Tag Archives: Human Rights

Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v Canada (AG), 2018 SCC 31

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Appeal dismissed. Tribunal decisions stand that the complaints were a direct attack on legislation. Legislation not a service under the Canadian Human Rights Act.

This appeal concerns several complaints alleging that Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (“INAC”) engaged in a discriminatory practice in the provision of services contrary to Section 5 of the Canadian Human Rights Act (“CHRA”). This section prohibits, among other things, the making of discriminatory distinctions in the provision of services customarily available to the general public. The Indian Act, since its enactment in 1876, has governed the recognition of an individual’s status as an “Indian”. The Indian Act has a registration system under which individuals qualify for this status on the basis of an exhaustive list of eligibility criteria. It is incontrovertible that status confers both tangible and intangible benefits. INAC denied a form of registration under the Indian Act that the complainants would have been entitled to if past discriminatory policies, now repealed, had not been enacted.

In two separate decisions, Matson v Canada (Indian and Northern Affairs), 2013 CHRT 13 and Andrews v Canada (Indian and Northern Affairs), 2013 CHRT 21 (“Andrews”), the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal (“Tribunal”) determined that the complaints were a direct attack on the Indian Act. On the basis that legislation is not a service under the CHRA, it dismissed the complaints. On judicial review, both the Federal Court ([2015] 3 CNLR 1) and the Federal Court of Appeal ([2016] 4 CNLR 1), found that the Tribunal decisions were reasonable and should be upheld. Two issues were before this Court: (1) whether deference is owed to a human rights tribunal interpreting its home statute and (2) whether the Tribunal’s decisions dismissing the complaints as direct attacks on legislation were reasonable.

On the first issue, where an administrative body interprets its home statute, there is a well-established presumption that the reasonableness standard applies. In applying the standard of review analysis, there is no principled difference between a human rights tribunal and any other decision maker interpreting its home statute. Where an administrative body interprets its home statute, the reasonableness standard applies Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 (“Dunsmuir”). In both of its decisions, the Tribunal was called upon to characterize the complaints before it and ascertain whether a discriminatory practice had been made out under the CHRA. This falls squarely within the presumption of deference. The Tribunal clearly had the authority to hear a complaint about a discriminatory practice, and the question of what falls within the meaning of “services” is no more exceptional than questions previously found by the Court not to be true questions of jurisdiction.

A contextual analysis would not rebut the presumption in this case. Where the presumption of reasonableness applies, the contextual approach should be applied sparingly in order to avoid uncertainty and endless litigation concerning the standard of review analysis. The presumption of reasonableness was intended to prevent litigants from undertaking a full standard of review analysis in every case. This Court may eventually find it necessary to revisit the standard of review framework. However, dissatisfaction with the current state of the law is no reason to ignore the precedents following Dunsmuir. Where a contextual analysis may be justified to rebut the presumption, it need not be a long and detailed one. Changes to “foundational legal tests” are not clear indicators of legislative intent, and do not warrant the application of the contextual approach or, by extension, correctness review. Nor does the absence of a privative clause, the fact that other administrative tribunals may consider the CHRA, the potential for conflicting lines of authority, or the nature of the question at issue and the purpose of the Tribunal.

On the second issue, the adjudicators reasonably concluded that the complaints before them were properly characterized as direct attacks on legislation, and that legislation in general did not fall within the meaning of “services”. Although human rights tribunals have taken various approaches to making a distinction between administrative services and legislation, this is a question of mixed fact and law squarely within their expertise, and they are best situated to develop an approach to making such distinctions.

