that Mr. Robinson was adopted when he was seven months old, raised in a “non-[A]boriginal” setting, and had only limited interaction with his biological mother and First Nations community of origin. The Court held that the Supreme Court of Canada’s concerns in the cases of R v Gladue and R v Ipeelee were relevant but “attenuated in Mr. Robinson’s circumstances”.

R v Joe, 2016 YKTC 31: The Yukon Territorial Court addressed Gladue factors in context to an Aboriginal offender’s refusal to comply with a breathalyzer demand, among other charges. The Court noted that it “had the benefit of a thorough, detailed and reliable [Gladue] Report” and the “background of this particular offender [was] rife with Gladue factors”. Among other things, Mr. Joe had endured sexual and physical abuse during ten years that he spent in “one of the more repressive and brutal residential schools in Canada”. Nevertheless, the Court held that Mr. Joe “should have almost no particular consideration afforded to him as an [A]boriginal offender” and that the relevance of Gladue in this case was “infinitesimal in and of itself”. The Court also stated it had no evidence before it that Aboriginal offenders are over-represented in jail on account of drinking and driving offences.

Limitation on admissibility of Gladue report –

R v Alec, 2016 BCCA 282: The British Columbia Court of Appeal heard an appeal from an Aboriginal offender’s conviction for second degree murder in which the appellant sought to set aside his guilty plea on the grounds that it was invalid and his conviction was a miscarriage of justice. In arguing his appeal, Mr. Alec sought to adduce fresh evidence in the form of a Gladue report addressing the concept of ‘Aboriginal fatalism’ to explain his failure to make a timely application to set aside his plea. Mr. Alec’s appeal was dismissed and the Court of Appeal raised several concerns with the way in which the Gladue report was relied upon in this appeal: it was not in an admissible form and the portion relied upon was entirely hearsay; the portion relied upon constituted opinion evidence that could only be admitted through a qualified expert, which the author was not; and the report was not found to be relevant to the validity of the guilty plea at issue.

Use of actuarial risk assessment tools for Aboriginal offenders –

R v Haley, 2016 BCSC 1144: The British Columbia Supreme Court addressed a Crown application to have an Aboriginal offender designated a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate period of incarceration in a federal penitentiary. Among other arguments, Mr. Haley raised the Federal Court’s 2015 decision in Ewert v Canada, where it was found that the same actuarial risk assessment tools applied to Mr. Haley “are susceptible to cultural bias and therefore are unreliable” in context to Aboriginal offenders. The Court upheld use of these same tests for the following reasons: the Crown’s expert evidence was not based exclusively on the use of these tools, but rather on a more broad-based and comprehensive reflection on all available information; the Crown’s expert testified that her opinion would not change even if she factored out any reliance on the contested tools; the evidentiary record was different from that in Ewert in terms of the reliability of the tools; and the context was different in this case, as sentencing courts addressing dangerous offender applications  “should be given access to the widest possible range of information in order to determine whether there is a serious risk to public safety”.

R v Awasis, 2016 BCPC 219: The British Columbia Provincial Court addressed the application of actuarial risk assessment tools to Aboriginal offenders in context to a dangerous offender application raised during a sentencing hearing for two counts of sexual assault. The Court distinguished the Federal Court’s findings in Ewert on the basis that in this case the actuarial tools were only used “as a very small part of a wide ranging consideration of Mr. Awasis’ psychological make-up, his antecedents, and his future prospects”, as part of “a contextual and individual review of Mr. Awasis’ risk level”. The Court held that the findings in Ewert were “part of a decision of another trial court respecting quite different issues than those that arise in the case at bar”.

Spousal support security over reserve land –

McMurter v McMurter, 2016 ONSC 1225: The Ontario Superior Court of Justice addressed whether a spousal support order could be secured against a support payor whose significant assets are located on land subject to the provisions of the Indian Act. Both the support payor, Mr. McMurter, and payee, Mrs. McMurter, are members of the Mohawks of the Bay of Quinte and live on reserve. While s 29 of the Act  prohibits the seizure of reserve land by a “non-Indian”, s 89 provides an exception for seizures in favour of another “Indian” or “band”. The Court granted Mrs. McMurter an order to charge and lien the Certificates of Possession held by Mr. McMurter as security for a spousal support order, subject to approval by the Mohawks of the Bay of Quinte and the Minister of Indigenous Affairs, which is required by the Act.

Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement –

Fontaine v Canada, 2016 ONSC 4326: The Ontario Superior Court of Justice addressed a request for directions arising from the rejection of the claimant’s application for compensation for his undisputed sexual abuse at the Spanish Boys’ Residential School. The adjudicator had dismissed the application on the basis that the sexual assaults occurred after the school had closed, and this decision was subsequently upheld on review and re-review. In preparation for its response to the request for directions, Canada found documents undermining the adjudicator’s conclusion and those documents were brought to the Court’s attention. The Court held that the adjudicator made a palpable and overriding error of fact that the review adjudicator and re-review adjudicator failed to correct. The Court substituted its own decision on the merits of the claim rather than remitting the matter to be redetermined, finding in favour of the claimant.

Fontaine v Canada, 2016 ONSC 4328: The Ontario Superior Court of Justice revisited “the bedevilling problems of documentary disclosure for the [Independent Assessment Process] claims for the St. Anne’s Indian Residential School and for Bishop Horden Indian Residential School”. The Court found that the request for directions in this case was aimed at having the court order a new hearing for one of the claimants based on a revised record, and re-open many if not all claims for St. Anne’s and other residential schools. The Court also suggested that counsel for the claimant was attempting to use the request “as a public commission of inquiry about the integrity of the IAP process”. The Court granted the claimant confidentiality orders as preliminary relief but adjourned other preliminary matters raised by the claimant as the review process had not yet been exhausted for his claim.

Fontaine v Canada, 2016 BCSC 1306: The British Columbia Supreme Court addressed a request for directions from the Merchant Law Group (MLG), which sought to retain a portion of a client’s award under the Independent Assessment Process to apply to outstanding accounts for other unrelated matters. An agreement between MLG and the client for application of a portion of the award to other accounts was held to violate the settlement agreement, as were the client’s direction that MLG do so. The request was dismissed and MLG was ordered to pay its client the withheld amount forthwith.

Child and Family Services –

Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v LF, 2016 ONSC 4044: The Ontario Superior Court of Justice allowed a motion to set aside the dismissal of an appeal in this matter for delay. The underlying appeal involves a constitutional challenge to statutory definitions in the Child and Family Services Act that limit special considerations for Aboriginal children to a subset of those children that would qualify as Aboriginal under s 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The appellants were given until July 15 to perfect their appeal.

Saskatchewan v Saskatoon Tribal Council Health & Family Services Inc, 2016 SKQB 236: The Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench addressed an application seeking various interim orders to allow the Saskatchewan government to reassert control over child and family services on reserve for First Nations represented by the Saskatoon Tribal Council. In the underlying action, Saskatchewan seeks a declaration that it lawfully terminated an agreement delegating ministerial authority under the Child and Family Services Act to the Saskatoon Tribal Council agency. The Court granted Saskatchewan the interim relief it sought, including injunctive relief preventing the agency from interfering with Saskatchewan’s provision of child and family services on reserve or providing those services itself.

Case Watch for June 2016

Posted on by
Reply

 FROM OUR PUBLICATIONS DESK

Case Watch

The following decisions came across our desk over the past month:

R v TJD, 2016 MBCA 67: Leave to appeal was granted by the Manitoba Court of Appeal in the sentencing of a young person under Manitoba’s Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA), the appeal was allowed and the sentence was varied. The Crown candidly conceded that various aspects of the sentence were illegal, or that the sentencing judge otherwise erred in principle, including with respect to the judge’s failure to consider relevant Gladue factors in imposing a sentence on this young person, who was of either Métis or Cree ancestry.

Calaheson v Gift Lake Metis Settlement, 2016 ABCA 185: The Alberta Court of Appeal allowed an appeal from part of an order of the Court of Queen’s Bench declaring the Gift Lake Metis Settlement General Election held in October 2013 invalid and vacating the election of three councillors. The appellant challenged the Order’s failure to declare a further position vacant, that of the respondent Dave Lamouche. The Court of Appeal held that this position should have also been vacated in the complex and unique circumstances of the contentious election at issue.