The adjudicator in Andrews noted that the sui generis nature of Parliament’s power to legislate is inconsistent with the characterization of law-making as a public service and that law-making does not have the transitive connotation necessary to identify a service customarily offered to the public. Parliament is not a service provider and was not providing a service when it enacted the registration provisions of the Indian Act. Law-making is unlike any of the other terms listed in s 5 as it does not resemble a good, facility or accommodation. It is sui generis in its nature. This is confirmed by the powers, privileges and immunities that Parliament and the Legislatures possess to ensure their proper functioning, which are rooted in the Constitution. The dignity, integrity and efficient functioning of the Legislature is preserved through parliamentary privilege which, once established, is afforded constitutional status and is immune from review. The disposition of this appeal, however, says nothing as to whether the Indian Act infringes the rights of the complainants under s 15 of the Charter. In this regard, there have been two successful challenges to the Indian Act registration provisions, both of which have prompted legislative reform (Descheneaux v Canada (Attorney General) [2016] 2 CNLR 175 (QCCS); McIvor v Canada (Indian and Northern Affairs, Registrar), [2009] 2 CNLR 236 (BCCA).

Furthermore, Parliament can be distinguished from the administrative decision makers that operate under legislative authority. These individuals and statutory bodies, which include the Registrar, may be “service providers”, or entities that provide services customarily available to the general public. If they use their statutory discretion in a manner that effectively denies access to a service or makes an adverse differentiation on the basis of a prohibited ground, s 5 will be engaged. But, when their job is simply to apply legislated criteria, the challenge is not to the provision of services, but to the legislation itself (Public Service Alliance of Canada v Canada Revenue Agency, 2012 FCA 7). The complaints did not impugn the means by which the Registrar had processed their applications, but substantively targeted the eligibility criteria that the Registrar was required to apply. Both Tribunal decisions stand on their own merits.

Case Watch for November 2016

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The following decisions came across our desk over the past month:

Equality rights of Métis children & families in child protection –

Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton v GH, 2016 ONSC 6287: The Ontario Superior Court of Justice released a decision in a Crown wardship application where it was found that the definitions of “Indian”, “Native person”, and “Native child” in Ontario’s Child and Family Services Act were invalid on the basis that they unjustifiably infringe s 15 of the Charter. The Court found that the impugned definitions do not extend to all individuals who self-identify as being Aboriginal. In fact, all parties conceded that they do not extend to Métis children. The Court also found that the Act afforded significant special protections for individuals falling into these definitions at every stage of a child protection intervention. The Court recognized that all Aboriginal peoples, including Métis, have been subject to a legacy of prejudice, stereotyping, and disadvantage. With this context in mind, the Court determined that the definitions created distinctions based on the analogous ground of “Aboriginality without membership in a community designated as “Native” under the [Act]”. It also concluded that these distinctions created or perpetuated disadvantage for Métis children and their families due to their inability to access the special protections under the Act. In conducting this analysis, the Court noted that the Act clearly created these unfair and objectionable disadvantages on its face and this could be discerned through logical reasoning alone. There was no need for social science evidence and empirical data. As no s 1 argument was advanced, the infringement was not saved. A suspended declaration of invalidity was issued and it was ordered that the Métis child in this case be treated as if he were an Indian, Native person or Native child within the meaning of the Act.

Inadequate investigation of vote-buying allegations by INAC –

Good v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FC 1272: The Federal Court released a decision allowing in part an application for judicial review of INAC’s dismissal of an election appeal under the Indian Act. The applicant first unsuccessfully sought to appeal the March 2014 election of the Red Pheasant First Nation through INAC based on allegations of misconduct by the electoral officer and corruption in the form of vote-buying. She then sought judicial review of INAC’s rejection of that appeal. However, a subsequent election had since taken place in March 2016. The Court found that INAC’s delegate erred by choosing to dispense with any investigation of the applicant’s vote-buying allegations and proceeding to dismiss the appeal on the basis that corruption had not been proven on a balance of probabilities. The Court noted that this approach appears to have become settled practice within INAC’s Elections Unit. While the Court was sympathetic to INAC’s desire to streamline its management of appeals, it had significantly changed the very nature of the appeals process in a manner tantamount to attempting to amend the law via internal policy. The Court took no issue with how the delegate addressed the issue of electoral officer misconduct, but found that the delegate’s refusal to investigate conflicting evidence on vote-buying was unreasonable, based upon an error of law and procedurally unfair. While these issues were moot due to the subsequent election, the Court exercised its discretion to deal with the central controversy between the parties as roughly 40% of First Nations hold elections under the regime at issue in this case.

Relevance of Aboriginal equity stake to remedy in consultation case –

Michipicoten First Nation v Ontario (Minister of Natural Resources and Forests), 2016 ONSC 6899: The Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed an application for judicial review of provincial approvals for the Bow Lake Wind Farm Project on the shared traditional territory of the Michipicoten and Batchewana First Nations in northeastern Ontario. Michipicoten argued that the Crown breached its duty to consult and sought to quash the approvals, preclude further approvals until more consultation takes place, and have the court remain seized of remedies or order removal of the infrastructure, remediation of the lands, and costs. The Court noted that Michipicoten had inexplicably delayed several months in pursuing and perfecting its application for judicial review, which caused the proponent and Batchewana, which has a 50% interest in the project, serious harm. For this reason, the Court dismissed the application on its own motion. In the alternative, the Court went on to conclude that consultation was adequate as Michipicoten failed to provide any evidence of potential adverse impacts on its Aboriginal or treaty rights in spite of many requests to do so. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the remedy sought in terms of decommissioning the project was inappropriate. Michipicoten argued that a proponent’s commercial interests may not come into play in determining the balance of convenience in a consultation dispute between the Crown and an Aboriginal community. However, the Court found this principle inapplicable in this case since Batchewana would face irreparable harm if the relief sought was granted.

Validity of a Will under the Indian Act not providing for spouse –

Poitras v Khan, 2016 SKQB 346: The Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench allowed an application for letters probate under a Will created pursuant the Indian Act. The testator met the man who became her husband and married him after she had already made her Will. Under provincial legislation, the testator’s spousal relationship would have automatically revoked her Will. However, the testator was a status Indian living on reserve and there was no such provision under the Indian Act to invalidate her Will automatically. Under the Indian Act, the Minister had the power to declare the Will void if it imposed hardship on persons to whom the testator had responsibility or was contrary to the interests of the band or the public. In this case, the Minister had referred the matter to the Court, conferring its power to declare the Will void on the Court. The testator’s husband, Mr. Khan, sought to invoke this power on the basis that he was not provided for in the Will. The Court confirmed the validity of the Will, but also noted that Mr. Khan could still potentially seek a claim for one half of the testator’s family property accrued from the date of marriage until death under provincial legislation.

Canadian Human Rights Tribunal’s jurisdictional limits re: Indian Act –

Beattie v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FC 1328: The Federal Court dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal where a complaint was dismissed as being solely a challenge to legislation beyond the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The applicant, Mr. Beattie, sought to register two leases and an assignment of lease in the Indian Lands Registry. The Registrar rejected the applications on the basis that the leases did not include the Crown as a party and no ministerial approval had been provided. Since the leases could not be registered, the assignment could not be registered either. As a result of this decision, the applicants brought a complaint to the Tribunal alleging that the respondent had discriminated against them on the basis of their race, national or ethnic origin by denying a service customarily available to the public. The Tribunal dismissed the complaints on the basis that they were beyond its jurisdiction since they were challenging the Indian Act itself, which obliged the Registrar to reject the leases and assignment. The Court was satisfied that the Tribunal’s decision was reasonable and it was reasonable to rely on other Federal Court and Tribunal decisions where such challenges to legislation were dismissed as beyond the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The Court also rejected the applicants’ assertion that title to the reserve lands at issue in this dispute were vested in an individual pursuant to either a Certificate of Possession or customary tenure.