Re Gray, 2016 CanLII 38311 (ON OCCO): The Office of the Chief Coroner for Ontario released a verdict explanation for the inquest into the death of Brian Gray. Mr. Gray died in the custody of police during an armed stand off on Lac Seul First Nation in 2010, making an inquest mandatory. The jury’s recommendations from the inquest included: more funding and training for mental health and addictions services for Lac Seul, a review of the resourcing for the Lac Seul Police Service with a view to increasing police services for Lac Seul, funding for a certified mental health counsellor, additional mental health workers and training for existing workers in Lac Seul, among others.

R v Halkett, 2016 SKPC 65: The Saskatchewan Provincial Court applied Gladue factors in sentencing an Aboriginal man who was found guilty of sexual assault against a cellmate in an RCMP station “drunk tank” to an 18-month conditional sentence followed by a two-year term of probation. The Court noted that in Saskatchewan, where Aboriginal people represent roughly 16% of the population, they account for roughly 77% of the province’s 2014-2015 admissions into adult correctional centres. After reviewing the individual’s Gladue factors, the Court held that the accused would be “apt to find more success in his home community than he would in jail”.

Rice c Agence du revenu du Québec, 2016 QCCA 1077: The Quebec Court of Appeal dismissed a petition for an order to stay the execution of its April 2016 judgment in this matter while the petitioners seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. The petitioners are Mohawks of Kahnawake with status under the Indian Act that reside and carry on business on reserve operating gas stations and retail outlets. They are challenging tax assessments for having failed to charge taxes against their customers, regardless of whether these customers had “Indian” status or not. They have so far been unsuccessful. The Court of Appeal accepted that their arguments for challenging their tax collection and remittance obligations, which are now largely based on the Royal Proclamation of 1763, are serious questions to be tried. However, the petitioners failed to establish serious or irreparable harm in the absence of a stay.

Malcolm v Fort McMurray First Nation, 2016 FC 672: The Federal Court dismissed an application for judicial review of three decisions on applications for membership in the Fort McMurray First Nation. At issue was whether the applicants needed to register for status under the Indian Act before their membership applications could proceed. The Court interpreted Fort McMurray’s Membership Code as requiring confirmation of registration under the Indian Act before the applications could be processed and upheld the Membership Clerk’s decision.

R v Rich, NLTD(G) 87: The Newfoundland and Labrador Supreme Court allowed an application from the Crown for review of an order granting judicial interim release to Mr. Rich. Among other things, the Supreme Court held that the Provincial Court judge erred in his application of the Supreme Court of Canada’s Gladue and Ipeelee decisions. The Supreme Court found no reference to either decision or the fact that Mr. Rich was Aboriginal in the interim release decision. The Supreme Court found that the court below had incorrectly held that being an Aboriginal person was a factor in favour of judicial interim release without any evidence of the particular Aboriginal background of Mr. Rich. The Court stated that “case-specific information regarding the particular Aboriginal offender” is essential in order to apply Gladue and Ipeelee; they cannot be applied “in a vacuum”.

R v Menicoche, 2016 YKCA 7: The Yukon Court of Appeal allowed an appeal from a sentence of 23 months’ imprisonment for sexual assault. The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge failed to give genuine effect to the Aboriginal status of the appellant. It found that the sentencing judge failed to consider any alternative to a lengthy territorial jail term despite being familiar with the appellant’s compelling Gladue factors that were set out in the pre-sentence report. The sentence was reduced by six months.

2403177 Ontario Inc v Bending Lake Iron Group Ltd, 2016 ONCA 485: The Ontario Court of Appeal rejected an application for leave to appeal from an Approval and Vesting Order in relation to the moving party’s receivership. Among other things, the moving party argued that the Court of Appeal judge who made that order failed to consider whether the receiver discharged its obligation to consult with “affected Aboriginal communities” in approving a sale agreement arising from the receivership. This duty to consult argument was rejected on the basis that it should have been fully canvassed earlier in the proceedings.

Sarrazin c Canada (AG), 2016 QCCS 2458: The Quebec Superior Court certified a class action on behalf of a group of approximately 45,000 people who were deprived of status under the Indian Act based on discriminatory provisions. In its 2009 McIvor decision the BC Court of Appeal held that section 6 of the Indian Act infringed upon certain individuals’ right to equality under section 15 of the Charter. As a result of this decision, section 6 of the Indian Act was amended through Bill C-3 in 2010. This class action seeks compensation for the individuals who gained status under Bill C-3 on the basis that they were deprived of various forms of financial support under the Indian Act between 1985 and 2011 that they would have otherwise been entitled to were it not for the discriminatory provisions struck down in McIvor and removed through Bill C-3.