Court’s duty to explicitly consider & inquire into Gladue factors –

R v Park, 2016 MBCA 107: The Manitoba Court of Appeal allowed an appeal from sentence for impaired driving and drug possession due in part to the sentencing judge’s failure to adequately consider Gladue factors. It was conceded that defence counsel during the sentencing hearing did not address Gladue factors other than to note that the accused was Aboriginal. No Gladue report was ordered. The Crown argued that defence counsel expressly waived the Gladue rights of the accused whereas counsel for the accused on appeal argued that the Court had a duty to make further inquiry when no advocacy was provided on Gladue factors during sentencing. The Court of Appeal found there was no express waiver in this case. Defence counsel at sentencing acknowledged there were Gladue factors but focused on other arguments. A waiver must be express and clear. Both defence and Crown counsel have an obligation to bring forward Gladue information. Where that does not happen, the Court may need to go further and has a duty to at least make further inquiries. The Court must also make explicit its consideration of Gladue factors and its determination that it has adequate information on those factors before it. It is unsatisfactory for both the offender and the public to have to infer such circumstances were properly considered. The sentencing judge failed to expressly confirm that Gladue factors were considered and failed to clarify defence’s reliance on Gladue, which in turn had an impact on the sentence. The sentence was varied.

No need for ‘linkage’ between Gladue factors & offence –

R v Predham, 2016 ABCA 371: The Alberta Court of Appeal allowed an appeal from sentence with respect to convictions for driving while disqualified, breach of recognizance, failure to appear and possession of a stolen licence plate. The appellant argued that the sentencing judge erred in failing to give appropriate weight to his Gladue factors, among other things. In particular, the appellant took issue with the sentencing judge’s reasons where it was suggested that Gladue factors were less relevant to the offence of driving while disqualified in the absence of alcohol, drugs or violence. The sentencing judge stated that there must be “some relationship between the Gladue factors and the offending in order for there to be that sort of linkage”. The Court of Appeal held that it was an error of law to require a linkage between Gladue factors and the offending conduct. The Court stated that it is also an error to carve out a certain category of offences as being immune from the Gladue analysis. The Court was also satisfied that the sentencing judge’s error influenced his ultimate decision. The sentence was varied.

Injunction against Cleveland baseball team’s name & logo denied –

Cardinal v Major League Baseball, 2016 ONSC 6929: The Ontario Superior Court issued its reasons for dismissing an urgent interim injunction application to restrain the Cleveland baseball team, Rogers Communications, and Major League Baseball (MLB) from displaying the team’s name or logo during a game in Toronto and while the underlying federal and provincial human rights complaints proceed. In the underlying complaints, the applicant, Douglas J. Cardinal, is alleging that the use of the team’s name and logo constitutes prohibited discrimination and harassment against him on the grounds of race, ancestry, colour, ethnic and national origins, and constitutes a publication or display intended to incite infringement of the Ontario Human Rights Code. The Court held that it had jurisdiction over the application, rejecting MLB’s argument that it ought to allow the United States Supreme Court to determine the underlying issues in this case based on principles of comity. The Court was also satisfied that the parties raised serious issues to be tried in terms of whether a service had been offered and whether the team’s name and/or logo offend the provisions of federal and Ontario human rights legislation, as well as the relevance of MLB’s freedom of expression to the dispute. However, the Court did not accept the applicant’s assertion that he would sustain irreparable harm if an injunction was not granted, noting that damages were available and disputes over use of the impugned name and logo have been ongoing for years. The Court noted that the applicant sought a change to the status quo and his last minute application, if granted, would materially prejudice the respondents. The issue of delay went to both the question or irreparable harm and the balance of convenience.

Settlement approved in Newfoundland & Labrador school claims –

Anderson v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 NLTD(G) 179: The Newfoundland and Labrador Supreme Court approved the terms of a $50 million settlement in a class action brought by Aboriginal individuals who attended schools, dormitories or orphanages in the province between 1949 and 1980. The plaintiffs claimed that Canada breached a fiduciary duty to the students who attended these facilities to protect them from actionable physical or mental harm. The Court was satisfied that the settlement was fair, reasonable, made in good faith, and in the best interests of the class as a whole. It was also satisfied that the fees and disbursements of the plaintiffs’ counsel were fair and reasonable. The settlement includes both General Compensation Payments for years that students resided at the facilities at issue, and Abuse Compensation Payments that depend on the harm individual students suffered. The settlement provides for a confidential paper-based claims process and Canada is committed to funding mutually agreeable commemoration and healing initiatives over and above its compensation funding.

Tax Court’s exclusive jurisdiction over tax assessment challenges –

Horseman v Canada, 2016 FCA 252: The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from a decision to strike the appellant’s claims as falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Court of Canada. The appellant received a Notice of Assessment and Requirement to Pay $59,000.06 of outstanding GST. He initiated this Federal Court action for a declaration that the Requirement to Pay is null and void and contrary to the Indian Act, Treaty No. 8, and s 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The Court found that this challenge was properly characterized as an indirect challenge to a tax assessment, making it plain and obvious that the Tax Court had exclusive jurisdiction. The Tax Court has jurisdiction to consider the constitutional validity, applicability or operability of federal legislation and regulations and can issue remedies if a notice of constitutional question is properly served. It is also well-established that the Tax Court can determine claims under s 87 of the Indian Act over the applicability of tax requirements, or involving tax exemption claims under Treaty No. 8. Such assertions are properly tested in the Tax Court.

Provincial human rights tribunal’s jurisdictional limits re band store –

Dinsmore v Slenyah Store, 2016 BCHRT 176: The British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal dismissed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination in the area of employment on the basis of colour or race with respect to a business in Fraser Lake, British Columbia known as the Slenyah Store. The business was operated by the Stellat’en First Nation up until April 2014. The majority of its customers are status Indians who are able to purchase gas and cigarettes at tax exempt rates there. In 2013, the store was in serious financial difficulty. It was kept afloat via overdraft protection from Stellat’en and Stellat’en paid the store’s back taxes to get it out of its financial difficulties. In 2014, the store was incorporated to be operated at arm’s length through a limited partnership. As a result of these changes, all the store’s employees were laid off by Stellat’en and encouraged to reapply for positions with the limited partnership that would operate the store going forward. The Tribunal found that while the store was operated by Stellat’en it was an integral part of the First Nation’s overall governance and operations. Its purpose was to permit members to avail themselves of their tax-free status, it was financially integrated with the First Nation, its employees were employees of the First Nation, and its operations were continuously concerned with the status, rights and privileges of Stellat’en’s members. As a result, the store fell under federal jurisdiction and outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction while it was operated by Stellat’en. While operated at arm’s length through a limited partnership, however, the store was a provincial undertaking subject to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The Tribunal went on to dismiss the complaint against both entities on the ground that it had no reasonable prospect of success if it were to proceed on its merits.

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This Case Watch blog post has been brought to you by the Native Law Centre in partnership with Pro Bono Students Canada – University of Saskatchewan

Case Watch for July 2016

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 FROM OUR PUBLICATIONS DESK

Case Watch

The following decisions came across our desk over the past month:

Crown’s duty to consult –

Gitxaala Nation v Canada, 2016 FCA 187: The Federal Court of Appeal quashed the Order in Council and Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity for the Northern Gateway pipeline project that was proposed to be constructed between Bruderheim, Alberta and Kitimat, British Columbia. The Court found that the federal Crown’s consultation on the project fell “well short of the minimum standards prescribed by the Supreme Court in its jurisprudence”. Among other issues, the Crown failed to engage in a respectful and meaningful dialogue on the First Nations applicants’ asserted Aboriginal title and governance rights, instead choosing to restrict itself to the discussion of mitigation of environmental impacts as a form of accommodation. The Crown also failed to provide any reasons for its conclusion that its duty to consult and accommodate had been met prior to issuing the Order in Council.

Pimicikamak Cree Nation v Manitoba, 2016 MBQB 128: The Court of Queen’s Bench of Manitoba dismissed Pimicikamak Cree Nation’s application for judicial review of the provincial Crown’s decision to enter into a settlement agreement with Manitoba Hydro and the Incorporated Community Council of Cross Lake. One issue in the litigation was the concern raised by Pimicikamak, representing the traditional government of the Cross Lake Cree, that the Cross Lake community (a municipality made up primarily of Aboriginal people) was not a collective entity capable of representing Aboriginal people or settling their claims, and was fragmenting the Aboriginal people in the area. The Court rejected Pimicikamak’s arguments that Crown consultation on the settlement agreement started too late, was not meaningful or sufficient, and foreclosed accommodation. The Court also upheld the Crown’s decision not to entertain changes to the agreement that Pimicikamak proposed, finding that Pimicikamak was attempting to negotiate in a way that would cause the Crown to abandon the settlement agreement it had negotiated in principle with other parties.