R v Laboucane, 2016 ABCA 176: The Alberta Court of Appeal dismissed a sentencing appeal brought on various grounds, including the ground that the sentencing judge disregarded the 30-page Gladue report provided on Mr. Laboucane, which the sentencing judge found had failed to disclose any meaningful Gladue factors to consider. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument and found that Mr. Laboucane had a “predominately stable and supportive upbringing and background” that did not mitigate his culpability. The Alberta Court of Appeal also went out of its way to criticize the Ontario Court of Appeal’s recent decision in R v Kreko, addressing an Aboriginal offender who was adopted by a non-Aboriginal family, suggesting that it expanded the level of generality in the application of Gladue factors “almost to a level of pure ethnicity”.

R v Chocolate, 2015 NWTSC 28: The Northwest Territories Supreme Court granted judicial interim release to Mr. Chocolate. The Crown in this case argued that Gladue factors are only relevant to the tertiary ground for detention under section 515(10) of the Criminal Code on the basis that Gladue factors are only relevant to questions of sentencing, and do not extend to questions of whether detention is required to ensure the accused attends at trial or whether the public is protected. The Court rejected this argument and found that Gladue factors were relevant to all three grounds for detention.

Robertson v The Queen, 2015 TCC 219: An official English translation of this 2015 decision of the Tax Court of Canada was released this month in which the Tax Court dismissed an appeal from a reassessment. The appellant is a member of the Mashteuiatsh Montagnais Band (Pointe-Bleu) with status under the Indian Act who operates a fur manufacturing and sales business. In disputing an assessment for GST, penalties and interest against his business, Mr. Robertson asserted an Aboriginal right to the fur trade as well as an Aboriginal self-government right in his defence, among other arguments. The Tax Court found that there was no right to engage in the fur trade in the manner that the appellant was engaged in this industry. It recognized the right of the Montagnais to engage in the fur trade but held that this must be limited to the sale of raw furs of trapped animals, noting that raw fur sales were non-taxable. The Tax Court also recognized the Montagnais du Lac Saint-Jean have an Aboriginal right to management of hunting, fishing and trapping territories within their jurisdiction, but held that this right could not give them exclusive authority over taxation of business transactions in their territory “since this would violate Crown sovereignty”. While the Tax Court recognized these Aboriginal rights it held that they were not prima facie violated by the Excise Tax Act.

First Nation of Nacho Nyak Dun v Yukon (SCC file 36779): The First Nation of Nacho Nyak Dun was granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada from the Yukon Court of Appeal decision in relation to a dispute over land use planning for the Peel watershed under the terms of modern treaty agreements for the region.

Hughboy v Oujé-Bougoumou Cree Nation, 2016 QCCQ 4544: The Court of Quebec dismissed an application for advance costs in relation to a challenge to the results of a 2015 election for the Oujé-Bougoumou Cree Nation. The Court held that there was prima facie merit to Mr. Hughboy’s case. However, it found there were no special circumstances of public importance in support of making such an exceptional order and that Mr. Hughboy failed to prove that his financial circumstances were such that he could not proceed with his case without such an order being made.

R v McDonald, 2016 NUCA 4: The Nunavut Court of Appeal allowed an appeal from a sentence for Ms. McDonald’s breach of a Conditional Sentence Order (CSO) that resulted in her being sent back to prison. Among other issues, the Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge had failed to give meaningful consideration to Ms. McDonald’s Gladue factors. The Court held that Gladue factors must be considered in every case involving an Aboriginal offender unless the offender waives this right. The sentencing judge erred in assuming that Gladue factors were adequately addressed into the original CSO and they ought to have been considered afresh at the CSO breach hearing.

Children’s Aid Society of Halton Region v MM, 2016 ONCJ 323: The Ontario Court of Justice released a decision addressing whether three children are “Indian” or “native persons” for the purposes of the Child and Family Services Act. This determination dictates whether the children have access to unique benefits, special treatment and special considerations not otherwise available under the Act. The Court noted that no previous decision in Ontario directly discussed the facts necessary to support a finding that children meet these definitions and therefore set out to provide such an analytical framework, including guiding principles.