Sipekne’katik v Nova Scotia (Environment), 2016 NSSC 178: In the underlying matter, Sipekne’katik has appealed the Crown’s approval of a natural gas storage facility at Fort Ellis, Nova Scotia, alleging that the provincial Crown breached its duty to consult and failed to provide the First Nation with procedural fairness with respect to the project’s approval. In this case, Sipekne’katik applied for a stay of the approval pending its appeal. The Supreme Court of Nova Scotia rejected Sipekne’katik’s application on the basis that Sipekne’katik failed to provide sufficient evidence of irreparable harm. Among other things, the Court held that the project had mitigation measures in place designed to reduce or avoid any adverse impacts, and there was insufficient evidence of irreparable harm to the Crown’s ability to engage in meaningful consultation if the stay was not granted.

Limitation on human rights jurisdiction –

Canadian Human Rights Commission v Canada, 2016 FCA 200: The Federal Court of Appeal upheld the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal’s dismissal of two complaints regarding section 6 of the Indian Act, which prevents the complainants from registering their children under the Act. The complaints were dismissed on the basis that the Federal Court of Appeal had already previously concluded that federal human rights legislation does not authorize complaints directed at legislation per se, and the complaints were characterized as just that. While the Court took note of the “sorry state of the case law and its lack of guidance on when decisions of human rights tribunals interpreting provisions in human rights legislation will be afforded deference”, it concluded that the tribunal’s decisions ought to be reviewed on a standard of reasonableness. It then determined that the dismissals were reasonable.

Federal Court jurisdiction –

Dickson v Canada, 2016 FC 836: The Federal Court allowed an appeal from an order striking certain defendants from the statement of claim in an action for damages over the Minister of National Revenue’s refusal to renew a federal tobacco manufacturing licence. The claim was originally struck as against all defendants except the federal Crown on the basis that the liability of the other defendants was grounded in provincial law. On appeal, however, the Court held that the plaintiffs’ claim against several of these defendants was “in pith and substance” based on federal law and governed by a detailed federal statutory framework essential to the outcome of the case – namely, the Indian Act.

Proper factual basis for Charter litigation –

Re Constitutionality of Abegweit First Nation Custom Election Rules, 2016 FC 750: The Federal Court addressed an application for a reference under s 18.3 of the Federal Courts Act regarding the constitutionality of Abegweit First Nation’s custom election rules in terms of its treatment of off reserve members. More specifically, Chief and Council were seeking a declaration that restrictions against off reserve members voting or running in the First Nation’s custom elections were contrary to the right to equality under s 15 of the Charter. In 2009, council attempted to amend the custom rules restricting off reserve members from participating in elections to bring them in line with new jurisprudence on this issue, but the amendments were rejected in a plebiscite vote. The Court held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine this matter because it did not originate from any ongoing proceeding and there was no proper factual basis to determine the Charter issue.

Kikino Metis Settlement v Husky Oil Operations Ltd, 2016 ABCA 228: The Alberta Court of Appeal determined an application for permission to appeal an order of the Metis Settlements Appeal Tribunal Land Access Panel in relation to annual compensation rates for surface lease sites. The Court granted leave to appeal from the Panel on three grounds in relation to statutory interpretation of the Metis Settlements Act. However, the Court denied Kikino the opportunity to appeal from the Panel on the ground that s 125 of the Act infringes s 15 of the Charter. Kikino sought to compare the timeline for compensation reviews under the Metis Settlements Act with the comparable provisions of the Surface Rights Act for the purposes of its Charter argument. The Court found that there was no proper factual foundation to address the Charter argument on appeal.

Gladue factors –

R v Fehr, 2016 SKPC 87: The Saskatchewan Provincial Court addressed Gladue factors in context to the sentencing of an Aboriginal offender for robbery. Among other factors, the Court noted that Ms. Fehr had been apprehended at the age of 3, and lived in 13 different foster homes between the ages of 3 and 5 before being adopted at age 5 by a Caucasian family, along with her two sisters. In taking note of Ms. Fehr’s Gladue factors, the Court noted that she was “raised by a loving family not of her own culture” and “separated from her [A]boriginal community”. In the Court’s view, “Native children raised by non-[N]ative families face unique challenges of identity, community, and social development”.

R v Robinson, 2016 BCSC 1269: The British Columbia Supreme Court addressed Gladue factors in context to the sentencing of an Aboriginal offender for breaking and entering and mischief. The Court found that Mr. Robinson was adopted when he was seven months old, raised in a “non-[A]boriginal” setting, and had only limited interaction with his biological mother and First Nations community of origin. The Court held that the Supreme Court of Canada’s concerns in the cases of R v Gladue and R v Ipeelee were relevant but “attenuated in Mr. Robinson’s circumstances”.

R v Joe, 2016 YKTC 31: The Yukon Territorial Court addressed Gladue factors in context to an Aboriginal offender’s refusal to comply with a breathalyzer demand, among other charges. The Court noted that it “had the benefit of a thorough, detailed and reliable [Gladue] Report” and the “background of this particular offender [was] rife with Gladue factors”. Among other things, Mr. Joe had endured sexual and physical abuse during ten years that he spent in “one of the more repressive and brutal residential schools in Canada”. Nevertheless, the Court held that Mr. Joe “should have almost no particular consideration afforded to him as an [A]boriginal offender” and that the relevance of Gladue in this case was “infinitesimal in and of itself”. The Court also stated it had no evidence before it that Aboriginal offenders are over-represented in jail on account of drinking and driving offences.

Limitation on admissibility of Gladue report –

R v Alec, 2016 BCCA 282: The British Columbia Court of Appeal heard an appeal from an Aboriginal offender’s conviction for second degree murder in which the appellant sought to set aside his guilty plea on the grounds that it was invalid and his conviction was a miscarriage of justice. In arguing his appeal, Mr. Alec sought to adduce fresh evidence in the form of a Gladue report addressing the concept of ‘Aboriginal fatalism’ to explain his failure to make a timely application to set aside his plea. Mr. Alec’s appeal was dismissed and the Court of Appeal raised several concerns with the way in which the Gladue report was relied upon in this appeal: it was not in an admissible form and the portion relied upon was entirely hearsay; the portion relied upon constituted opinion evidence that could only be admitted through a qualified expert, which the author was not; and the report was not found to be relevant to the validity of the guilty plea at issue.

Use of actuarial risk assessment tools for Aboriginal offenders –

R v Haley, 2016 BCSC 1144: The British Columbia Supreme Court addressed a Crown application to have an Aboriginal offender designated a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate period of incarceration in a federal penitentiary. Among other arguments, Mr. Haley raised the Federal Court’s 2015 decision in Ewert v Canada, where it was found that the same actuarial risk assessment tools applied to Mr. Haley “are susceptible to cultural bias and therefore are unreliable” in context to Aboriginal offenders. The Court upheld use of these same tests for the following reasons: the Crown’s expert evidence was not based exclusively on the use of these tools, but rather on a more broad-based and comprehensive reflection on all available information; the Crown’s expert testified that her opinion would not change even if she factored out any reliance on the contested tools; the evidentiary record was different from that in Ewert in terms of the reliability of the tools; and the context was different in this case, as sentencing courts addressing dangerous offender applications  “should be given access to the widest possible range of information in order to determine whether there is a serious risk to public safety”.

R v Awasis, 2016 BCPC 219: The British Columbia Provincial Court addressed the application of actuarial risk assessment tools to Aboriginal offenders in context to a dangerous offender application raised during a sentencing hearing for two counts of sexual assault. The Court distinguished the Federal Court’s findings in Ewert on the basis that in this case the actuarial tools were only used “as a very small part of a wide ranging consideration of Mr. Awasis’ psychological make-up, his antecedents, and his future prospects”, as part of “a contextual and individual review of Mr. Awasis’ risk level”. The Court held that the findings in Ewert were “part of a decision of another trial court respecting quite different issues than those that arise in the case at bar”.

Spousal support security over reserve land –

McMurter v McMurter, 2016 ONSC 1225: The Ontario Superior Court of Justice addressed whether a spousal support order could be secured against a support payor whose significant assets are located on land subject to the provisions of the Indian Act. Both the support payor, Mr. McMurter, and payee, Mrs. McMurter, are members of the Mohawks of the Bay of Quinte and live on reserve. While s 29 of the Act  prohibits the seizure of reserve land by a “non-Indian”, s 89 provides an exception for seizures in favour of another “Indian” or “band”. The Court granted Mrs. McMurter an order to charge and lien the Certificates of Possession held by Mr. McMurter as security for a spousal support order, subject to approval by the Mohawks of the Bay of Quinte and the Minister of Indigenous Affairs, which is required by the Act.

Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement –

Fontaine v Canada, 2016 ONSC 4326: The Ontario Superior Court of Justice addressed a request for directions arising from the rejection of the claimant’s application for compensation for his undisputed sexual abuse at the Spanish Boys’ Residential School. The adjudicator had dismissed the application on the basis that the sexual assaults occurred after the school had closed, and this decision was subsequently upheld on review and re-review. In preparation for its response to the request for directions, Canada found documents undermining the adjudicator’s conclusion and those documents were brought to the Court’s attention. The Court held that the adjudicator made a palpable and overriding error of fact that the review adjudicator and re-review adjudicator failed to correct. The Court substituted its own decision on the merits of the claim rather than remitting the matter to be redetermined, finding in favour of the claimant.

Fontaine v Canada, 2016 ONSC 4328: The Ontario Superior Court of Justice revisited “the bedevilling problems of documentary disclosure for the [Independent Assessment Process] claims for the St. Anne’s Indian Residential School and for Bishop Horden Indian Residential School”. The Court found that the request for directions in this case was aimed at having the court order a new hearing for one of the claimants based on a revised record, and re-open many if not all claims for St. Anne’s and other residential schools. The Court also suggested that counsel for the claimant was attempting to use the request “as a public commission of inquiry about the integrity of the IAP process”. The Court granted the claimant confidentiality orders as preliminary relief but adjourned other preliminary matters raised by the claimant as the review process had not yet been exhausted for his claim.

Fontaine v Canada, 2016 BCSC 1306: The British Columbia Supreme Court addressed a request for directions from the Merchant Law Group (MLG), which sought to retain a portion of a client’s award under the Independent Assessment Process to apply to outstanding accounts for other unrelated matters. An agreement between MLG and the client for application of a portion of the award to other accounts was held to violate the settlement agreement, as were the client’s direction that MLG do so. The request was dismissed and MLG was ordered to pay its client the withheld amount forthwith.

Child and Family Services –

Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v LF, 2016 ONSC 4044: The Ontario Superior Court of Justice allowed a motion to set aside the dismissal of an appeal in this matter for delay. The underlying appeal involves a constitutional challenge to statutory definitions in the Child and Family Services Act that limit special considerations for Aboriginal children to a subset of those children that would qualify as Aboriginal under s 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The appellants were given until July 15 to perfect their appeal.

Saskatchewan v Saskatoon Tribal Council Health & Family Services Inc, 2016 SKQB 236: The Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench addressed an application seeking various interim orders to allow the Saskatchewan government to reassert control over child and family services on reserve for First Nations represented by the Saskatoon Tribal Council. In the underlying action, Saskatchewan seeks a declaration that it lawfully terminated an agreement delegating ministerial authority under the Child and Family Services Act to the Saskatoon Tribal Council agency. The Court granted Saskatchewan the interim relief it sought, including injunctive relief preventing the agency from interfering with Saskatchewan’s provision of child and family services on reserve or providing those services itself.